University of Connecticut

OpenCommons@UConn
Doctoral Dissertations

University of Connecticut Graduate School

5-5-2015

State Capacity and Human Rights: Explaining the
Tools of Repression
Benjamin C. Carbonetti
University of Connecticut - Storrs, bcarbonetti@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations
Recommended Citation
Carbonetti, Benjamin C., "State Capacity and Human Rights: Explaining the Tools of Repression" (2015). Doctoral Dissertations. 693.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations/693

State Capacity and Human Rights: Explaining the Tools of Repression
Benjamin C Carbonetti, PhD
University of Connecticut, 2015

State capacity is one of the most invoked but least understood concepts in both
international relations and comparative politics. It is linked to many important outcomes of
interest such as economic growth, civil conflict, inter-state war, environmental management, and
many more. Despite a large amount of informative work on the subject, previous attempts to
measure state capacity lacked conceptual depth and often failed to account for its
multidimensional nature. This has left observers confused about the difference between state
capacity as an explanatory concept and the outcome of interest being explained. Moreover, poor
specification and oversimplification make it impossible to answer the all important question
“capacity to do what?” when utilizing state capacity in analysis. This project seeks to address
these shortcomings in the existent literature by developing a multidimensional measure of state
capacity. Moreover, this dissertation explores the relationship between material factors like
resources, social capital, and geography, and institutional factors like bureaucratic quality, and
infrastructural reach. I find that both material and institutional factors, as well as indicators of
international power are crucial elements of state capacity. This dissertation then examines the
link between state capacity and government respect for human rights, in an effort to show how
governments deploy the tools of repression. To do so, the more nuanced and conceptually valid
measure of state capacity developed herein is tested against 12 of the human rights contained in
the CIRI database including physical integrity rights and empowerment rights. Overall, this
project demonstrates that state capacity is a multidimensional concept, and that the presence or
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absence of high levels of each dimension of state capacity can help explain the strategies of
government repression.
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Introduction
“An empirical science cannot tell anyone what he should do – but rather that he can do.”
“The ideal-type concept will help develop our skill in imputation in research: it is no
‘hypothesis’ but it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses.”
-Max Weber 1904|1949, 54 & 88

I. Introduction
Max Weber made it his mission to develop a method for understanding mass social
behavior and, in particular, the way polities develop. Weber’s work on the conceptualization of
the state and the construction of ideal types in order to advance understandings of how states
behave, develop, and fail, remains a benchmark in political science. This dissertation project is
not unlike Weber’s research arc, in that it attempts to develop typologies of states, particularly
the capacities of states, in order to better understand social phenomena. It is for the reader to
determine the degree of success or failure achieved in that endeavor, but hopefully the pages that
follow help illuminate how the level of a variety of capacities available to a given state can
influence the lived experience of the citizens within that state.
State capacity is a fundamental concept in both international relations and comparative
politics, often used to explain important outcomes such as war (Organski and Kugler 1980), civil
conflict and political stability (DeRouen and Sobek 2004, Fjelde and de Soysa 2009), and
economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, Kaufmann and Kraay 2002)
among many others. Unsurprisingly, given the growing popularity of the concept, there are also a
number of measures for scholars to choose from (see Hendrix 2010). While these and other
existing studies established the importance of state capacity and greatly advanced the
1

understanding of how it might explain numerous outcomes, the concept remains incomplete,
hindering its utility to explain a range of important phenomena. This dissertation aims to address
the weaknesses in the current work on state capacity by offering a new conceptualization and
national-level measure of state capacity and then applying it to patterns of state respect for a
range of human rights.
Developing a new and more-robust measure of state capacity is a timely goal. In 2010 the
Journal of Peace Research commissioned a special issue exploring the relationship between state
capacity and civil conflict to better capture the “multi-faceted” nature of the concept (Sobek
2010, 270). Other studies have also re-invigorated the debate over which factors influence state
performance (Arbetman-Rabinowitz, Kugler, and Abdollahian et al. 2012) or lead to “state
failure” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Even more recently, studies have attempted to examine
the relationship between state capacity and human rights (Cole 2015) with important
implications for future work and policy-makers alike. Moreover, there is growing interest in
analyzing the role political will plays in a state’s ability to address a variety of problems through
policy initiatives and reforms (Grindle and Thomas 1991; Brinkerhoff 1996, 2000; Post, Raile,
and Raile, 2010). Political will, not unlike state capacity, is often conceptualized in ways that
lead to circular reasoning, and also conflate it with state capacity itself, making analysis difficult
(see Hammergren 1998). A new, more complete, measure of state capacity will help differentiate
when a governments fail to take effective action because they cannot (lack of capacity) or
because they choose not to (lack of will) (Carbonetti, Pomeroy, and Richards 2014).
Given the broad range and scope of work invoking state capacity as an explanatory
concept, re-conceptualizing it and developing a useful and valid measure requires the synthesis
of many sets of literature from both international relations and comparative politics. Indeed, a
2

large portion of this dissertation, including much of the first chapter, is dedicated to making
sense of the vast and diverse literature on state capacity.

II. Dissertation Goals
There are five main goals for this dissertation. The first goal is to develop a new
conceptualization of state capacity. The second is to create a correspondingly valid
operationalization that captures the multi-dimensional nature of state capacity. The third goal is
to ensure this measure of state capacity is not “outcome based,” in other words it is not an
attempt to ensure state capacity is represented by everything often considered normatively
“good” for states, like economic growth and democracy. Creating a measure that exists
independently of the outcomes scholars are trying to explain is crucial to making such a measure
useful. The fourth goal is to demonstrate the utility of this new conceptualization and measure by
analyzing the influence of state capacity on the level and pattern of government respect for
human rights around the world. Finally, the fifth goal of this dissertation is to use the findings
from the analysis of the new measure of state capacity and government respect for 12 human
rights to better explain the strategies of repression.
Most importantly, as chapters one and two of this dissertation show, current
conceptualizations of state capacity fail to account for the large potential number combinations
of state attributes influencing state capacity can take. The focus on how factors combine to form
state capacity is an important step in developing a coherent and useful measure of state capacity.
This approach recognizes that a state’s aggregate capacity is only determined by looking beyond
the sum of its parts. Simply adding up the state attributes which we theorize to increase state
capacity is not enough, since some state attributes that are positively linked to state capacity in
3

some circumstances, such as oil or other natural resources, may not be in others. The tendency to
focus on tallying resources, or identifying the presence of certain institutions, has left current
conceptualizations of state capacity incomplete or too narrow to explain many complex
outcomes. That said, this approach is not meant to include every single possible indicator
associated with state capacity, rather it is to use sound theory, and empirical analysis to distill the
most important dimensions of state capacity. My hope is this will offer a more refined alternative
to the large and diffuse number of current conceptualizations and operationalizations of state
capacity.
Put simply, current conceptualizations of state capacity suffer from being overly general
or being too narrow. Conceptualizations that suffer from overgeneralization are not particularly
useful in explaining outcomes or become tautological, i.e. positive outcomes like state stability,
are a function of high state capacity and therefore prove its existence (Kocher 2010; e.g.
Jackman 1993).1 Conversely, other conceptualizations of state capacity are overly simplistic,
such as only using state wealth measured as gross domestic product (GDP) (e.g. Fearon and
Laitin 2003).
In the same vein as oversimplification of state capacity, are those conceptualizations that
are idiosyncratic to the outcome being explained. For example, the use of resource or
geographical factors as the key concepts related to either a weak or strong state vs. weak or
strong rebel groups in the civil conflict literature (e.g. Lujala 2010). Beyond missing key
dimensions of state capacity, this approach does not allow for wider applications to more
outcomes of interest in the study of both international relations and comparative politics.

1

Jackman (1993) outlines his conception of “political capacity,” a similar concept to state capacity, and focuses on
state stability, measured as years without major civil unrest, as both an outcome of high political capacity and one
of its key components.
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Ultimately, the biggest problem with being overly general or overly idiosyncratic in
conceptualizing state capacity is that it leaves scholars unable to answer the question of “capacity
to do what?” This is a crucial element to understanding the specific way outcomes of interest
vary from state-to-state, and most importantly, what actions policy makers can take to address
negative outcomes of differing levels and types of state capacity. This dissertation seeks to
remedy these shortcomings by providing a better specified conceptualization and measure of
state capacity.

III. Outline of Dissertation
Chapter one begins by outlining the dominant point of view in the state capacity
literature—that institutional factors, rather than material or historical factors, largely determine a
state’s capacity (Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). This
perspective became popular during the movement to re-invigorate research on “the state” in both
comparative politics and international relations (Krasner 1978; Skocpol 1985; Reuschmeyer and
Evans 1985; Migdal 1988). The emphasis on state institutions as an explanatory variable is
important to the growth of state capacity as a popular concept because it highlights how different
institutional arrangements such as regime type, electoral laws, the structure of the executive
branch (O’Donnell 2004), and also the routine interactions between the state apparatus and the
people (Evans 1995; Ostrom 1997) could influence a state’s ability to take both domestic and
international actions it deems beneficial to its interests.
Chapter one then moves on to discuss the importance of resources to state capacity.
Resources are often defined broadly to include both material resources—such as mineral
deposits, timber, and foodstuffs—and social resources, which includes an educated, adaptive,
5

and interconnected population.2 In international relations resources are thought by scholars of
most of the major theoretical traditions to improve a state’s power which improves the ability to
act autonomously in the international sphere. Not surprisingly, liberal and neoliberal
international relations theorists argue that resources are pivotal in determining which states make
and uphold the world order (Keohane and Nye 1977; Ikenberry 2001). The liberal school of
thought also focuses on “soft power” (Nye 1990) which includes more economic and idea-based
resources states can use to influence other states. Neomarxists argue both natural and social
resources can be deterministic of a state’s place in the mode of production of the global economy
and thus, its power to influence the prevailing world order in ways that benefit or harm its
interests (Frank 1966; Wallerstein 1979; Gill and Law 1988). Similarly, realists and neo-realists
argue that resources are crucial to state power, but focus primarily on how resources influence a
state’s ability to wage war on its enemies and corral allies (Carr 1939; Mearsheimer 2001).
Constructivists (Onuf 1989; Wendt 1992) on the other hand, focus primarily on social resources,
such as a state’s cultural influence through media and personalities of leaders, to influence
perceptions of their behavior and influence others states via their leaders’ and populations’
attitudes.
In comparative politics, both natural and social resources are also thought to be crucial to
the state’s ability to control what happens within its borders though are often not included in
conceptions of state capacity. For example, it is hypothesized that states rich in mineral resources
or cash crops can be vulnerable to “Dutch disease” or the “resource curse” (Karl 1997; Ross
1999). The resource curse is the idea that too many resources produce an over-reliance on one
sector of the economy which is easy controlled by the government or a cartel-like group of
2

This is discussed at much greater length in chapter two, but I am alluding here to arguments made by both Evans
(2001) and Putnam (1994) about “state-society synergy” and “social capital” respectively.
6

individuals or corporations. This pattern makes resource rich states sensitive to price shocks and
corrupt politicians and businessmen. Furthermore, resources that are easily captured represent a
major incentive for rebel groups, and the presence of those resources is thought to influence civil
conflict and thus reduce state capacity (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). So-called “blood” diamonds
in Sierra Leone and the oil in the Sudan are examples of scenarios where resources are linked to
conflict (Ross 2006).3 Resources are also emphasized by political economists who claim that
they dictate the internal dynamics of a state by dividing society along urban-rural or capital-labor
lines (Bates 1981; Rogowski 1987).
Social resources are also important in study of comparative politics, most prominently
through the large literature concerning the influence of social capital on the quality of
government (Putnam 1994; Paxton 2002). Evans (1995; 1997) and Ostrom (1997) take another
approach by emphasizing the importance of educated populations to the state’s ability to make
effective policy. They demonstrate the importance of a state’s ability to tap local knowledge for
both technical advancement critical to the economy and natural resource management. Adger
(2003) incorporates these arguments into work on climate change, and argues that resources like
social capital and educated populations are crucial to a society’s ability to adapt to changes in
their climate.
Chapter one then discusses the importance of geography and climate, which some link to
state development and prosperity (Sachs and Malaney 2002). For example, Sachs and Warner
(2001) argue that in tropical climates the high toll of diseases such as malaria are hugely
detrimental to economic growth. Others claim that access to navigable waterways for trade is
3

The role of resources in civil war is one of the most debated issues in the conflict literature (see Fearon 2005).
However, Ross (2006) finds that countries that produce large quantities of oil, diamonds, and gas is robustly
correlated with civil war onset. Ross establishes causality by examining the amount of these resources are sold by
known rebel groups, presumably to fund military operations.
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crucial to long-term economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). Chapter
one closes with a discussion of the important step of integrating all of these social and material
factors, such as resources, social capital, and geography, with the role of institutional factors and
presents a conceptualization that does just that. This new conceptualization of state capacity
forms the basis of the operationalization created in chapter two.
Chapter two is principally concerned with how to operationalize the new
conceptualization of state capacity proposed at the end of chapter one. After summarizing past
attempts to create multidimensional indicators of state capacity, factor analysis is identified as
the method of choice for creating a new indicator of state capacity because it allows the
researcher to use numerous variables that directly measure important state attributes to identify
latent traits representing the essential dimensions of state capacity. Furthermore, the indicators
that “load” on particular factors acts a theoretical test for current theories of state capacity
discussed in chapter one. Ultimately, five essential dimensions of state capacity are identified by
the factor analysis including 1) administrative-extractive capacity, 2) international-power
capacity, 3) reach-coastal capacity, 4) coercive-rentier capacity, and 5) social-cohesion capacity.
Creating an indicator that can be disaggregated into its component types allows for scholars to
explain what aspects of state capacity are instrumental to explaining a number of outcomes of
interest. Moreover, it allows researchers to answer the important question of “the capacity to do
what?”
In chapter three, the new indicators of the dimensions of state capacity developed in
chapter two are included in an analysis of patterns of government respect physical integrity
rights. Physical integrity rights include the rights to no torture, political imprisonment,
extrajudicial killings, and disappearances. The measures of these rights come from the CIRI
8

Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). State capacity is central to
understanding how states treat their citizens because the state is the primary entity charged with
respecting, protecting, and fulfilling human rights. State respect for human rights is the subject of
numerous studies that explore a number of potential explanations for the variance in state respect
for physical integrity rights Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Fein 1995; Davenport 1995,
2007; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko
2001).
While others (Englehart 2009; Young 2009) have included indicators of state capacity in
their analyses of state respect for physical integrity rights it is argued in this dissertation that
these indicators reflect an incomplete conceptualization. Ultimately, the inclusion of state
capacity in models of state respect for physical integrity rights illuminates numerous patterns and
will hopefully be useful to scholars and policy-makers alike in their attempts to better understand
why, when, and how states decide to repress their citizens.
Chapter four takes advantage of the breadth of measures contained in the CIRI Human
Rights Data Project and examines the relationship between state capacity and empowerment
rights. Empowerment rights include the rights to freedoms of association, speech, religion,
domestic movement and foreign movement, as well as the right to electoral self-determination
and worker rights. The causes of state respect for these rights are examined far less often in the
human rights literature meaning this chapter fills an especially important gap in the field.4
Repression of empowerment rights may be even more important, since their violation is often
widespread and it deprives people of the mechanisms by which they advocate democratically for
protections that allow them to live a life with dignity. As with physical integrity rights, all five

4

A notable exception includes (Cole 2015).
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types of state capacity types are found to be statistically significant associates of the level of
government respect for at least one (and often many) empowerment rights.
Finally, the conclusion distills some important lessons from the results in chapters two,
there, and four, and offers some directions for future research. Figure A depicts the overall
design of this dissertation which is carried through the four chapters summarized above. In the
end the dissertation re-conceptualizes state capacity, creates a corresponding measure using
factor analysis, and tests that measure’s ability to explain state respect for physical integrity and
empowerment rights.

Figure A: Research Design for Dissertation
State Attributes

Geograph
y Factors
Rentier
Power
Social
Cohesion

Coercive
Extractive
Institution
s

Factor Analysis

Types of Capacity
1. AdministrativeExtractive
2. InternationalPower
3. Coercive-Rent
4. Reach-Coastal
5. Social-Cohesion

Analysis

Physical
Integrity
Rights
Empowerment
Rights

Ultimately, the conceptualization and accompanying multi-dimensional indicator of state
capacity created for this dissertation are useful for explaining an important outcome of interest—
government respect for human rights. Moreover, because pains were taken to ensure this
measurement scheme is not “outcome-based” (meaning it is not derived simply from outcomes
that scholars argue are normatively good) the indicators of state capacity created here should be
10

useful in explaining a number of other outcomes of interest like economic growth, civil conflict
onset, transitions to democracy, and many more.

11

Chapter One
Conceptualizing State Capacity
“Political and economic institutions, which are ultimately the choice of society, can be
inclusive and encourage economic growth. Or they can be extractive and become
impediments to economic growth. Nations fail when they have extractive economic
institutions, supported by extractive political institutions that impede or even block
economic growth.”
--Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012).
“There is no doubt that good institutions are important to determining a country’s wealth.
But why have some countries ended up with good institutions, while others haven’t?”
--Jared Diamond (2012)

1.1 Introduction
What role does geography play in political development? Why do high-quality
institutions form in some countries and not others? Why are some countries rich and others poor?
Why do some states experience civil war while others remain relatively stable over-time. How
come some states respect human rights while others do not? The quotes at the top of this chapter
illustrate one of many great debates over what explains the huge variety of outcomes in different
states around the world. On the one side are scholars like Acemoglu and Robinson who argue in
their recent book Why Nations Fail (2012) that institutions are the result of unique historical
legacies, and that states whose legacies produced “inclusive” economic and political institutions
have thrived, while states whose legacies produced “extractive” economic and political
institutions have floundered. On the other side are geographers and economists like Jared
Diamond and Jeffrey Sachs who, while acknowledging institutions are important, also recognize
that geography and resources play a crucial role in shaping how “inclusive” institutions come
12

about. Furthermore, geography and resources can help explain the patterns of how institutions
arise, their degree of effectiveness, and potential limits of their abilities to produce “good”
outcomes that characterize thriving states.
The institutions-versus-geography debate represents only a fraction of those academic
arguments over how states produce “good” outcomes for their people. At the center of all of
these debates is the concept of state capacity. State capacity has a long history as an explanatory
variable in political science and it has changed, and still changes dramatically, depending on the
outcome it is being used to explain. Much like the argument over the relationship between
geography, resources, and institutions, state capacity has rotated between being thought to
represent a country’s fungible resources or the quality of its institutions. The former is favored
by theorists of international relations and political economists who focus on power in the
international system. The latter is emphasized by many scholars of comparative political
development. Today, with the end of the Cold War and less emphasis on the so-called “high
politics” of war and peace, and the increased attention on the “third-wave” of democratization,
state capacity has become more synonymous with institutions. Put simply, when scholars of both
international relations and comparative politics discuss “state capacity” they tend to mean the
quality of a state’s institutions.
This chapter, then, focuses on how institutions and state capacity have become closely
linked by discussing the common ways that state capacity is conceptualized and operationalized
with an institutional focus. The chapter goes on to examine how geography, climate, and
resources are also connected to state capacity in the existent literature. It bears emphasizing that
one of my main contributions in this dissertation is to bring geography, resources, and climate
into a coherent conceptualization of state capacity rather than simply treating them as intervening
13

or control variables. Finally, the chapter offers a new conceptualization that lays the foundation
for a valid and reliable measure of state capacity.
The new conceptualization merges both the institutional and physical characteristics of
states into a coherent idea of state capacity. That said, the observation that state capacity is a
“multidimensional concept” (Sobek 2010) is not lost in this conceptualization. In fact its
dimensions are the core elements of both the conceptualization and operationalization offered in
this chapter and in chapter two respectively. Critically, the process of isolating the dimensions of
state capacity helps to answer the central question of “the capacity to do what?” Answering this
question is important because state capacity is conceived of as a set of state attributes that
increase the probability of certain “good” or even “bad” outcomes like economic growth and
respect for human rights, or tight control over the citizenry and rentier behavior. These outcomes
are more likely depending on the dimension of state capacity a particular state ranks highly in,
but not assured. State capacity, then, represents a necessary but not sufficient condition for
certain outcomes to take place, and individual state capacities make some actions outcomes more
likely than others.

1.2 Defining States
Before moving forward it is important to define some terms that are used throughout this
dissertation. The term “state” is defined in multiple ways in both comparative politics and
international relations. These definitions range from broad and general to narrow and specific
(Nettl 1968; Krasner 1984; Mitchell 1991). The most comprehensive meaning of “state” refers to
the primary unit under analysis in international relations. States are political entities that possess
a defined territory, a population, a government, and international recognition. Put simply the
14

word “state” in this dissertation refers to all of the governmental, economic, and societal
institutions that exist within the geographical borders of any internationally recognized country.
This broad conception of “state” is adopted in this project because; at the most fundamental
level, “state capacity” refers to the combination of resources and institutions that can be
mobilized toward a particular action.
The word “government” is sometimes treated as interchangeable with the state. “State
institutions” can refer specifically to the set of organs that govern a particular territory.
Therefore, when the word government is used it is explicitly referencing the sovereign
institutions that make the rules within a particular territory. Finally, the term “regime” is used to
denote the political system of a particular state. Regimes are the rules and norms that govern
action within a state. Regimes change more often than states do and most states experience
numerous “regime changes” throughout their existence.
During the remainder of this chapter, sometimes the words state, government, and regime
are all used interchangeably. The reason for this is because much of remainder of this chapter
describes how different scholars try to analyze and study “the state.” The way these authors used
the word “state” is maintained when explaining their approaches. That said, once at the
conceptualization portion of this chapter, and the results chapters, the words state, government,
and regime are used as I described above.

1.3 Studying the State
The current popularity of state capacity as an explanatory concept is a product of the
movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s to “bring the state back in” as a primary unit for
analysis in political science (Evans, Reuschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). This movement was in
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response to the dominance of pluralist and Marxist conceptions of the state as simply a reflection
of the preferences of dominant societal actors (Krasner 1984). This state-centric approach argues
that the state apparatus—made up of government institutions and the leaders who occupy
positions of authority—represents both structural constraints on actions of society and also
behaves as a corporate actor that develops potentially distinct interests from powerful actors in
society (Nettl 1968). This approach focuses mostly on “state autonomy” from society as the
ultimate indicator of state strength and capacity to govern (Kjaer, Hansen and Thomsen 2002;
see also Migdal 1988). Put simply, strong states are those with more power than domestic actors,
while weak states have less power relative to societal actors.5
The notion that the state mattered as both a structuring force and agent led scholars to
examine what attributes held the most analytical leverage in explaining state strength and
weakness and thus, different outcomes. Of course, the definition of state capacity arises from the
outcomes it is used to explain. Broadly, these outcomes of interest included nearly anything, but
focused primarily on levels of economic growth and development, domestic political stability,
international security, and international trade. The ability to achieve these types of outcomes is
generally thought to be the product of high state capacity. A recent article sums up the catch-all
notion of state capacity resulting in good things by referring to the outcomes state capacity is
linked to generally as “peace and prosperity” (McBride, Milante, and Skaperdas 2011).
1.2.1 Previous attempts to define state capacity
In much of the state capacity literature “state autonomy” or “state strength” is the most
fundamental aspect of a state’s ability to function. In comparative politics the focus is primarily

5

Note, as mentioned above, throughout this section of the dissertation the word “state” often refers to the
“government” of a particular polity. This is how the work being described use it, not necessarily how this project is
using it.
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on the state’s autonomy from society (Stepan 1978; Skocpol 1985; Evans 1995), while in
international relations the focus is on a state’s ability to remain autonomous in the global
economy, or the arena of war and peace (Weatherbee 2009; Boyer and Drache 1996). In
comparative politics, for example, “strong states” when compared to societal actors are often the
explanation for the “East Asian Miracle” of rapid economic development (Johnson 1982;
Amsden 1989; Wade 1990) while “weak states” (Herbst 2000; Centeno 2002) are linked the
economic failures in Africa and Latin America. Meanwhile in international relations scholars the
power and autonomy held by strong states is the constant advantage and goal. Thus, the
autonomy state capacity delivers acts as the bulwark against the constraints of international
institutions (Mearsheimer 1996), the market (Boyer and Drache 1996), and the international
system itself (Strange 1982) numerous other factors that potentially shackle states.
In both cases autonomy means the ability of the state to pursue its own interests with as
few constraints as possible. The assumption being, that the more autonomy a state has the more
capacity it has to act. Of course this broad definition, while being parsimonious, leaves much to
the imagination. What are state interests? What types of autonomy deliver outcomes in the state
interest? Is autonomy simply freedom to act or should it deliver the freedom and wisdom to
undertake good actions? The literature is divided, with some focusing simply on autonomy to act
toward state goals (Sikkink 1991), and others going further to define state capacity as the ability
of a state to make and enforce policies that deliver goods to the public and firms (Besley and
Persson 2011), or that improve the quality of life of their citizens (Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno,
and Robinson 2014). In chapter two the way state capacity is defined in this project is outlined in
detail.
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When attempting to conceptualize what makes a state with high capacity, most scholars
look to Weber’s writings (1919/1958). Weber’s idea that a state must have a monopoly on the
use of force within a given territory and have a strong rational-legal bureaucracy undergirds
nearly all conceptions of state capacity. Skocpol (1985) builds on Weber by identifying five
different facets of state capacity (1) sovereign integrity, (2) financial resources, (3) loyal and
skilled officials, (4) stable administrative-military control, and (5) authority and institutional
mechanisms to employ resources. Conceptions of state capacity generally boil down to the
“tripartite conception” that encompass some level and combination of military or coercive
capacity, the quality and consistency of the bureaucracy, and the state’s ability to extract
resources from society (see Cardenas 2010; Hendrix 2008, 2010; Hanson and Seligman 2011).6
As illustrated by Figure 1.1, all three factors are deeply inter-related. For example, without
coercive capacity it is unlikely there is enough political stability to raise revenue. Without a
strong high quality bureaucracy accurate revenue accounting and collection is impossible and
coercive capacity weakens. Finally, without revenue a state is unlikely to have either coercive
capacity or a strong bureaucracy as government employees and soldiers do not work for free. 7
All three of these factors are thought to be a function of strong, high-quality institutions, and the
next section goes into detail about different ways they have been conceptualized and measured as
part of state capacity.

6

Scholars combine different components in unique ways. Hendrix (2010) separates the “quality” of a bureaucracy
from the “coherence” of the bureaucracy, and does not give extractive capacity its own category. Cardenas
distinguishes between all four components, and Hanson and Seligman merge quality and consistency together,
into “administrative capacity.”
7
Adam Smith also identified three core functions of the state. These included the provisions of defense, justice,
and public works and public institutions. He notes that providing all three was impossible without tradeoffs (1902
volume 3 book 5).
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1.3 Institutional Measures of State Capacity
Despite the observation that the different dimensions of state capacity are related, for the
sake of parsimony or conceptual clarity scholars often try to find unidimensional measures that
represent state capacity as a whole, or at least most of the concept. These scholars claim that one
dimension of state capacity precedes others, and therefore can be used to represent state capacity
as a whole (Cardenas 2010). Sometimes this is because studies are trying to explain the influence
of a specific outcome in relation to a related dimension of state capacity such as the influence of
low quality corrupt bureaucracy on economic growth, or the influence of a weak military on the
likelihood of civil conflict. Other times researchers make the argument that state capacity is
simply captured totally by one measure, such as a state’s wealth. Table 1.1 summarizes a number
of attempts to conceptualize and operationalize state capacity using unidimensional measures
meant to capture institutional quality. Many of these conceptualizations were used to explain
civil conflict, which could help explain the institutional focus, since as opposed to geography and
resources that is a changeable state attribute. That said, obviously some of the indicators are
resource based, but they are intended to represent the quality of a state’s institutions instead of
just the raw amount of the resource itself. In the following sub-sections these unidimensional
operationalizations of state capacity that emphasize institutions are explored before moving to a
discussion of the potential role geography, climate, and resources play in conceptualizations of
state capacity.8
1.3.1 Wealth
In their article on ethnicity and civil conflict, Fearon and Laitin (2003) explain the
capacity of the state relative to the capacity of potential insurgents. In doing so, they use national
8

The following section draws heavily on literature reviews in Cardenas (2010) Hendrix (2010) and Hanson and
Seligman (2011).
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wealth (GDP per capita) as a proxy of state capacity. Even though this is a resource based
indicator it is actually used in this case to capture the administrative and coercive capacity of the
state.
By employing GDP per capita they assume that wealth is strongly correlated with repressive
capacity and administrative capacity: “higher per capita income should be associated with lower
risk of civil war onset because (a) it is a proxy for a state’s overall financial, administrative,
police, and military capabilities, and (b) it will mark more-developed countries with terrain more
‘disciplined’ by roads and rural society more penetrated by central administration” (Fearon and
Laitin 2003, 80). For them, wealth is a catch-all proxy able to represent all of the latent elements
of state capacity.9
Similarly Young (2009), in an analysis of state capacity and human rights, uses wealth as
part of a conceptualization of state capacity. He writes, “…the government’s relative bargaining
power is a function of the resources it controls. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the most direct
measure of the pool of resources available for a state to extract.”10 Young does not combine this
measure with any other dimensions of state capacity prior to his analysis on his outcomes of
interest, human rights. This means that the way wealth combines with other dimensions of state
capacity cannot be determined. For example, if the citizens of a state are wealthy, which could
explain high GDP, but the government is unable to extract any revenue from that wealth then the
bargaining position between the government and society might actually be reversed, which
wealthy elite holding all the cards. Furthermore, using wealth as a proxy for state capacity,

9

From an international perspective this approach mirrors Mearsheimer (2001) who uses wealth as a proxy for
power, which he defines as the capacity to make war.
10
Young (2009) also uses measures of leader insecurity for leaders and election from Cheibub (1998), and
population size to complete his conceptualization and measure of state capacity.
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means the researcher is precluded from using state capacity as an explanatory variable for
economic growth, or for economic development, due to concerns about endogenity.
1.3.2 Military/Coercive Capacity
Similarly, many see military capacity as indicative of bureaucratic and fiscal capacity
and, therefore a good representative measure of state capacity. For example, Cardenas argues
that “military capacity is largely a reflection of the state’s ability to collect taxes and deliver
public goods” (2010, 3).
Such thinking is often justified by referring to studies showing a military build-up in
response to both domestic (Cohen, Brown and Organski 1981) and international threats
(Organski and Kugler 1980) is the catalyst for increased state bureaucratic and fiscal strength
(Tilly 1978). It also references back to the original thinker of state capacity, Weber. Weber
argued that a fundamental attribute of a state is the monopoly on the legitimate use of force
within its borders. Therefore, for some scholars, the state’s war making ability is so intimately
tied to its capacity to make war and use force both abroad and domestically, that a state’s
military capabilities represents an all-encompassing proxy for state capacity as a whole.
Of course, domestic and international coercive capacities are two fundamentally different
things. From an international perspective and for inter-state war, the most important indicator of
military capacity involves the size and level of sophistication of a state’s military. Mearsheimer
(2001) includes the size of a state’s military and its potential military, as well as military
spending as a key component of power in the international sphere. Of course in this case, the
largest states, such as the United States, China, and Russia, with the biggest populations and
budgets will be at the top of the list, followed by mid-sized countries that prioritize national
defense. For understating domestic coercive capacity on the other hand, the salient piece of
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Table 1.1: Studies Operationalizing State Capacity with Institutional Measures
Indicator
GDP Per Capita
Military Personnel
Military Personnel
Military Personnel
Military Spending
Bureaucratic Quality
Bureaucratic Quality
Taxes/Expected Taxes
Taxes/Expected Taxes
Prime Com Exports
Oil Reserves
Taxes Trade/GDP
Oil Product/GDP
Oil Production/GDP
Expropriation Risk
Expropriation Risk
Expropriation Risk
Investor Confidence
Transitional Regimes
Polity2Squared
Scalar Index of Poliites
Polity2
Taxes/Expected Taxes
Corruption
Independent Judiciary

Author
Fearon and Laitin
Waymann et al.
DeRouen & Sobek
Walter
Henderson & Singer
DeRouen & Sobek
Feaon
Buhaug
Theis
Collier & Hoeffler
Humphreys

Year
2003
1983
2004
2006
2000
2004
2005
2010
2010
2004
2005
Baunsgaard and Keen 2010
Chaudry
1989
Karl
1997
North
1981
Knack & Keefer
1995
Acemoglu et al.
2001
DiGiuseppe et al.
2012
Tilly
1978
Hegre et al.
2001
Gates et al
2006
DeRouen & Sobek
2004
Englehart
2009
Englehart
2009
Englehart
2009

Concept
Wealth
Coercive
Coercive
Coercive
Corruption
Bureaucratic Quality
Bureaucratic Quality
Bureaucratic Quality
Bureaucratic Quality
Rentier Institutions
Rentier Institutions
Rentier Institutions
Rentier Institutions
Rentier Institutions
Rentier Institutions
Institutions/Judiciary
Institutions/Judiciary
State Capacity
Stability
Stability
Stability
Democracy
Resources
Bureaucratic Qual
Ind. Judiciary

Outcome Being
Explained
Civil Conflict
Civil Conflict
Civil Conflict
Civil Conflict
Civil Conflict
Civil Conflict
Civil Conflict
Civil Conflict
Civil Conflict
Civil Conflict
Civil Conflict
Growth
For Aid/Invest
Pol/Econ Dev
Growth
Growth
Growth
Civil Conflict
Civil Conflict
Civil Conflict
Civil Conflict
Civil Conflict
Human Rights
Human Rights
Human Rights

22

Figure 1.1: Tripartite Conception of State Capacity
Coercive Capacity

Administrative Capacity

Extractive Capacity
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information is the ratio of military personnel to the overall population, and the ratio of military
spending to GDP or total government spending.
The most commonly used database of military capacity is the Correlates of War (COW)
(Singer 1987) data on military personnel per capita and military spending per capita. Numerous
studies have employed this data to explain outcomes such as the likelihood of civil conflict, the
likelihood, length, and duration of inter-state war, economic growth, and the ability to collect
taxes (Mason and Fett 1996; Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999; Balch-Lindsey and Enterline
2000; DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce 2008; Walter 2006).11
1.3.3 Administrative/Bureaucratic Quality
Others argue that bureaucratic/administrative capacity encompasses all of the key
elements of state capacity. Moreover, high quality bureaucracies are often seen as the primary
source of state capacity because they institutionalize the “rules of the game”, a characteristic
many identify as the most important factor for ensuring peace and prosperity (Reynolds 1983;
Przeworski et al. 2000; Keefer 2008; and McBride et al. 2011). For example, professionalized
bureaucracies are considered crucial to economic growth because bureaucracies are necessary to
monitor and protect property rights and ensure credible commitments through contract
enforcement (North 1982, 1990; Weingast 1995; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; North and
Weingast 2009). To operationalize bureaucratic quality, scholars have a tendency to use direct
survey measures of bureaucratic quality and expropriation risk (DeRouen and Sobek 2004;
Fearon 2005). From this perspective, quality bureaucracies are measured based on their
commitment to being rational-legal bureaucracies, which is based on factors such as (1) lack of
corruption (2) high quality independent judicial systems (3) a meritocratic civil service (4) the
11

Henderson and Singer (2000) argue that military spending is associated with high levels of corruption, which can
actually lead to societal grievances and decrease political stability.
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ability to make credible economic commitments, and (5) the risk of expropriation for private
actors.12
Another way of measuring the quality of a state’s bureaucracy is to examine the structure
of a state’s economy. It is posited that states relying more heavily on natural resources, or
primary commodity exports (PCEs), as a proportion of their economy must have a weak
bureaucracy because it is unable or unwilling to develop a more dynamic economy (Collier and
Hoeffler 2004; Humphreys 2005; Fearon 2005).13 Over-reliance on natural resources and PCEs is
considered indicative of rent seeking or rentier-states or states that gain all their revenue from
resource extraction or easily taxed goods. “Rents” is an economic term for when excess returns
are generated above and beyond what is expected by the market due to a positional advantage
(Tollison 1982).
One characteristic of rentier-states is political and economic stunting, sometimes referred
to as “Dutch disease”,14 due to the state’s failure to create value-added technologically advanced
products (Karl 1997; Ross 1999, 2004). Another problem for a state that relies on one or two
commodities, such as oil or coffee, makes that state’s economy extremely vulnerable to the
inevitable price shocks brought on by the global business cycle, and supply and demand. This
means that these states are susceptible to what Gurr (1970) identified as a “relative deprivation”
or the gap between expectations and reality. This problem leads to civil conflict which can lead
12

The first three factors are contained within the International Country Risk Guides (ICRG) surveys and all five are
contained in the Political Risk Services Group (PRSG) surveys.
13
The PCE data found in Fearon (2005) and Humphreys (2005) are based on commodities defined in the Standard
International Trade Classification (SITC): SITC 0: food and live animals which include foodstuffs such as wheat
coffee, sugar, and livestock. SITC 1: beverages and tobacco. SITC 2: inedible crude materials which include: textiles,
rubber, and wood products. SITC 3: mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials which include oil, coal, natural
gas. SITC 4: animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes. SITC 68: nonferrous metals: silver, copper, nickel, aluminum,
lead, and tin.
14
The term “Dutch Disease” was coined by The Economist in 1977 due to the discovery of natural gas in the North
Sea and the subsequent decline in governmental spending in the Netherlands on the agricultural and
manufacturing sectors (The Economist 2014).
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to a spiral of civil conflict, poorer growth, followed by even deeper conflict. Gurr writes, “Men
are quick to aspire beyond their social means and quick to anger when those means prove
inadequate, but slow to accept their limitations” (1970, 58). This observation becomes doublely
true in the boom and bust cycles rentier states are particularly susceptible to, due to their reliance
on one or two commodities for growth. Not adjusting to this reality is indicative of a lack of
sophistication, and willingness amongst leaders, and the bureaucracy to invest in alternative
sources of economic growth. Finally, an over-reliance on primary commodities can lead to civil
conflict in another way, if these resources are easily captured they represent a tempting target for
rebel groups who can cut of a major source of government funding while simultaneously funding
their own rebellion (Ross 2006; Collier and Hoeffler 2004).
To determine if a state is a rentier state or not, scholars typically use data from the World
Development Indicators (WDI) on the amount and type of goods that are exported by a given
country and the ratio of those goods to GDP. Specifically, oil and natural gas, and diamonds are
the most popular commodities included in studies of instability and civil conflict (Collier and
Hoeffler 2004; Fearon 2005; Humphreys 2005; Ross 2006). Fearon (2005) argues that if a state’s
oil exports represent thirty percent or more of a state’s GDP then that state is most likely a rentier
state others simply examine rentierness on a continuum, assuming that as these commodities
become larger percentages of GDP their rentierness rises. Additionally, the WDI now contain a
specific measure of oil rents which measure the revenue extracted by the state from oil
production above and beyond the cost of producing that oil.
1.3.4 Administrative/Bureaucratic Consistency/Coherence
Some scholars focus on the coherence of state institutions as an indicator of state capacity
(Back and Hadenius 2008). It is often argued that states with a combination of democratic and
26

autocratic institutions are more unstable than states that are completely democratic or completely
autocratic (Mansfield and Snyder 2002, 2002a). These states, termed “anocracies” (Gurr 1974),
are the most likely to experience civil conflict (Hegre et al. 2001; Regan 2005) and to violently
repress their citizenries (Fein 1995).15 Anocracies have these difficulties because leaders feel
threatened by institutions that might check their power (Gates et al 2006) or empower other elites
that could seize power (Highley and Burton 1989). Due to this infighting, leaders have a difficult
time marshalling resources to crush rebellions, defend against outside attack, or formulate
coherent economic policies that ultimately lead to economic growth.
Embedded in the importance placed on this concept in the state stability/capacity
literature is the assumption that states are always transitioning between democracy and
dictatorship until they reach an equilibrium, usually at either one end of the spectrum or the
other. Similarly, as Cheibub (1998) and Young (2009) argue, elections are when leaders or the
ruling elite are at their weakest, and in anything other than a fully consolidated democracy,
where democracy is “the only game in town”, elections can make leaders lash out to protect their
interests. This usually results in repression of the population which can spark unrest or full scale
rebellion. Indeed, work by those who study post conflict resolution and state building (Toft 2008;
Autesserre 2010) and human rights (Richards and Gelleny 2007) suggest elections bring large
challenges for weak states. Specifically, the weakness and uncertainty elections bring means that
partially democratic countries are weaker and less able to make and enforce policy than fully
democratic or fully autocratic states. Scholars typically operationalize mixed regimes using
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The debate about what anocracies are and how they influence civil war onset is not settled. Some scholars
define anocracies broadly as simply having a mix of democratic and authoritarian characteristics (Fearon and Laitin
2003). Others see anocracy as having specific institutional arrangements such as dictatorships with legislatures
(Gandhi and Vreeland 2004). For summaries of this debate see Regan and Bell (2010).
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databases such as Polity (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2013) or the Scalar Index of Polities (SIP)
(Gates et al. 2006).
1.3.5 Extractive Capacity
One of the most popular unidimensional conceptualizations of state capacity is the state’s
ability to collect taxes. This is often termed “extractive capacity” (Hanson and Sigman 2011) or
“fiscal capacity” (Cardenas 2010). Collecting taxes is seen as a fundamental task of the state
(Levi 1988). 16 North (1981, 21) even defines the state as “an organization with a comparative
advantage in violence, extending over a geographic area whose boundaries are determined by its
power to tax constituents.” Those scholars who argue that the ability to collect taxes is the best
indicator of state capacity make this claim based on the fact that collecting taxes requires a
relatively sophisticated bureaucracy; some combination of coercion, cooperation, and tax
collection. The bureaucracy can monitor and enforce tax law through coercion, and voluntary
action from the citizenry (Braithwaite 2010).17.
Attempts to operationalize extractive capacity include the ratio of taxes collected to
overall GDP (Cheibub 1998; Fauvelle-Aymar 1999; Besley and Persson 2009; Theis 2010), the
proportion of tax collected to total revenue (Steinmo 1993), and the ratio of taxes collected
versus expected tax revenue (Kugler and Arbetman 1997). The ratio of collected taxes to
expected tax revenue is known as “relative political capacity” (Arbetman-Rabinowitz and
Johnson 2007) and attempts to deal with the problem—summarized by Lieberman (2002)—that

16

Levi (1988) argues that the desire of the leadership to extract revenues gives rise to the modern state, because
the leadership is forced to build institutions to monitor and collect revenue generated in its territory. These
institutions eventually check the power of the leadership and reduce its bargaining power vis-à-vis other societal
actors. In the end, the apparatus originally constructed by the leader to fulfill their own designs on increased
revenue extraction constrains them.
17
Cheibub (1998) argues that taxation is a way to measure the ability of governments to impose unpopular
policies.
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revenue is much harder to raise in some countries than others due to the nature of their
economies. Kugler and Arbetman (1997) control for this by generating an expected tax yield
based on the proportion of a state’s GDP coming from different sectors and juxtapose this
against the amount of taxes actually collected. The gap between the two represents the relative
“political capacity” of the state.18
1.3.6 Accountability
Clearly, the state’s relative administrative, coercive, and extractive capacities are all
important, but the question remains, what explains the state’s ability to effectively make and
implement policies? One potential answer is the degree of connectivity between the state and
society, yet another way some scholars conceptualize state capacity. The state-society
relationship is often thought of as crucial to a state’s ability to provide public goods necessary for
peace and prosperity. Evans refers to this concept as “state-society synergy” (1997) which
reflects the degree and form of the connections between the state and actors in civil society
through formalized relationships. He argues that the level of connectivity between the state and
civil society, and the form of those connections, aids understanding successful policy outcomes
versus unsuccessful ones across a range of issues.19 This argument mirrors the work of Ostrom
(1997), who argues that the government must tap into societal resources in order to solve
collective action problems associated with resource management.

18

Kugler and Arbetman (1997) primarily determine the expected tax yield based on a state’s GDP plus revenue
that comes from trade and from natural resources. They argue that these factors are much easier to tax and raise
the expected tax yield for that state. This rationale is explained further in Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson
(2007).
19
The nature and form of connections between the public and private sector is often hypothesized as a key
explanatory factor in industrial and trade policy, but it is noted by many that it is still under-developed (Alt and
Gilligan 1994; Lake 2009)
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Evans identifies two different types of connections that span the “public-private divide”
and create synergy—“complementarity” and “embeddedness” (1995, 189). Both concepts are
necessary but not sufficient conditions for synergy on their own and they make synergistic
capacity closely linked to other forms of capacity. Complementarity reflects the conventional
notion that the state can provide certain collective goods that private actors cannot and viceversa. Effective complementarity requires resources, and therefore is related most closely to the
extractive capacity of the state (Ostrom 1997).20 The concept of embeddedness captures the
degree that state actors and private actors work together to find solutions to problems they were
unable to solve on their own. Embeddedness, as Evans (1995) understands it, arises when state
institutions foster connections with society but maintain an appropriate separation to avoid
rampant corruption and clientelism. Evans claims that productive forms of state-society relations
as leading to “embedded autonomy” (Evans 1995).21 In this way, embeddedness is closely related
to elements of administrative capacity that lead to coherent, corporate bureaucracies with
meritocratic advancement and competitive salaries. However, institutional structures must also
allow for connections that bridge the public-private divide, something rarely included in standard
measures of administrative capacity.
Another related way to think about the importance of accountability is in its relationship
to a state’s ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Many claim that accountability is an
element of “adaptive capacity,” and without institutionalized accountability states are unable and
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In an analysis of the deplorable state of the Nigerian educational system, Ostrom (1997) argues that the primary
problem was the absence of complementarity, or the inability of the state to help communities solve the problem
by providing resources.
21
The importance of state society separation is noted by Wildavsky who argues, “planners begin by attempting to
transform their environment and end by being absorbed into it” (1973, 128). Evans’ (1995) idea of embedded
autonomy rejects that complete absorption is inevitable.
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unwilling to tap into societal knowledge to make effective policy changes and manage common
collective action problems (Adger 2003; Brooks, Adger, and Kelly 2005).22
Ultimately, the prominence granted accountability in ideas like synergy and adaptive
capacity in studies of state performance, illustrates the importance of accountability to a concept
of state capacity. Accountability is a central component of democratic theory, which argues that
a population’s ability to hold its leaders accountable prevents or alters disastrous policies that do
not serve the public good (O’Donnell 1996, 2004).23 Additionally, as Evans (1995, 1997)
suggests, accountability allows for a public process of improvement which can lead to better
policy formulation at the outset. It is well documented that different institutional structures
influence the relationship between society and the state, thus including measures of different
governmental institutions are key to measuring the accountability capacity of the state (Kitschelt
1986, 2000). Of course, by definition, more-authoritarian regimes will be less accountable and
more-democratic regimes more accountable to society, but that conceptualization is rather crude
and tells us little about the wide variety within types of democracies and within types of
authoritarian regimes (Collier and Levitsky 1997).

1.4 Resources, Geography, & Climate
After the preceding section the importance of the quality and type of institutions in the
state capacity literature should be clear. What is less clear is the role that resources—outside of
their role in the poor institutions in rentier states—geography, and climate, play in state capacity.
The rest of this chapter is dedicated to demonstrating the importance geography, climate, and
22

The concept of “adaptive capacity” is a popular explanation amongst scholars of environmental science for the
varying ability of states to deal with climate change (Adger 2003).
23
O’Donnell’s (1996) well known conceptual division between “horizontal” and “vertical” accountability captures
the importance of this different forms of accountability to the state-society relationship.
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resources play in the state capacity literature and thus in a valid conceptualization and measure
of the concept.
2.4.1 Geography and Climate
The effect of geography and climate on state level outcomes is highly contested.
Diamond (1997) popularized the argument that the relative level of development of different
civilizations could be attributed to geographically determined resource endowments rather than
any cultural, racial, or even institutional factors. He claimed that the historical dominance of
Europe can be explained by its East-West axis, which makes crops easier to promulgate. Its
abundance of large, easy to tame, animals allowing for better food production, war making, and
germ immunization. Finally, a huge advantage is the fact that it Europe is located in a temperate
rather than tropical climate making disease and crops easier to control. The argument that
geography is a crucial factor in political and economic development is critiqued on two fronts.
First, by those that claim geographical explanations are simply rationalizations for the
dominance of Europe during the colonial and post-colonial periods (Sauer 1956, Sluyter 2001).
Second, are those who contend that institutions trump the effect of geography in explaining
political, economic, and social outcomes (Simon 1981, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001,
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004).
To rebut these two critiques Hendrix (2008) argues that employing physical geography as
an explanatory variable solves two key problems. First, it solves the vexing question of what
determines existing distributions of state power and capabilities. He writes, “Institutions cannot
provide the answer to that question because they cannot cause the circumstances that led to their
creation” (2008, 19). Second, he points out that it avoids potential tautological arguments that
can arise from assuming geography exerts no influence over culture. In other words, like
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institutions, culture must come from somewhere. For example, Moore’s seminal study of how
political regimes arise explicitly begins with geography, climate, and resources which determines
the primary industries in a country, and therefore its distribution of labor, capital, and agriculture
(Moore 1966). Put simply, “agrarian cultures,” are necessarily tied to the geography and climate
that allowed agriculture to arise just as the presence of horses on the Asian steppes produced the
nomadic people who would become the Mongolian empire. Geography and climate were critical
to the development of these cultures and their behavior. Therefore, following Hendrix (2008),
this project includes indicators of geographically determined resource endowments, along with
climate.
Where this study differs from the work of Hendrix (2008) and others is that geography,
climate, and resources are included in the overall conception of state capacity rather than kept as
separate intervening or control variables. Figure 1.3 illustrates how the relationship between
geography and state capacity is treated by much of the literature and how that contrasts with how
the relationship is treated in this project. As is evident from the portion of 1.3 under “this
project,” here geography, climate, and resources are treated as endogenous rather than exogenous
to state capacity. As argued above, this is justified because structural factors such as geography
often form the frontiers of a state’s capacity potential, and they interact with other state features
to form new types of state capacity.
1.4.2 Mountainous Terrain
The hypothesized links between geography and social & economic outcomes are numerous.
Mountainous terrain is thought to reduce the state’s ability to administer programs and also to
extract resources from the population (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2002;
Young 2009). Additionally, more-challenging terrain is often attributed to the likelihood of
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conflict due the ability of rebel groups to use terrain to their advantage such as to launch guerilla
wars, and build strongholds (Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala 2009). Attempting to control these
mountainous areas is a massive drain on state resources that could otherwise be used to more
productive ends. Cederman (2004) offers a different take on the link between mountainous
terrain and civil conflict arguing that mountainous terrain is simply a proxy for ethno religious
groups that view themselves as separate from the state. These separatists often arise out of
societies that were at one time completely cut off from the central government of the territory in
which they live and indeed, Cederman (2004) finds that these types of groups are much more
likely to arise in mountainous areas.
Among the huge number and variety of indicators used in the study of civil conflict, one
constant is that mountainous terrain is a statistically significant correlate of civil war onset. This
is in stark contrast to another indicator that offers intuitively similar causal mechanisms, forest
cover. Forest cover is generally not a significant predictor of civil conflict or other problems
associated with lower state capacity (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). In a more recent test of the
causal mechanisms above Hendrix (2011) argues that there are a number of indirect and direct
effects that exacerbate the effect mountainous terrain on civil conflict, most notably, that
sustainable economic activity is severely limited, and therefore drives countries into the
compounding effect of relying on mined commodities which, as discussed in the first part of this
chapter, leads to rentier tendencies.
The most extensive measure of mountainous terrain is from Collier and Hoeffler 2004.
This measure, captures “rugged terrain” rather than simply differences in elevation (2004, 570).
For example large portions of Asia are high plateaus and therefore appear to be mountainous
when elevation is used, but they are not rough and therefore provide little cover for rebels and
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are not difficult to build infrastructure through compared to areas where elevation changes
constantly.
1.4.3 Coastal Land
Another way geography may influence state capacity is through the state’s access to the
ocean. Scholars dating back to Adam Smith recognized access to navigable waterways as
important to economic growth. More recently, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005)
demonstrate that access to the Atlantic Ocean was a pivotal factor explaining differing levels of
development in Europe from 1500 to today. Similarly, according to Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger
(1999), access to the ocean is important to economic growth due to lower transportation costs.
Hausman writes, “It is estimated that for every one kilometer goods are shipped over-land they
could be shipped 7 kilometers by see for the same cost” (2001, 47). Today there is little doubt
that navigable waterways and deep water ports are a critical component of any state’s economy.
Several major geopolitical struggles of the 20th century often involved ocean access and the
success of the United States is often attributed to its extensive coastlines on two major oceans
(Rappaport and Sachs 2003).
Additionally coastline offers natural borders and barriers to migration and invasion, two
phenomena that can damage a state’s capacity. The United States, famously, has not endured an
invasion of foreign troops during the twentieth or twenty-first centuries, due in large part to the
fact that it is bordered by only two other countries and two oceans. The United States’ access to
two oceans is also a formidable advantage in trade and economic development. Finally, the fact
that the United States has many major ports and naval bases allows the U.S. to project power all
over the world quickly and easily. Russia’s centuries-long struggle to control warm water ports is
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evidence of the importance states place on ocean access for both national defense and economic
reasons.
1.4.4 Proximity to Major Ports
Proximity to “core markets” as operationalized by distance to the major ports of
Rotterdam, Tokyo, and New York is also thought to be a geographical influence on state
capacity, particularly vis-à-vis economic growth (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1999). Trade is
crucial to economic growth for any state, and the distance to the major markets for trade has been
shown to influence growth and the ability of the state to integrate into the international economy
(Krugman 1991). Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) show that Africa, for example, in
addition to being mostly tropical, possessing few navigable waterways, and containing a largely
landlocked population, is at huge disadvantage because of the massive distance between its
population centers and core markets. This causes much larger transaction costs in the production
and transportation of goods. To a lesser extent India and South America suffer from similar
shortcomings (1999, 182). Therefore, distance to major ports, despite technological advances in
shipping and transportation, remains a crucial element of a state’s capacity.
1.4.5 Climate
Climate is also hypothesized to influence state capacity. One climate factor linked to state
capacity is the state’s proximity to the tropics. Tropical locations are associated with many
diseases, specifically Malaria (Sachs and Malaney 2002), that affect outcomes such as economic
development and make providing goods and services more difficult for the government (Sachs
and Warner 2001). Conversely, states with large amounts of land in temperate climates generally
have more advantages when it comes to political and economic development due to the lack of

37

many tropical diseases, more predictable weather patterns, and more arable land (Gallup and
Sachs 1999).
Of course, a state’s climate and geography are related, but not perfectly. Geography
captures a state’s terrain and also its geo-spatial position on the globe, while climate captures the
state’s ability to use its land to raise beneficial crops such as cereal grains (Hibbs and Olson
2004). Additionally, a state’s climate can be indicative of the likelihood of a state having to deal
with environmental catastrophes such as severe drought and severe storms that can be extremely
destabilizing (Hendrix and Salehyan 2012). Furthermore, there is little doubt today that climate
is changing, and some have claimed that climate change may affect states in different ways
depending on the presence or absence of a host of other factors (Adger 2003).
Remarkably, given the importance of climate and geography to a number of outcomes of
interest, and the growing proliferation of satellite imagery, high quality cross-national measures
of climate and geographical features like mountainous terrain, rainfall, and climate are relatively
scarce. One option is a general measure called the “climate scale” which is developed by Hibbs
and Olsson (2004) and captures the favorability of a state’s climate to the production of key
cereal grains on a 1-4 ordinal scale. Another option to capture climate volatility is to examine
annual rainfall totals, but these are only available for a few states, Shanker (2004). Gallup, Sachs,
and Mellinger (1999) employ a measure of the percentage of a state’s territory that is temperatewet and temperate-dry, as well as the percentage of a state’s land that is in tropical climes
(located between the latitudes marked by the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn) to
determine the effect of climate on economic growth. These measures are the broadest available
and exist for most countries.
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1.5 Material and Social Resources
In addition to geography and climate, a number of studies show that physical and social
resources influence state capacity. As mentioned above, particularly in the study of comparative
political development, bountiful resources can be detriment to a state achieving political,
economic, and social advancement because of the “resource curse” (Karl 1997, Ross 2004,
Putnam 1994, Paxton 2002). Yet, state power (Mearsheimer 2001), and economic growth (Sachs
and Warner 1997) are both linked to the resources a state has at its disposal. However, similar to
geography and climate, they are often treated as exogenous influences on state capacity rather
than endogenous elements of state capacity itself.
Similarly, social resources are often marginalized when it comes to explanations of state
capacity. The term “social resources” refers to the importance of “social capital” (Putnam 1993;
Helliwell and Putnam 1995; Woolcock 1998) and “social cohesion” (Jensen 1998; Maxwell
1996) which helps societies cooperate and trust each other much more and therefore make more
efficient and effective states. Social capital and cohesion represent resources for a state to tap in
order to generate economic growth, make and enforce policy, and generally act toward state
interests. The assumption underlying the marginalization of social resources in the state capacity
literature—as with physical resources, geography, and climate—is that institutions can conquer
all. Yet numerous findings point to the conclusion that when social resources are absent,
institutions fail to materialize or when they do they operate badly (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly
1999; Easterly, Ritzan, Woolcock 2006)
1.5.1 Material Resources
Attention on the relationship between stocks of physical resources and state institutions is
particularly pronounced in the study of international relations (IR) where many scholars argue
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these two factors define a state’s power relative to other states (Snider 1987). Resources, such as
oil, coal, natural gas, food, water, and the state’s size and population are all thought to influence
a state’s ability to remain autonomous in a globalized economy (Keohane and Nye 1977; Gilpin
1987; Lake 1988). For these scholars, a state’s resources, factor endowments, and the societal
relationships they engender, change its ability to take action both domestically and
internationally (Gourevitch 1978, 1986, 2002; Rogowski 1988), and therefore, these elements
potentially influence state capacity.
Resources are also a crucial factor in determining a state’s potential capacity. Resources
interact with characteristics of a state’s government, and according to some this relationship
largely predicts to what extent a state’s absolute potential capacity can be realized. As Krasner
notes,

The potential or maximum international power of the state, the power that could
be derived from all the resources controlled by its citizens relative to those of
other societies, establishes only the outer boundaries of state power (1978, 57).

For Krasner, it is the combination of domestic political structures and the convergence of private
and public interests that allow a state to use its resources and maximize its power. Relative
power is crucial to state capacity because it is well established in international relations
scholarship that relative capabilities between states influence a state’s ability to remain
autonomous on issues such as trade policy and industrial policy which, it is argued, can have a
dramatic effect on the ability of a state to govern (Gilpin 2001, Katzenstein 1985, Lake 1988).
Therefore, measures are included to capture the material resources of a state such as oil, natural
gas, coal, and iron all of which are so-called “power resources” according to Krasner (1978).
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In addition, measures of population, internal renewable water, and agricultural land are
included as potential power resources. Mearsheimer (2001) 24, among others argues that state
population is important because people are potential soldiers so population will determine
military capability. Lake (1988) stresses the importance of the size of domestic markets in
determining the ability of a state to dictate trade terms and be powerful in the global economy.
Of course, with large populations comes challenges, larger societies are more difficult to control
(Bruckner 2010), can contain more social divisions, and large states are often saddled with the
task of providing international goods such as trade regulation and international security (Lake
1993). Nevertheless, the influence of population on state capacity needs to be considered. Water
is another crucial resource, because of the importance in domestic food production, power
generation, and sustenance (Brooks et al. 2005). Many states rely on water resources that span
international borders and therefore, states with control over water resources hold distinct
advantages in international bargaining (Khagram 2004).
1.5.2 Social Resources
Social resources are another factor that must be considered when conceptualizing state
capacity. Social resources, often thought of as “human capital,” provide the raw materials in the
form of highly educated citizens which can work in government, and the private sector to deliver
good economic and social outcomes for a state (Grindle 2009). One important facet of social
resources that many argue is essential to successful governance and economic growth is the
relative stock of social capital existent in a given state (Putnam 1994, 2000). The
conceptualization of state capacity posited here includes social capital because it undergirds all
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Mearsheimer also focuses on wealth in his operationalization of a state’s potential power (2001, 56). Scholars
often focus on “potential economic power” and employ a state’s share of world trade and worker productivity
(Krasner 1976, Lake 1988).
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other social resources. However, social capital is a notoriously difficult concept to measure in
either quantitative or qualitative settings (Kubik 1998, 132). Cross-national attempts to measure
social capital typically focus on several characteristics of the society within a state. First, a
popular measure is the degree of societal divisions within a state. It is argued that more social
divisions render social capital more difficult to develop and are indicative of a lack of social
capital which binds society together. Measures of societal divisions include various measures of
ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, linguistic fractionalization, and/or some
combination of all three (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Amorim, Neto, and Cox 1997;
Lijphart 1999; Fearon 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003).25
Another common way to operationalize social capital is to look directly at the
associations believed to breed social capital. In an examination of social capital in the United
States, Putnam (1995, 2000) examines membership numbers in churches, labor unions, parentteacher associations, women’s organizations, the Boy Scouts, and the Red Cross, among others.
Sources of cross-national data on the number of associations, and their membership, respectively
include the International Yearbook of Organizations (IYO) (Union of International Associations
(UIA) 2011) and the World Values Survey (WVS).26 In a study of the relationship between
democracy and social capital, Paxton (2002) operationalizes social capital using both the WVS
and the IYO while also identifies some associations that could be detrimental to social capital by
determining which associations tend to stay isolated from other associations.
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Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) and Amorim, Neto, and Cox (1997) focus primarily on ethnic fractionalization
and examine the number and relative sizes of ethnic groups within a state. Lijphart (1999) expands on this by
integrating religious and linguistic fractionalization and Fearon (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) employ four
measures including the Atlas Narovda Mira (1964) or ELF index, among others.
26
The pertinent WVS survey question for the 2011-2012 (6th wave) asks the respondent to answer whether they
are an active, inactive, or nonmember in a range of associations.
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A third way to operationalize social capital is to examine the amount of non-violent elitechallenging behavior within a particular society. Welzel, Inglehart, and Deutsch (2005) argue
that elite-challenging behavior can have higher “civic” payoffs than voluntary associations.27
This is because of the deeper and more complex collective action problems associated with
actions such as protests, boycotts, and sit-ins, which are considered indicative of high levels of
social capital and an explanation for growth of social capital. Again, this approach utilizes
questions in the WVS to ascertain the degree of unconventional political participation.
In sum, the inclusion of proxies for social cohesion is important to understanding state
capacity. WVS is only available for most countries going back to the early and mid 1990s and
the international yearbook of organizations is extremely difficult to apply cross-nationally.
Ethnic and religious fractionalization measures are available for most countries and are largely
static over-time so they can be used for most country years.

1.6 A New Conceptualization of State Capacity
By now it should be clear that for one developing a new conceptualization of state
capacity there is no shortage of potential ingredients to add and subtract. There are numerous
institutional, social, and physical characteristics of states that are all linked to state capacity in
many literatures. Moreover, these literatures stem from both the studies of international relations
and comparative politics with each set of scholars focusing on different sets of indicators. The
new conceptualization offered below represents the best attempt to combine previous attempts
into a coherent idea of state capacity. As any effort to conceptualize a complex concept, striking
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See also Inglehart and Caterberg (2002) who argue that non-violent elite-challenging behavior such as protests,
petitions, and boycotts, is a symptom of and a cause of a deepening of democracy and thus a greater civic culture.
See Stockemer and Carbonetti (2010) for a critique of this argument.
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a balance between being overly abstract and overly specific is an important step. Being overly
abstract makes creating a valid and reliable measure extremely difficult, since the temptation to
include too much is high and the concept becomes “stretched” (Sartori 1970). Overly specific
conceptualizations, however, have limited utility across a variety of studies, and are difficult to
generalize from. Therefore, given the broad range of outcomes of interest where state capacity is
used, this project errs on the side of abstract, while also allowing for greater refinement without
losing the core concept. In the following chapter (chapter 2), however, the underlying theories
about the relationship between the different conceptual dimensions of state capacity are tested to
ensure the dimensions proposed here reflect empirical reality.
1.6.1 Defining State Capacity
To develop both a useful and also straightforward conceptualization of state capacity the
definition needs to be broad and relatively simple. Keeping the definition broad and simple
allows clarity while also avoiding over-determining the role state capacity plays in certain
outcomes. As Hanson and Sigman write,

In defining state capacity, “the capacity to do what?” is the first question one
should ask. State capacity is a multidimensional concept, and the state’s
capabilities can vary across different functions. Additionally, it is important that
we think about state capacities as probabilistic or necessary factors, but not
sufficient ones, for the emergence of particular outcomes. States with large
coercive apparatuses will not necessarily repress opposition, nor will states with
capable bureaucracies necessarily experience economic growth. Rather than asses
state capacities in terms of outcomes, accordingly, our goal in this paper is to
conceptualize and measure the capacities necessary to achieve certain outcomes
(2011, 1).
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Given the importance of allowing state capacity to be a probabilistic rather than outcome
oriented concept, the definition of state capacity used for this project is as follows: state
capacity represents the state’s ability to undertake a given action.
Based on the survey of the state capacity literature discussed previously in this
chapter, I argue there are at least five elements that influence state capacity: 1) A state
requires autonomy from both its people and other states, 2) resources to undertake action
3) control in order to ensure stability, and an environment where action is possible and
enforceable, and finally 4) expertise in the form of people within institutions with the
skills and education to collect resources for action, formulate action, and enforce action.
These four core elements of state capacity: autonomy, resources, control, and
expertise, are then a function of seven state attributes including: 1) international power,
2) social cohesion, 3) extractive capabilities, 4) institutional capabilities, 5) geography, 6)
coercive capability, 7) rentier capability. All of these attributes are crucial to a state’s
ability to have autonomy, accountability, resources, control, and expertise.
The relationship between state capacity’s core elements and key state attributes
are illustrated in Figure 1.3. Each core element forms the border of a quadrant that
demarcates where the function of the key state attributes. Everything revolves around the
definition of state capacity—the ability of a state to take a given action. Figure 1.4
illustrates where countries might be situated given their state attributes. The closer a state
is to the center the more of each state attribute they have and thus the more overall state
capacity they have. Drifting into one quadrant versus another indicates a state has either
an overabundance of one or two state attributes and an absence of those state attributes it
is moving away from.
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The, definition of state capacity and the derived core elements and state attributes
now form the basis for a conceptualization of state capacity. This conceptualization is
both broad enough to be useful in many areas of inquiry, but also specific enough to
allow the researcher to determine what dimensions of state capacity are exerting the most
influence over the outcome of interest. Moreover, as Figures 1.3 and 1.4 illustrate the list
of necessary state attributes represents a roadmap to building an empirical measure of
state capacity that is reliable, valid, and useful.

1.7 Conclusion
The literature on what attributes make an effective state is broad and diverse.
Indeed, the question of what improves state capacity has occupied multiple subfields and
specialties in political science especially the studies of comparative politics and
international relations. The movement in the late 1970s to “bring the state back in” to the
analysis of numerous outcomes of interest such as economic growth, civil conflict, interstate war, is mostly to thank for the proliferation of the state capacity literature.
Yet despite the abundance of research on the topic, attempts to synthesize all of the
attributes that are thought to effect state capacity are lacking. This is mostly due to attempts to
capture state capacity parsimoniously using a single indicator like wealth, taxation, or
bureaucratic quality. This previous work has been very important, as it has greatly increased
understandings of the importance of each element of state capacity. However, it has failed to
account for the multidimensional nature of state capacity, and for the fact that all states have
some degree of each dimension of state capacity which must be accounted for when using it as
an explanatory variable. Shortcomings in this literature also stem from the overly optimistic
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belief that institutions can conquer all, including a state’s lack of material and social resources,
or poor geography and climate. Therefore, chapter two of this dissertation develops and tests the
relationships between these different theorized dimensions of state capacity, and generates
corresponding indicators that can be used in analyses of outcomes of interest.
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Chapter Two
The Dimensions of State Capacity
“Let it be stressed, therefore, that long before having data which can speak for themselves
the fundamental articulation of language and of thinking is obtained logically—by
cumulative conceptual refinement and chains of coordinated definitions—not by
measurement. Measurement of what? We cannot measure unless we know first what it is
we are measuring.”
-Giovanni Sartori (1970)

2. 1 Introduction
A multidimensional conceptualization of state capacity created in the previous chapter is
based on the definition: state capacity represents the state’s ability to undertake a given action. I
posit five core elements of state capacity which include: autonomy, resources, accountability,
control, and expertise, and seven state attributes which make these five core elements possible:
international power, social cohesion, extractive capabilities, institutional capabilities, geography,
coercive capabilities, and rentier capabilities (see Figures 1.3 and 1.4 in the previous chapter).
The goal of this chapter is to operationalize the conceptualization of state capacity presented in
chapter one to develop a useful measure that can be used to examine different outcomes of
interest.

2.2 Methodology
I argue that state capacity is a multidimensional concept, and any method of generating a
measure of it should account for that. As explained in the previous chapter, others have theorized
many different state attributes that are important to state capacity. Moreover, it is often argued
that state characteristics like institutions, geographical features, and resource endowments
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interact to form a state’s true level of capacity. However, little has been done to understand the
relationships between all of the important elements in a state that could influence state capacity. I
propose to do just that by using principle component factor analysis.
Factor analysis is a method that allows the researcher to explore the relationships among
variables, making it a useful tool for understanding, interpreting, and utilizing concepts that
could be represented by large numbers of different indicators. Factor analysis operates on the
assumption that “the observed variables are linear combinations of some underlying
(hypothetical or unobservable) factors” (Kim and Mueller 1978). Put another way, the basic
element of factor analysis is that multiple observed variables for a given sample have similar
patterns because they are all correlated, or “load”, strongly on a latent unobservable variable, or
“factor” (Treier and Jackson 2008; Bartholomew, Deary, and Lawn 2009). Each observation in
the sample is given a score for each factor which can be used as independent variables in further
analysis.
For example, a researcher may want to try to test the relationship between an individual’s
intelligence and their lifetime earnings. The concept of intelligence could be operationalized in
many ways such as one’s IQ score, SAT score, grade point average, number of advanced
degrees, or memory score. Factor analysis can reveal if all of these variables are indeed
correlated with a latent trait, overall intelligence, or if they correlate with multiple latent traits. If
the former is true, the researcher could simply pick the variable explaining the most variance in
the sample of individuals and use that to proxy intelligence. However, if the latter is true it may
mean that intelligence is multidimensional and some dimensions may be more beneficial to
lifetime earnings than others. It also allows the researcher to include these different dimensions
in their model of lifetime earnings without including all of the possible indicators of intelligence.
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Thus, as illustrated by the example of operationalizing and testing theories about the
nature of intelligence, being able to tell which “factors” are explaining the most variance in a
given sample is useful information. The amount of variance explained by each factor is
expressed by the reported “eigenvalue” following factor analysis. An eigenvalue above 1
indicates that the underlying factor is explaining more variance in the data than any one variable
does on its own. For instance an eigenvalue of 2.3 for a particular factor would mean that factor
is explaining more variance than any two variables in the sample taken together. This is why the
main criterion for determining when to retain a factor and when to discard it is if that factor’s
eigenvalue is greater than 1 (Girden and Kabacoff 2010), though considerations about the
substantive value or sense of the factor should also be incorporated into decisions. Overall
understanding the proportion of variance each factor explains is important information because it
can test theories about how many dimensions a concept might actually have.
Another application of factor analysis is to analyze the validity of an existent measure.
For example, the Human Development Index (HDI), a cross-national measure of social welfare,
is often critiqued for being oversimplified and “conceptually weak” (Srinivasan 1994, 241). This
measure aggregates the scores of indicators of three different indexes based on a few indicators:
health, education, and standard of living. Among the numerous critiques is that the three
dimensions are highly correlated, should be weighted differently (instead of equally), and do not
adequately capture such a complex concept of “human development” (Slottje 1991). However,
Noorkbakhsh (1998) used factor analysis to determine that the indicators used to create the HDI
are actually multidimensional and explain approximately even levels of the variance in the data.
Biswas and Caliendo (2001) also use factor analysis and find that each component explains a
roughly equal proportion of the variance in the data—life expectancy 34%, education 34%, and
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standard of living 32%. The fact that factor analysis, at least in some studies, vindicates the
specification of HDI highlights how advantageous a method it can be for testing theories about
the dimensionality in data and how data should be used to operationalize complex social
concepts like human development.
Therefore, factor analysis serves three purposes. First, it is a method to reduce a large
number of variables into a smaller, more manageable number of variables which can be used to
operationalize a theoretically important concept. Second, by revealing how the variables in the
analysis “load” on different factors it exposes the latent inter-relationships that exist in one’s
data. Third, factor analysis reveals how much variance in the data one, or a group of variables,
are explaining relative to all the other variables. The amount of variance explained by each factor
is expressed by the reported eigenvalue.
Operationalizing state capacity, then, is an ideal application for factor analysis for several
reasons. First, state capacity is often called a multidimensional concept (Sobek 2004) and in
chapter one I argued the same, but that should not be taken for granted. Each factor produced by
the factor analysis also captures a certain amount of the variance between all of the variables
included in said analysis. If only one factor explains the majority of the variance it is safe to say
that the proposition that it is a truly a multidimensional concept is incorrect and it can indeed be
operationalized by one or two key variables. On the other hand, if there are two or more factors
that explain significant variance between the variables in the analysis then the idea that state
capacity is multidimensional is vindicated.
If state capacity is found to be multidimensional, it bears repeating that another advantage
of factor analysis is that it reduces the large number of indicators required to capture all of the
key elements related to state capacity, into a smaller, more useful set of latent variables that
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capture the conceptual essence of state capacity. In doing so, factor analysis reveals the hidden
relationships of the indicators that are important to state capacity, and produces variables that
represent the different “dimensions” of state capacity. These variables can then be used to
understand how high or low levels of different types of state capacity cause states to vary in their
ability to take action.
Given the inherent advantages of using factor analysis to operationalize multidimensional
concepts, it is unsurprising that it has been applied to state capacity by both Hendrix (2010) and
Hanson and Seligman (2011). Both studies use factor analysis to determine how many
dimensions exist in commonly used indicators of state capacity. Table 2.1 illustrates the different
indicators Hendrix and Hanson and Sigman choose for their analyses and the factors they find
and what dimensions of state capacity they think those factors represent. As shown in the lefthand column of Table 2.1, Hendrix uses a list of variables he argues relate to a state’s level of
development, regime type and institutional quality three elements he considers fundamental to
state capacity. Level of development is captured by a state’s GDP per capita and the investment
profile. Quality of institutions is captured by the Political Risk Services (PRS) index of
bureaucratic quality and a ratio of taxes collected to GDP. He posits both of these variables
indicate effective institutions within a state. He measures institutional quality with the ratio of
primary commodity exports to overall exports, the amount of military spending and personnel
per capita, all of which Hendrix argues can proxy corruption in government. Finally, he
measures regime type using several different forms of the Polity2 (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr
2013) index as well as the Scalar index of Polities (Gates et al. 2001). Despite his factor analysis
producing three different dimensions, Hendrix notes that the first factor, which he calls the
“rational-legal” aspect of state capacity because the measures of regime type and bureaucratic
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quality correlate strongly with it, accounts for most of the variance in the data. His argument,
then, is “all good things go together” and that state capacity is mostly a unidimensional concept
(2010, 283) and should be treated as such.
As shown in the center column of Table 2.1, Hanson and Sigman, like Hendrix, use
indicators of institutional quality, but they also include variables that capture how extensive a
state’s infrastructure is by using data on road density. They also include a measure of a state’s
historical continuity using the State Antiquity Index from Bockstette et al. (2002), arguing that
populations that have long occupied a set territory are more likely to view their government as
legitimate. Additionally, they drop measures of regime type because following the work of Linz
and Steppan (1996) they argue that state capacity is more likely a cause democratization rather
than vice versa and therefore measures of democracy should be kept separate from measures of
state capacity. Ultimately, contra Hendrix, they find state capacity is multidimensional, and
argue theirs is a more accurate operationalization because they account for the diversity of
factors that makeup state capacity (2011, 23).
The divergent findings in these studies highlight how choices about which indicators to
include can lead to very different ideas about the nature of state capacity. Hendrix (2010)
emphasized indicators that focused on regime type and quality to represent state capacity. He
only chose one variable (GDP per capita) to capture something else—level of development.
Hanson and Sigman (2011) go further than Hendrix, because they attempt to avoid focusing

55

Table 2.1 Comparison of Hendrix 2010 and Hanson and Sigman 2011

Retained²
Factor
Names

Hendrix 2010
Wealth
Bureaucratic Quality
Investment Profile
Primary Commodity Exports
Fuel Exports/Exports
Tax Revenue/GDP
Military Personnel/Per Capita
Mil Spending/Per Capita
Regime Type¹
Regime Coherence
Regime Type
Regime Coherence
Regime Type

Hanson and Sigman 2011
Rule of Law (PRS)
Bureaucratic Quality
Military in Politics
Road Density
State Antiquity
Census Frequency
Tax Revenue
Tax on Goods and Services
Tax on Trade
Military Personnel/Per Capita
Military Spending/Gov. Expenditures

Rational-Legal³
Rentier-Autocraticness
Neopratrimonial

Administrative
Reach
Trade Tax
Income Tax
Goods Tax
Coercive
1562
116

N
1408
Countries 101

Note (1): Regime Type and Coherence Indicators used by Hendrix are: Polity2, Polity2squared, Xpolity,
XpolitySquared, and the Scalar Index of Polities.
Note (2): Retained factors listed in order of the proportion of variance they explain in each respective
analysis.
Note (3): Hendrix argues that because this factor explains 53% of the variance in the data and over twice
as much variance as the next factor state capacity is mostly produced by rational-legal institutions.
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wholly on institutions, and instead include indicators like road density and census frequency
which capture how much penetration governmental institutions actually have in society.
They also interpret military personnel per capita and military expenditures as a ratio of
GDP differently than Hendrix. Hanson and Sigman instead think of them as the coercive
capacity of the state rather than indicative of low quality (corrupt) institutions. As explained in
the next section I explain my operationalization of state capacity. While it has overlap with those
used by both Hendrix and Hanson and Sigman it is more similar to the latter’s operationalization.
Moreover, it goes further in an attempt to capture all of the key elements of this
multidimensional concept.

2.3 Operationalizing State Capacity
Selecting which observable indicators to include in the factor analysis is where the
majority of the theoretical and practical decisions are made by the researcher. Theory is crucial
because it dictates the link between the conceptualization and operationalization. Choosing what
indicators to include in the factor analysis is based on a theoretical reason linking each of those
indicators to a component of the conceptualization. Recall that in chapter one I posit seven key
state components that make up state capacity: 1) international power, 2) social cohesion, 3)
extractive capabilities, 4) institutional capabilities, 5) geography, 6) coercive capability, 7)
rentier capability. Each of these seven components has at least one indicator included in the
factor analysis. Some of the seven, like institutional capabilities and geography, required several
indicators to be adequately represented because they are more complex components of state
capacity. Others, like resources related to state capacity, are captured sufficiently by just one
indicator.
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2.3.1 Data
Table 2.2 contains the name of each indicator used, its source, the component of state
capacity in my conception it relates to and the number of years and observations available for
that indicator from the source. During the process of selecting indicators and sources for this
analysis there are multiple things to consider. First, a large coverage of countries and years is
preferable to avoid systematic bias due to missing data. Missing data is a problem for most crossnational indexes. Returning to the example of the Human Development Index (HDI), its creators
are often criticized for not adequately dealing with either missing or inaccurate data that can
artificially lower the rankings (Srinivasan 1994; Ogwang 1994) of poorer countries that do not
have accurate census data or other important demographic information. In order to avoid missing
data, indicators that are widely available and cover large samples of countries and years are
selected. Ultimately, the dataset used for the complete factor analysis below includes 102
countries containing roughly 6 billion people, or 85% of the world’s population. A list of
countries included in the factor analysis is available in Table 2.1A of Chapter 2 Appendix.
The second and more important criterion for selecting indicators to operationalize the
different components of state capacity, is how closely they are related to my conceptualization of
each component as described in chapter one. Based on the large literature on the antecedents of
state capacity described in chapter one, it is clear that some components are more conceptually
complex than others, and therefore need more indicators to operationalize them satisfactorily.
For institutional capacity, my conceptualization focuses on the efficiency and technical abilities
of state institutions, rather than on type or arrangement like whether institutions are explicitly
democratic or have institutional checks and balances. That means finding indicators that a state’s
institutions can undertake large technically difficult challenges and complete them successfully
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all while respecting rules and order enough to gain the trust of the population and outside
investors. Thus, institutional capacity is operationalized using the amount of contract intensive
money (CIM) in the economy, the level of investor confidence, and census frequency. CIM is
calculated from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators using Clague et al.’s (1999)
method.28 Investor confidence is from DiGuiseppi, Barry, and Frank (2012) who utilize bi-yearly
investor rating scores from the Institutional Investor magazine (Institutional Investor, Various Years).

Census frequency is calculated using the World Heath Organization data on censuses overtime
(World Health Organization, 2013).
The power component of state capacity is conceptualized as the international power of
each state. IR scholars, particularly Realists, tend to focus on military might as the most
important indicator of international power (Morgenthau 1948; Mearsheimer 2001) thought it is
important to note that so-called “soft” power, revolving around diplomacy, economic
interdependence, and cultural influence is also often thought to be an important (Keohane and
Nye 1977; Nye 1990) component of power generally. That said, as discussed in chapter one,
given the difficulty of incorporating all indicators of each theoretical dimension of state capacity
into one operationalization, I use my conceptualization to guide my selection of the most
important elements, and the observation that military might is the ultimate arbiter of international
disputes makes it crucial to state autonomy, thus expanding a government’s options and thus
increasing state capacity.

28

Clague et al. (1999) measure CIM using the ratio of non-currency money to the overall currency supply. The
formula is (M2-C)/M2 where M2 is the overall money supply and C is the currency held outside of banks. They
argue high levels of CIM indicate large numbers of transactions that require third-party enforcement and that they
will be a good indicator that the population has faith in the financial institutions in a state. non-currency money to
the total money supply
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As shown in Table 2.2, international power is operationalized using the level of military
spending and military personnel. The indicators are from the Correlates of War (COW) National
Material Capabilities dataset (Singer 1987). The natural logs of both indicators are used. Logged
measures are preferred in this case because it is assumed there is an exponential, rather than
linear progression in how the values of these indicators change overtime which can lead to a
skewed distribution which can bias results, taking the natural log solves this problem (Tufte
1974, 109). The practical outcome of using logged versus unlogged variables is to reduce the
outsized effects large rich, oil producing countries might exert on the analysis.
Coercive capacity is conceptualized as the ability of a government to force its citizens to
behave a certain way. This could include the government’s ability to repress the population by
breaking up protests, repelling civil violence, or rounding up mass law breakers. Indicators of
this type of capacity include the same COW indicators of military spending and military
personnel, but taken as a ratio of GDP and population respectively (Singer and Small 2008).
These indicators capture not the overall size and capability of the military, but the size and
capability of the military relative to the resources and citizens of the state.
Social cohesion is conceptualized as the ethnic and religious unity within a country.
Indicators of this are taken by reversing the measures of ethnic and religious fractionalization
from Fearon and Laitin (2003) to instead capture ethnic and religious cohesion. Fearon and Latin
created these measures by using the Atlas Narovdov Mira, which lists the probability that two
random individuals selected in a country will be from two different ethno-linguistic or religious
groups and extended them using the CIA World Fact Book data. Although some might argue this
is a blunt instrument for capturing social cohesion, it is chosen because high levels of ethnic and
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics For Indicators of State Capacity
Variable
(ln) Military personnel¹
(ln) Military Spending
(ln) Oil Production
Ethnic Fractionalization
Religious Fractionalization
Oil Rents/GDP
Contract Intensive Money
Coastal Land
Domestic Taxes/Total Revenue
Trade Taxes/Total Revenue
(ln) Distance to Nearest Port
Temperate Land
Investor Confidence
Census Frequency
(ln) Mountainous Terrain
Military Personnel/ Per Capita
Military Expenditures/GDP

Source Component Ctrys
COW: National Material Capabilities v.3.02
Power
190

Years Obs
1816-2007 4109

COW: National Material Capabilities v.3.02
U.S. Energy Information Administration
Fearon and Laitin (2003)
Fearon and Laitin (2003)
World Development Indicators
World Development Indicators
Gallup and Sachs 1999
Baunsgaard and Keen (2010)/IMF/WDI
Baunsgaard and Keen (2010)/IMF/WDI
Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999)
Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999)
DiGuiseppi, Barry, and Frank (2012)
United Nations Statistics (2012)
Fearon and Laitin (2003)
COW: National Material Capabilities v.3.02
COW: National Material Capabilities v.3.02

1816-2007
1962-2013
N.A.
N.A.
1962-2012
1962-2012
N.A.
1981-2010
1981-2010
N.A.
N.A.
1981-2007
1981-2010
1981-2010
1816-2007
1816-2007

Power
Resources
Social Coh.
Social Coh.
Rentier
Institution
Geography
Extractive
Rentier
Geography
Geography
Institution
Institution
Geography
Coercive
Coercive

189
193
150
153
140
180
147
167
169
147
147
142
193
156
190
189

4045
5183
4230
4305
3723
4615
4408
3567
3501
4408
4408
2872
5700
4538
4597
4201

Note (1): (ln) = Natural Logarithm

61

religious fractionalization are the most commonly used proxy of social cohesion in both the
economic growth and civil conflict literature (Easterly, Ritzan, and Woolcock 2006). 29
The rentier component of state capacity is conceptualized as the ability of a state to
extract value from domestic natural resources and trade. Therefore, this component is
operationalized using the oil rents as a percentage of GDP from the World Bank World
Development Indicators and a measure of taxes from trade as ratio of total revenue from
Baunsgaard and Keen (2010). The resources component of state capacity is conceptualized as
those resources that are crucial to a country’s economic development and is operationalized
using the natural log of average oil production per day in thousands of barrels from the Energy
Information Agency (2012).
The geography component of state capacity is conceptualized as those geographical
features that influence a state’s ability to control its territory, maintain a healthy population, and
interact with the developed world. This component is operationalized using indicators of
temperate climate, the natural log of mountainous terrain, the natural log of distance from the
major ports of Rotterdam, New York, and Tokyo, and the percentage of land within 100km of
the coast from Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999).

29

Of course, this is not the only available indicator of social cohesion or even of ethnic heterogeneity. Putnam
(2000), famously, uses membership in civic organizations, but that type of micro analysis is impractical here as this
study is cross-national over time. Others have used the GINI coefficient to capture the economic dimension of
social cohesion (Rodrik 1999; Easterly 2001), though that data is often missing and does not capture the ethnic
component, which I argue is more important for social cohesion and state capacity. Yet another proxy for social
cohesion can be civil society organizations such as NGOs (Paxton 2002). Measures of this can be obtained from the
International Yearbook of Organizations (IYO) (Union of International Associations 2014-2015) but this data is
unwieldy and does not include numerous other types of domestic organizations that are likely more important to
social cohesion. Finally, the Minorities at Risk (MAR) database is often seen as the standard for understanding how
ethnic, racial, religious, and linguistic minorities are distributed across most states (Minorities at Risk 2009; Fox
2002), however, this is not necessarily a measure of the overall “fractionalization” in a society, though the MAR
data could be used for such purposes. In expanded versions of the analysis in this dissertation I plan to further
explore the potential of the MAR data to capture the social cohesion dimension of state capacity.
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Finally, the extractive component of state capacity is conceptualized as the ability of the
state to raise revenue from domestic sources. This component is operationalized using
information on taxes from domestic sources, such as transactions, income tax, and property
taxes, as a ratio of total revenue from Baunsgaard and Keen (2010).

2.4 Factor Analysis Results
The results of the factor analysis performed on the indicators described above suggest
strong support for the theory that state capacity is a multidimensional concept. Table 2.3 contains
the eigenvalues for each factor. Recall that eigenvalues relate to the proportion of the variance
explained in the sample each factor explains. If an eigenvalue is above 1 it means that factor is
explaining more variance than one variable could on its own. Factor 1, for example, explains the
amount of variance equal to nearly 4 variables in the sample taken together. Factor 5 on the other
hand explains an amount of variance of roughly 1.5 variables. One can also look at the direct
proportion of variance explained in column 3 of Table 2.3. No factor dominates, with the highest
proportion of the variance explained by factor one at 23% and the lowest being factor 5 at 8%.
The five factors taken together explain 73% of the variance in the data with the final 27% being
explained by factors smaller than threshold (eigenvalue above 1) to be retained.
Also shown in Table 2.3, are the names I give to each factor. These names are based on
the factor loadings of each indicator on each factor and attempt to capture what I feel is the
conceptual component or components of state capacity they most closely capture. They are in
order of the variance they explain: administrative-extractive, international-power, reach-coastal,
coercive-rentier, and social-cohesion. The indicator loadings are presented in Table 2.4. Only
those factors that load at either positive or negative .3 or higher are considered significant to that
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particular factor. Using this cutoff is based on the argument that with a sample size greater than
350 (my sample size is 1526) .3 represents “practical significance,” which means that by a
conservative estimate, those positive and negative loadings above .3 and below -.3 are important
in determining that factor’s makeup (Hair et al. 2009, 112).

Table 2.3: Eigenvalues For Factor Analysis
Factor Eigenvalues Proportion Capacity Type
1
3.999
0.235
Administrative -Extractive
2
2.776
0.163
International - Power
3
2.288
0.134
Coercive-Rentier
4
1.986
0.117
Reach-Coastal
5
1.473
0.087
Social-Cohesion
N = 1526
Countries = 102

The higher the positive or negative number is for a variable in each column of Table 2.4,
the more strongly that variable loads or does not load on that factor and the more important it is
to determining the core makeup of that factor. The administrative-extractive factor is a perfect
example of the advantages of using factor analysis to operationalize state capacity discussed
above. First, the results for the administrative-extractive factor are presented in the first column
of Table 2.4 demonstrate that a number of theoretical relationships between different indicators
can be tested using this analysis. Both indicators of high quality institutions (domestic
taxes/GDP, investor confidence) and geographical conditions thought to be favorable to the
development of high quality institutions (temperate climate and proximity to major ports) load
strongly, on this factor. This suggests a positive relationship between geographical factors and
high quality institutions that prominent studies have doubted or minimized (Acemoglu and
Robinson 2012). While this is not proof of causality between geography and institutions it offers
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support for my argument that the factors that states can change (institutions) and cannot change
(geographical features) interact and influence state capacity.
Furthermore, the results across all five factors presented in Table 2.4 show that the
indicators used in the analysis to represent the seven key components of state capacity collapse
into coherent dimensions or “types” of state capacity. I argue they are coherent because they fit
with many existing theories about what makes states able to take action. That the indicators of
institutional quality (investor confidence, domestic/taxes), advantageous geography (temperate
climate, less mountainous terrain, and closer proximity to major ports), low levels of rentier
tendencies (low taxes from trade) and even a technologically well-equipped military (military
spending), all load on one unobservable factor, which I call administrative extractive capacity,
supports existing theories about how states institutions and geography, cause states and
economies to develop in a positive way (Diamond 1997; Ross 2006; Karl 1997; Acemoglu and
Robinson 2001; Krugman 1991).
The second factor, depicted in column three of Table 2.4, which I call internationalpower, has indicators of overall military size and scale (military personnel and military
expenditures) plus the presence of the most important natural resource to both military and
economic might, oil (oil production), and one of the most historically important aspects of
defense (mountainous terrain).
These state attributes are often linked to power in the international realm by numerous
studies (Krasner 1978; Mearsheimer 2001). That the results indicate this is its own dimension of
state capacity supports the idea that power and regime type or institutions not necessarily
dependent on one another, and states with international power potentially behave as their own
class of actors.
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Table 2.4 Factor Analysis Results of Indicators of State Capacity²
Capacity Type
Variable
(ln) Military Personnel¹
(ln) Military Expenditures
(ln) Oil Production
Ethnic Cohesion
Religious Cohesion
Oil Rents/GDP
Contract Intensive Money
Coastal Land
Domestic Taxes/Total Rev
Trade Taxes/Total Rev
Distance to Nearest Port
Temperate Land
Investor Confidence
Census Frequency
(ln) Mountainous Terrain
Military Personnel Per
Military Expenditure/GDP

Administrative International
Reach Coercive Divided
Extractive
Power Coastal
Rentier
Rentier
Factor 1
Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Unique
0.0903
0.2168
0.2199 0.2023
*0.8389 -0.1124
0.0609
0.2053 -0.0315 0.1111
*0.4637
*0.7024
0.1013
-0.0036 -0.2814 0.4177
*0.6842 -0.0723
0.0832 -0.2363
-0.1269 *0.5689
0.271
*0.5064
0.1984
-0.1372 -0.0722
-0.1237 *0.7931
0.334
-0.2389
0.0049
0.0638 *0.5064 *-0.3991 0.4967
0.2028
0.0894 *0.6652 -0.0577
0.0003 0.3922
-0.0441
-0.3416 *0.7673
0.0767
0.1664 0.3373
-0.1036
0.1915
0.0193 -0.1596 0.3127
*0.7515
-0.1818 -0.0056
0.0941
0.0913 0.5695
*-0.5874
-0.2363
0.0434
0.0475 -0.1372 0.4031
*-0.6955
-0.0188 -0.2651
-0.1179
0.1441 0.3137
*0.8507
0.2413
0.2612
0.0178 -0.1831 0.1822
*0.6943
-0.0093
0.2967 *0.6025 -0.2071
0.0638 0.4361
0.048 -0.2177
0.1777 0.4256
*-0.4379
*0.6371
0.0882
0.099
0.0154 *0.8665
0.1922 0.2223
-0.1034
0.1905 -0.0885 *0.8405
0.0178 0.2271

Note (1): (ln) = Natural Logarithm
Note (2): *Bolded indicates loadings above .3 or below -.3
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Results for the third factor, which I call the reach-coastal factor, is shown in column four
of Table 2.4, and has three indicators that load strongly on it. These include census frequency,
contract intensive money (CIM), and coastal land. This most closely approximates the idea of
“infrastructural power” within the IR and state capacity literature (Mann 1993; Fortin 2012).
Infrastructural power is the ability of the government to “reach” all the areas of the territory it
controls with diverse and complex policy implantation and enforcement. Mann (1993) used CIM
as a key component of his operationalization of infrastructural power, and the ability to
administer a regular census along with clearly defined borders via coastal land, fits with this
overall conception. As explained in the previous chapter, CIM in particular is thought to indicate
high levels of trust in the government and that government regulation and enforcement is of a
high quality and is far reaching (Clague et al. 1999).
The fourth factor, I name the coercive-rentier factor, also has three indicators that load
strongly on it, as depicted in column five of Table 2.4. The variables of military personnel per
capita, military expenditures as a ratio to GDP, and oil rents as a percent of GDP are all strongly
associated with this factor. Recall Table 2.2, following the work of others (Hendrix 2010) the
first two military variables, were included explicitly to capture the coercive component of state
capacity described in my conceptualization in chapter one. While overall military might is a
good measure of international power, military personnel and expenditures as ratios of domestic
population and resources indicates that the state might be worried about dissent or, in extreme
cases, revolt from its population. Therefore, it spends a disproportionate amount of resources on
its military. That this is coupled with the most explicit rentier indicator, oil rents as a percentage
of GDP, supports theories that rentier states are their own class of polity, and that they rely on
coercive behavior to maintain control and power (Karl 1997; Ross 2004, 2006). As with the
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other factors, that this pattern holds despite its inclusion with all the other variables in the factor
analysis, highlights it as a distinct “type” of state capacity, that most-likely empowers different
sorts of state behaviors.
Finally, the fifth factor, I call the social-cohesion factor, has the measures of ethnic and
religious fractionalization load positively on it, and the measure of oil rents load negatively on it.
The fact that these two variables only correlate at .37 percent in isolation, but in the factor
analysis load strongly on the same factor indicates that both types of fractionalization, or
cohesion, occur in certain types of states at high rates. That rentierism is low in highly cohesive
states is doubly interesting, and either says something about how cohesive states extract oil, or
about how states with oil attract diverse and divided ethnic and religious groups. Either way this
is an interesting relationship worth exploring, and it supports my original notion that social
cohesion was an important and distinct aspect of state capacity.
Table 2.5 depicts results for individual factor analysis on only those variables that loaded
above .3 or below -.3 for each factor. This extra step is important because it tests whether or not
it was the idiosyncratic nature of the data, caused by either the list-wise deletion of certain
countries on some variables, or that one or two variables were driving the relationships between
all five of the factors, rather than just the individual factors they loaded strongly on. As
evidenced by the different number of observations for each factor analysis shown in Table 2.5,
when the number of variables is reduced, many countries are included that were deleted in the
full factor analysis. Only one variable that loaded strongly on a factor drops below the .3 cutoff
and that is the indicator of mountainous terrain for the administrative-extractive factor. This
means that the results in the full factor analysis are not particularly susceptible to changes in
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Table 2.5: Results of Separate Factor Analyses
Administrative-Extractive
(ln) Military Expenditures¹
Ethnic Fractionalization
Domestic Taxes/GDP
Trade Taxes/GDP
Temperate Land
Investor Confidence
(ln) Distance to Nearest Port
(ln) Mountainous Terrain²
N

0.78
-0.63
0.81
-0.67
0.74
0.88
-0.81
-0.05
1795

Reach-Coastal
Census Frequency
Coastal Land
Contract Intensive Money
N

0.71
0.70
0.83
3635

Social Cohesion
Ethnic Fractionalization
Religious Fractionalization
Oil Rents/GDP
N

0.73
0.54
0.69
3267

International-Power
(ln) Military Personnel
(ln) Military Expenditures
(ln) Oil Production
(ln) Mountainous Terrain

0.90
0.90
0.65
0.40

3668
Coercive- Rentier
Oil Rents %GDP
Military Personnel Per Capita
Military Expenditures/GDP
N

0.63
0.62
0.72
2948

Note (1): (ln) = Natural Logarithm
Note (2): The indicator of mountainous terrain drops out of the administrative-extractive factor
when examining each in isolation. It is the only indicator to change between the full factor analysis
and the individual factor analysis.
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the countries that are included in the sample and one can be more confident in those results
presented in Table 2.4. Indeed, the fact that most factor loadings become stronger also inspires
confidence in the results from the full factor analysis. It is these individual factor analyses that
are used to produce the “factor scores” or variables that represent each dimension of state
capacity in further analysis. These are discussed at greater length in the next section.
In sum, the factor analysis results presented in Table 2.4 and 2.5 demonstrate several
important things. First, they show that indicators commonly linked to state capacity can be
divided into multiple and distinct dimensions. This strongly supports the theory that state
capacity is a multidimensional concept and should be operationalized accordingly. Second, it
highlights the advantages of using factor analysis on many indicators used to operationalize a
concept, in order to reduce the number of variables into the core components that capture a
complex concept. This makes that concept more amenable to analysis in quantitative models of
numerous outcomes of interest. Finally, the results in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate the utility of
factor analysis as a tool to test the theories about the relationship between different indicators
related to state capacity. That advantageous geography and institutions are related in the factor
analysis supports the work of many on this subject. Similarly the links between rentierism and
coercive elements within a state revealed by the factor analysis aligns with long-standing ideas
about how rentier-states might operate. This is all important information that helps continue to
build theories about how and why states behave the way they do.

2.5 Factor Analysis Results and Countries
Another important result of the factor analysis described above is to produce variables
that contain scores for each country, in each year data is available, for each factor. These
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variables can then be used to understand where countries are relative to each other on each
dimension of state capacity exposed by the factor analysis. This makes further research
comparative analysis of how the level and type of state capacity influences state behavior easier.
States with similar levels of capacity on some dimensions but not on others, and with divergent
outcomes, could make ripe candidates for in depth study. Moreover international policy makers
could use this information to better assess what areas of a state need more focused help to make
them more stable and/or functional.
Table 2.6 provides the descriptive statistics for the “factor scores” that correspond to each
state capacity type. These scores can be used as variables, representing each dimension or “type”
of state capacity described above. Because these cores are produced by a procedure attempting to
find hidden relationships between the indicators that explain the largest amount of variance in the
data possible it should produce relatively standard scores for each factor. The reason for this is to
standardize the values of each factor according to the proportion of the variance it explains. Put
simply, the factors should have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1 (Grice 2001). Table
2.6 illustrates that this is the case. That said it is common when using factor scores from a full
factor analysis for the ranges of those scores to be relatively equal. Because these variables are
produced by individual factor analyses for each dimension of state capacity that only include the
variables that load above .3 or below -.3 in the full factor analysis, a broader range of values is
possible on some of the variables. Though at first this might seem problematic, the fact that these
variables are not standardized to roughly the same range is actually helpful because they
maintain the information about countries existing at the bottom and top limits of each factor
score.
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For example, Table 2.6 shows that the coercive-rentier factor has a much larger
maximum (13.73) value than the scores for the other factors. This is because a handful of
countries for several years, including Kuwait in the early 90s, Bosnia Hercegovina in the middle
90s, Eritrea in the late 90s and early 2000s, Isreal in the early 80s, and Syria in the late 80s, were
all given high scores on this factor. This is caused by each of these countries, for those years,
having high values for the three indicators that load strongly on this factor: military expenditures
relative to GDP, military personnel per capita, and oil rents as a percentage of GDP. Kuwait in
the early 90s represents the extreme value. This is most likely due to the fact that immediately
following the removal of Iraqi invaders from their territory they ramped up oil production and
used rents from it to fund an exceptionally large military expansion (Al-Zumai 2013). Despite
representing an extreme case, this could be indicative of states that emerge from conflict, making
it useful information that animates how the type of state capacity a state has influences how it
behaves in different circumstances.
Table 2.6 Descriptive Statistics of State Capacity Types
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Range
Administrative-extractive 1804 -4.38E-10
1
-2.062 2.234
International-power
3668 -3.31E-10
1
-2.522 4.571
Coercive-rentier
3134 4.87E-11
1
-0.996 13.73
Reach-coastal
3635 -7.00E-10
1
-2.541 2.871
Divided-rentier
3267 4.97E-10
1
-3.344 1.738

Overall, then, the fact that the factor score ranges depicted in Table 2.6 are uneven,
represents an advantage of generating the factor scores from only those indicators linked to each
factor in the full analysis. The following sub sections examine how countries rank relative to
each other based on their scores for each factor. This helps illuminate what these scores mean in
the real world. It also helps act as a check on the validity of this analysis, because if country
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scores on each of the factors, which I argue represent dimensions of state capacity, do not make
sense then the analysis may be flawed and require further refinement.
2.5.1 Countries and Administrative-Extractive Capacity
Figure 2.1 illustrates scores on the administrative-extractive dimension of state capacity
for five of the top ten scoring countries over time. Despite the fact that there is still variety
between how these countries organize their institutions, their historical legacies, and even their
individual cultures, the high scores on this factor indicate there is something similar about them
related their relatively stable governments, temperate climates, close proximity to other
developed economies, low levels of rentierism, and high levels of ethnic cohesion.
The Figure 2.1 also illustrates five of the bottom ten scoring countries on this dimension
of state capacity over time. They are all countries in Africa, mostly sub-Saharan Africa, a hotbed
of internal strife, poor geographical conditions, such as a tropical climate, low proximity to
developed economies, and low quality institutions. Again, these countries all represent enormous
diversity in their institutional designs, culture, and size, but there is an essential quality they all
share, and that is low levels of administrative-extractive capacity. The identification of these
patterns is a major advantage of using factor analysis to operationalize state capacity because it
highlights how essential qualities at the low and high end in these states could explain the
different outcomes within them.
In addition to illustrating how countries change relative to each other, the results
presented in Figure 2.1 show what years states were either at their best or worst for
administrative-extractive capacity. This is useful information because the yearly scores for states
can act like the rings of a tree, indicating relative stability over time or pointing to when a state
may have gone through some internal or external shock that affected a state’s factor score, and
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thus level and type of capacity. Japan is represented by the top line in Figure 2.1. It reached its
peak level of administrative-extractive capacity in the late 80s, immediately before its economy
declined substantially. The resulting so-called “lost decade” (Economist 2012) resulted in a
steady decline in administrative-extractive capacity and could warrant further in-depth
investigation.
Another important point highlighted by Figure 2.1 is that the top scoring countries on
administrative-extractive capacity all have high scores throughout the time period under
examination. Recall scores for the administrative-extractive factor range from 2.2 to -2. This is
true for all of the top 10 countries, which take up 166 of the possible 240 year-country parings at
the top of the rankings for administrative-extractive capacity, suggesting that there are positive
feedback loops to high levels of this form of capacity that keep countries high on this dimension
of state capacity.
Turning to the bottom of Figure 2.1, countries at the bottom of the rankings for
administrative-extractive capacity there may also be a feedback loop, but with opposite
consequences. All of these countries, despite marginal changes over time, remain in the bottom
third of the rankings for administrative-extractive capacity. The stability of countries at both the
top and bottom may also be a function of their unchanging geographies, which are factored into
their scores. That said marginal changes are not insignificant and could highlight states who are
successfully overcoming their unfortunate geographical luck. Mauritius, for example, is
represented by the dark solid grey line. It was still emerging from colonialism in the late 70s, in
the early 80s there was minor political strife, followed by a period of modest economic growth,
political stability, and expanding social safety net (Stiglitz 2011). Mauritius’ administrativeextractive capacity appears to match the story of its development, hiccups and all.
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Another pattern is that the levels of administrative-extractive capacity as depicted in
Figure 2.1 appear much less stable over time than the levels in high scoring countries shown in.
Perhaps this is because states with low levels of stability, or poor geographic circumstances,
cannot improve the quality of their institutions in a sustainable way. Although the investigation
of these precise causal mechanisms are beyond the scope of this analysis, the patterns revealed
by looking where countries rank on the administrative-extractive dimension of state capacity
raise important questions about the role shocks play in effecting state capacity, and what makes
some states able to improve despite a worse starting position relative to other states.
2.5.2 Countries and International-Power Capacity
Figures 2.2 depicts six of the top and bottom ten ranking countries for factor two, which I
call the international-power dimension of state capacity. Given this dimension of state capacity’s
inclusion of the overall size and scale of a state’s military and resources, countries with large
territories and populations dominate the top ten. That said, population and country size do not
determine the rank order, since China is not first—as it is in population—but third, and Saudi
Arabia, France, and Iran all have larger militaries and more oil resources than does the second
most populous country, India. The reverse pattern, that the smallest countries would be at the
bottom of international-power rankings, is mostly true as well, given that these countries are
mostly small African or Eastern European countries. That said, however, the bottom is not
simply a list of the smallest countries in the dataset, as that would mean Botswana should be
third from the bottom rather than seventh, and the list should include the United Arab Emirates,
Lesotho, and Namibia.
As discussed in the previous section, the advantage of this analysis is that countries
receive a score for each year, so it is possible to see how states change overtime. It also helps to
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see how patterns linking both external and internal circumstances, like threats from a neighbor or
from within, changes in the global economy, or a discovery of oil to international power. For
example, Saudi Arabia experiences a sharp rise during the years of the first Gulf War, but it
never declines again. Clearly this period represented a new military reality for Saudi Arabia.
Figure 2.2 also puts patterns of pre vs. post-Cold War into context. China and Saudi
Arabia engage in military buildups starting in 1990, while the United States continues its general
pattern despite the demise of its main adversary, the Soviet Union. Russia, illustrated by the light
grey dotted line whose data starts with the collapse of the Soviet Union, experiences an initial
decline which corresponds to the problems they experienced with transitioning away from
communism, and the economic shocks associated with that, before steadily rising again due to
discoveries of large oil reserves and an improving economy. France, shown by the dark thin line
in the middle of the chart, stays more stable overtime indicating perhaps that they are less
influenced by changing international landscapes than other countries.
For the bottom scoring countries on this dimension, Figure 2.2 shows a more stable story.
While there are minor variations, the scores constrained to a smaller range than for those
countries at the top of the rankings. This is likely because without resources or population
reserves, large buildups are impossible. What is highlighted, however, is how internal strife can
create significant drop-offs in international-power capacity. Sierra Leone experiences a large dip
beginning in the late 90s and continuing through the early 2000s, at the height of their civil war.
Liberia experiences a similar dip throughout the 90s due to their first civil war (Ellis 1999). The
second Liberian civil war lasted fewer years and thus only slowed its steady increase in
international power throughout the early 2000s. This relationship between civil conflict and
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international-power, is one many observable patterns available when capacity types are tracked
over time.
2.5.3 Countries and Reach-Coastal Capacity
The scores for six of the top and bottom ten scoring countries for factor 3, or what I call
the “reach-coastal” dimension of state capacity, are presented in Figure 2.3. Relatively large
island nations such as Ireland, New Zealand, Japan, and the Philippines dominate the top of the
rankings for this list, while land-locked African nations dominate the bottom of the list. As with
the other factors presented above, despite the variety of differences between countries at both the
top and bottom of the list, the result of the factor analysis shows they have some essential and
similar qualities that allow them to have either high or low levels of contract intensive money
(CIM) and conduct a regular census. The fact that large amounts of coastal land fit with these
other two components is yet another interesting result from the factor analysis that fits with
existent theory, discussed in chapter one and above, about the importance of coasts to economic
and institutional development. The results also highlight how landlocked countries suffer when
they have little to no access to coasts.
The trend of the top countries staying relatively stable appears to continue for reachcoastal capacity, though sudden drops highlight, yet again, the importance sudden internal and
external shocks can have to an economy. For example, Ireland’s struggles, indicated by bold
grey line, since the great recession of 2008 are indicated by the sharp drop in its reach-coastal
capacity which perhaps caused a loss of faith in domestic institutions and international trade.
Unlike, Ireland, New Zealand, South Korea, and the Philippines who were less integrated and
dependent on the international financial institutions most affected by the crash bore it quite well,
staying much more stable in the years following the crash.
79

80

Perhaps these states were rewarded by international investors and citizens for avoiding the worst
consequences of the 2008 recession.
Turning to the bottom of Figure 2.3, it is notable that two countries are improving, and
four are holding reasonably steady. Some part of the fact that there appears to be more
improvement among the bottom ranked countries is that they have much more room to increase
the proportion of contract intensive money and begin to issue a regular census. Strong
performances in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and in Kazakhstan might be
attributable to discoveries of natural resources of rare earth minerals like copper, cobalt, and
gold, for the former and oil for the latter. It is unlikely that this increase is due to more state
stability since the DRC especially has been embroiled in civil conflict since the Mobutu regime
fell in the 1990s (Autesserre 2010). Thought it may also be the result of technological advances
that allow capital to move into Africa more easily than in the past. This can include better cell
service and internet connections (Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013). Furthermore, the DRC and
Afghanistan move in opposite directions despite both experiencing conflict during this period
lending further support to the natural resources explanation. Afghanistan’s only major export is
an illicit drug (Opium) while the DRC exports resources that often brings international
investment and some measure of regulation. The identification of these, and other potential
patterns, are evidence once again of the advantages inherent in using factor analysis to
understand what indicators group together to make countries similar and different.
2.5.4 Countries and Coercive-Rentier Capacity
The rankings of six of the top and bottom ten countries for factor 4, which I name
“coercive-rentier” capacity, are presented in Figure 2.4. Top scoring countries generally are
either well-known oil producers or countries that have experienced serious internal or external
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military threats throughout their history. Another apparent pattern, which was mentioned in an
above section, is that countries that score highly on this dimension of state capacity often do so
in years at the end of conflict, or immediately following conflict. Following the eviction of Iraq
from Kuwait, for example, Kuwait’s score on this component is very high. Eritrea and Bosnia
Herzegovina experienced similar a phenomenon at or near the end of their conflicts. This is most
likely due to the large number of troops present in country, and the need for the governments to
extract as much as they can from natural resources in order to pay for them. Countries at the
bottom of the list are famous for having small to nonexistent militaries, Costa Rica for example
was the first nation to explicitly disband their military in 1948 and have remained peaceful since
(Barash 2013). Other countries that have experienced conflict, like Ghana, Haiti, and
Mozambique either made decisions after to reduce their militaries (Ghana), or did not have the
resources to have organized units fighting, but instead experienced chaotic civil violence (Haiti,
Mozambique).
The make-up of the countries on the bottom of this list highlights the cross-cutting nature
of the coercive-rentier dimension of state capacity. Some countries, like Iceland, Monaco, and
Switzerland, are highly developed and maintain order through the legitimacy their governments
enjoy with their populations. Meanwhile other states that are low on this dimension truly require
more coercive-rentier capacity in order to increase security and order for their citizens. Haiti in
particular highlights this juxtaposition and illustrates why coercive-rentier capacity allows the
government to undertake important functions, like providing stability, control, and security for
citizens, and therefore is a key part of state capacity (Toft 2008).
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Figure 2.4 also highlights the extreme situation in Kuwait during and following the Iraq
invasion. It also shows how levels of this dimension of state capacity appeared to peak in the top
countries during the 80s and early 90s but, with the exception of in Eritrea who was under threat
of conflict with Ethiopia and internal unrest, have declined since. One possible explanation is
that as a new post-Cold War order stabilized states felt less pressure to maintain large militaries
relative to their populations. Another explanation is that rent-seeking declined in
Numerous states as governments learned about the economic pitfalls of rentierism and found
other ways to raise revenue. An example of this is Middle-Eastern States like Saudi Arabia, who
have attempted to diversify their economies away from oil production (Reguly 2014).
The coercive-rentier scores shown in Figure 2.4 illustrate that countries ranking at the
bottom of the coercive-rentier dimension of state capacity have remained stable and low on this
dimension over the entire sample of country-years. These states have few resources that lend
themselves to rentierism, which may highlight the relationship between resources, rent-seeking
behavior, and both the ability and desire to maintain large coercive apparatuses. The causal
direction, however, is difficult to identify. The Collier and Hoeffler model of civil conflict
(2004), for example, would suggest that the mere presence of resources will increase the
incentives for elites and rebels to challenge the government for control over those resources. This
would make the government feel more pressure to maintain coercive capacity to protect said
resources. Another way it could work is that coercive regimes are so and rents only enhance that
capacity. Specifically, I would argue that Israel is a coercive state not because of the resources it
has, which are minimal, but because it is under constant threat from outside and within.
Regardless of the precise reasons, the comparison of states at the top and bottom of this list helps
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can help identify patterns that require further exploration about the relationship between rents
and coercion in states.
2.5.4 Countries and Social Cohesion Capacity
The final factor I link to a dimension of state capacity is what I call “social-cohesion”
capacity. In some ways this is the dimension of state capacity that is under the least amount of
control by the government because population demographics change very slowly over time.
Nonetheless, as explained in chapter one, and earlier in this chapter, it is an important component
of how a state functions and thus important to state capacity overall. Figure 2.5 depicts changes
overtime for six of the top and bottom scoring countries on this dimension of state capacity. The
top ranked countries are populated with countries from all over the world. The one commonality
between them is that they are all states where there is a high level of overlap between the
“nation” associated with state institutions and religion and ethnicity. Sometimes this is a result of
their geographical isolation (Japan) or because the country is small and has existed for a long
time on its current territory. Other countries like Armenia and Cambodia experienced genocides
that drove minorities out.
Countries at the bottom of the list illustrated in Figure 2.5 are mostly newer states in the
Middle-East or Africa notorious for their arbitrary borders. These borders were often drawn to
divide populations rather than unite them to make colonial governance easier and have had many
long-term consequences on the development of these states (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
2011). These states often suffer from ethnically driven violence (Sambanis 2001; 2004) or
simply distrust, which can have a deleterious effect almost all aspects of a state’s ability to
function (Zak and Knack 2001).
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Another important observation illustrated in Figure 2.5 is that since scores of ethnic and
religious fractionalization rarely change, the changes depicted in the chart are mostly driven by
oil rents, which associate with this factor. That rent-seeking behavior negatively associated with
high social cohesion fits with ideas discussed above, and in chapter one, that discover of oil can
exacerbate already simmering ethnic and religious divisions, this can push the state to use
resources to maintain control rather than for economic development. Figure 2.5 highlights states
that have no oil, like Portugal, represented by the flat thin black line. It also shows when oil rentseeking is having a deleterious effect on a highly cohesive country like Tunisia where 99% of the
population is the same ethnicity and religion. Oil rents held Tunisia back on this dimension in the
80s, but as oil production decreased cohesion increased. The recent events of the so-called “Arab
Spring” which began in Tunisia map onto a decrease on this dimension of capacity due to
increased rent-seeking behavior.
At the bottom end of this dimension of state capacity a different story comes to light.
Countries with low social-cohesion capacity experience much more variability on the socialcohesion dimension of capacity than do the top scoring states. With the exception of
international-power, and coercive-rentier capacity, the bottom countries were on the socialcohesion dimension of state capacity are always more volatile than the top countries which again
emphasizes the potentially positive feedback loops associated with administrative-extractive
capacity, reach-coastal capacity, and now social-cohesion capacity. Again what variability there
is in the factor scores for social-cohesion shown in Figure 2.5 is driven by oil rents since ethnic
and religious fractionalization do not change much overtime. Due to the negative loading of oil
rents on this factor, an increase oil rents leads to a decline in social-cohesion capacity scores.
One interesting potential pattern requiring further analysis is if, for example, in the Republic of
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Congo, a highly divided state, anytime rent seeking occurred there was also ethnic strife. This
fits with a key theorized causal mechanism linking ethnic and religious divisions to poor
governance. The mechanism is that states with high levels of diversity will have higher levels of
rent-seeking behavior because ethnic and religious groups will band together in an attempt to
monopolize state resources (Horowitz 1985; 1993). This type of theory testing is an important
advantage of using factor analysis on different indicators of state capacity.

2.4 Conclusions
This chapter applied factor analysis to indicators used to operationalization each
component of my conceptualization of state capacity outlined in chapter one. Hopefully, after
reading this chapter, the advantages of using factor analysis to better understand what state
capacity is and to measure it empirically are clear.
First, it helps to reduce the number of observable indicators required to operationalize a
complex concept like state capacity by revealing the “hidden” variables that represent core
associations in the data. Second, it helps to test theories about the relationships between these
indicators by showing how they are associated with each other in ways that are not directly
observable. For example, the theorized relationship between strong, efficient institutions and the
ability to extract resources via taxes (Kugler and Arbetmann 2007) was confirmed by this
analysis because they loaded on the same “factor” and became what I call “administrativeextractive capacity. Third, this analysis helped confirm the theory that state capacity is, in fact, a
multidimensional concept by showing that there are multiple factors that explain significant
proportions of the variance between all of the indicators for the countries and years included in
the sample. While this is often accepted as conventional wisdom, recent work by Hendrix (2010)
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had cast doubt on that idea, so it represents an important finding. Fourth, the scores for countries
for each dimension of state capacity produced by the factor analysis can be charted over time and
can help illuminate what the causes and consequences of internal and external shocks to many
different countries. Understanding why events unfold the way they do is a primary goal in
political science, and finding patterns between state attributes different outcomes during events
will hopefully be an important aid to future, more in-depth research on specific countries. These
scores can also be used as independent variables in quantitative analysis of many outcomes of
interest. The next three chapters are focused on a quantitative analysis examining how the
different dimensions or “types” of state capacity related to state respect for human rights.
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Chapter Three
State Capacity and Physical Integrity Rights
Traditionally the state has been expected to provide security both internally and externally,
and to provide for the general good of society. In an age when considerable resources are
available for the state’s missions, it is paradoxical to find many states insecure and
repressive.
Conway W. Henderson (1991)

3.1 Introduction
My goal in this chapter is to use the new indicators of state capacity developed in chapter
two to better understand patterns of state repression. Recall that in previous chapters this
dissertation focused primarily on the development of a new conceptualization and
operationalization of state capacity. I argue the utility of any conceptualization and
operationalizations of state capacity should be its ability to capture the multidimensional nature
of state capacity. Put simply, it must account for the fact that state capacity can have many
sources, and because of this, states can have high capacity in some areas of action and low
capacity in others. For example a government in a state with high levels of coercive-rentier
capacity might behave differently towards a set of protesters than a government in a state with
high levels of administrative-extractive capacity. The ultimate result—a stable government with
control over its territory—could be the same but the pathway to get there is different depending
on the level and type of capacity a state has.
As I argue in chapter two, using factor analysis to help reveal the multidimensionality of
state capacity makes understanding how different types of capacity might lead to different state
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outcomes or behaviors. The factor analysis on 17 indicators commonly associated with state
capacity revealed there are five core dimensions which I named: administrative-extractive,
international-power, reach-coastal, coercive-rentier, and social-cohesion. Furthermore, the factor
analysis produced a score on each of the five dimensions for each country in each year from
1981-2010. These scores can be used as independent variables to analyze a number of outcomes
of interest, including the different levels of state respect for human rights.
Therefore, this chapter examines the effect of a state’s level and type of state capacity on
the amount of respect for so-called physical integrity rights. Physical integrity rights include the
rights prohibiting torture, political imprisonment, disappearances, and extrajudicial killing
(Henderson 1991; Cingranelli and Richards 1999a). State respect for these four rights is one of
the most examined topics in the study of human rights. However, measures of state capacity are
often not included in analysis of physical integrity rights. Recently, Young (2009) and Englehart
(2009) found state capacity did play an important role in explaining state respect for physical
integrity rights in their analysis. This chapter builds on their work, by not only using the
improved measures of state capacity developed in chapter two, but also by disaggregating the
analysis of each physical integrity right to see why states might choose to respect one right more
than another rather than using an index of respect for all four rights.
In sum, the results presented in this chapter show the types of state capacity described in
chapter two do influence state respect for physical integrity rights in important ways.
Administrative-extractive capacity in particular is the most influential and positive factor in
explaining state respect for all physical integrity rights by a wide margin. Meanwhile, other types
of capacity linked to state attributes thought to increase the odds of repression, like coerciverentier capacity, international power, and social-cohesion are less influential. Moreover, when
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measures of state capacity are included in the model with other well-established explanatory
variables often related to state repression, like regime type, regime coherence, wealth, civil
conflict, and population the effect of those other factors is clarified. Specifically, the level of
democracy has a mixed relationship with physical integrity rights confirming the suspicion of
some that democracy is no panacea for better state human rights practices (Davenport 2007).
These findings suggest that state capacity, and particularly the type of state capacity a country
has, is a crucial element in accounting for patterns of state respect for physical integrity rights.
The next section of this chapter discusses general hypotheses about the relationship
between different types of state capacity and physical integrity rights. The second section focuses
on specific hypotheses on the influence of different types of state capacity on each individual
physical integrity right. The third section outlines the methods used for testing these hypotheses
statistically using the measures of different types of state capacity. Section four discusses the
results of the statistical tests and offers some concluding thoughts on state capacity and physical
integrity rights.

3.2 State Capacity and Physical Integrity Rights: General Hypotheses
The state and human rights are inextricably linked. When talking about “the state” in this
context I am really speaking of governments. Governments play a critical role both in the theory
and practice of human rights since it is the primary actor for both the protection and violation of
human rights throughout the world (Donnelly 2003). In some cases governments engage in direct
violations of human rights to accomplish goals. These goals can include violent repression of the
perceived threats to those in power (Davenport 2007) or systematic structural discrimination
against minorities, women, and other vulnerable groups to maintain a particular social order
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(Chapman and Carbonetti 2011). In other cases, governments simply lack the ability, or “state
capacity” to protect their citizens from forces that conspire to violate human rights, such as
powerful multi-national corporations, violent militias, or criminal organizations.
I argue that the behavior of governments is to a large degree a function of the level and
type of state capacity the government can draw upon. By this logic, a state’s capacity to
undertake action will necessarily affect its ability to respect, protect, and fulfill the rights of its
citizens. For example, on the one hand governments in states with high institutional capacity may
be in a better position to avoid violating the human rights of their citizens because they can
provide for them, which keeps them happy, and less inclined to engage in political dissent. On
the other hand if state has low institutional capacity, the government might not be able to provide
for their citizens, leading to more political dissent, and more opportunities for human rights
violations through repression.30
Of course, governments vary greatly in what types and levels of state capacity they have
access to. Some states have a large coercive apparatus, some have high quality institutions, some
have a large amount of control over their borders and territory, and some have all of the above.
The key question of this chapter, then, becomes what types of state capacity can one expect to
increase the government’s respect for physical integrity rights?

Physical Integrity Rights H1: States with high levels of administrative-extractive capacity will
have higher levels of governmental respect for physical integrity rights than those with low
levels.

30

This example follows Gurr (1970) who argues that when people feel their government is not providing them the
ability to realize their life expectations, whatever those may be, the resulting “grievances” will make violent
challenges directed at the government more likely.
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The administrative-extractive dimension of state capacity includes indicators of high
quality institutions that are capable of endowing the government with resources, such as tax
revenue, it can use to take action. Indicators of investor confidence, and a high percentage of
taxes from domestic sources like income and sales taxes, load strongly with this dimension of
state capacity. Furthermore, indicators usually thought to suggest weak institutions like rentseeking behavior (Karl 1997; Ross 2004), load and negatively with this dimension of state
capacity. A large number of studies support the idea of the positive role that institutional quality
can play in enforcing the rule of law, fostering economic growth, attracting foreign investment,
and in building robust democratic societies (O’Donnell 2004; Rigobon and Rodrik 2005;
Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya 2006). All of these factors are associated with state respect for
physical integrity rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001). Therefore, as
stated in PhysintH1, it is expected that high scores on this dimension of state capacity will be
associated with higher levels of respect for all physical integrity rights.

Physical Integrity Rights H2: States with high levels of international-power capacity will have
lower governmental respect for physical integrity rights performance than those with low levels.

Recall from chapter two that large absolute numbers of both military personnel and
expenditures, along with oil production, load strongly the international-power dimension of state
capacity. There are several ways high levels of international-power capacity could associate with
lower governmental respect for physical integrity rights. First, states with high levels of
international power are more like to play power politics and therefore are more often involved in
international conflicts (Senese and Vasquez 2008). Because of this, they often become a target,
of domestic political dissent and international terrorism. Saudi Arabia, for example, is a state
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with a high score on the international-power dimension of state capacity due to its large wellfunded military and massive oil reserves. As a consequence Saudi Arabia has both the means and
the interest to become involved in other country’s affairs, as in the recent civil war in Syria
where it was funding Sunni rebel groups (Barnard 2013). This has made the Saudis a prime
target of terrorist groups who disagree with their actions (Hegghammer 2009). The result is a
paranoid government that uses its power to violate the physical integrity rights of many of its
citizens in the name of maintaining internal security.
Second, states with high levels of international-power are also immune to international
pressure to change their internal practices. Despite the fact that they are taken to task for
domestic human rights violations, it is typically the conclusion that they hold themselves above
international norms or international law (Evans 1996; Mertus 2004; Ignatieff 2005; Walldorf
2009). Realist international relations theory posits this is the result of the powerful “doing what
they will” without fear of consequences (Mearsheimer 1996). Again, states like China, Iran,
Saudi Arabia, and Russia, all have high scores on the international-power dimension of state
capacity and all violate the physical integrity rights of their citizens with relative impunity.
That said, high levels of international-power capacity could cut both ways when it comes
to respecting physical integrity rights. One way international power could be positively
associated with physical integrity rights is that governments in these states will feel safe from
serious threats from the population due to their large, well-equipped militaries. Davenport (1995;
2007), for example, argues that the level of threat political elites feel from the population is a
good predictor of the use of repression, particularly violations of physical integrity rights. On
balance, however, the combination of using security as a pretext for rights violations, and
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insulation from international pressure makes international power more likely to lower respect for
physical integrity rights.

Physical Integrity Rights H3: States with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity will have
lower levels of governmental respect for physical integrity rights than those with high levels.

States with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity have a high ratio of military personnel
to the population and a high level of military expenditures relative to GDP. These states also
extract large rents from oil production. The expected relationship between coercive-rentier
capacity and state respect for physical integrity rights is curvilinear, where the least amount of
respect will occur in states with the medium levels of this form of capacity. This hypothesis
follows a similar logic of the so-called “more murder in the middle” (MMIM) theory of political
repression (Fein 1995). The MMIM theory is that governments in states caught between being
fully autocratic and fully democratic will be more likely to use repression because political elites
are at their weakest but still possess enough control over state resources to engage in mass
violations of physical integrity rights.
States with medium levels of coercive capacity are likely to follow a similar pattern
because governments in states with no coercive capacity will not be able to use repression as a
viable tool and governments in states with high levels of coercive capacity will not need to.
When coupled with the rentier component of this dimension of capacity the odds become even
more likely in states with medium levels of this type of capacity.31 Rentier states tend to be
corrupt, have poor institutions, and be subject to global boom and bust cycles because of the
31

This, in part, follows Tilly’s (2003) argument that high capacity (which he defines as control) non-democratic
states will be less likely to use violence against citizens than low capacity non-democratic states.
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government’s over-reliance on one resource for its revenue (Karl 1997; Ross 2004). However,
states which huge amounts of rentier capacity can store up revenue to use during harder times to
control the population, or at least keep them happy. States with moderate amounts of rentier
capacity are likely to experience all of the negative consequences, like corruption and uneven
economic development, without many of the long-term benefits. Nigeria, Eritrea, Yemen, Iran,
Qatar, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan, in the 80s and early 90s are all examples of states with medium
levels of coercive-rentier capacity, and who I expect to be more likely to violate physical
integrity rights.

Physical Integrity Rights H4: States with high levels of reach-coastal capacity will have
greater levels of governmental respect for physical integrity rights than those with low levels.

High scores on reach-coastal capacity are likely to increase state respect for physical
integrity rights. The reach-coastal capacity dimension contains indicators that suggest strong
penetration of governmental institutions throughout a state’s territory. These indicators include
large amounts of contract intensive money (CIM) and the regular execution of a census.
Furthermore, I argue that since high percentages of coastal land also load strongly on this
dimension of capacity, that it captures states that can control their borders more easily since they
do not share them with other states. This dimension of state capacity is similar to so-called
“infrastructural power” concept developed by Mann (1984; 1993).32 Mann referred to this form
of state power as being based on “territorially-centralized” organization, something made much
easier in states with borders defined by coasts.

32

Mann’s (1984) concept of infrastructural power has been operationalized by subsequent studies using CIM
(Fortin 2012).
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The reason the reach-coastal dimension of state capacity should increase state respect for
physical integrity rights, then, is because it means the state is more likely to be able to provide
public goods throughout its territory. The provision of public goods throughout a state’s territory
by the government is crucial to avoiding serious challenges by dissidents because they help
ameliorate grievances among the population and avoid leaving ungoverned territorial spaces
where rebels can build power bases (Rotberg 2003).

PhysintH5: States with high levels of social-cohesion capacity will have greater levels of
governmental respect for physical integrity rights than those with low levels.

That social-cohesion, meaning a population with similar ethnic and religious
backgrounds, is related to social harmony and state effectiveness is an old idea. J.S. Mill (1861),
argued that social homogeneity is a necessary condition for rights to be realized. More recently
others find that high levels of ethnic fractionalization, the opposite of social cohesion, can lead to
conditions that create human rights violations. These conditions include civil conflict (Horowitz
1985; Sambanis 2004), poor economic growth (Keefer and Knack 2002), and weak democratic
institutions (Dahl 1973). It is important to note that recent studies suggests ethnic and religious
divisions are a necessary but not sufficient condition for repression (Walker and Poe 2002).33
Despite this, however, if anything greater social-cohesion should improve respect for physical
integrity rights by making conditions that foster repression less likely.

33

Walker and Poe (2002) find support for the link between diversity and human rights violations, but only at the
extremes. However, they use a different measure of divided societies than this project, and also do not test this
relationship in a multivariate model, but rather only examine the bivariate correlations between diversity and
rights violations. Therefore, it is difficult to know if diversity interacts with other state characteristics to make
rights violations more or less likely.
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3.3 Right Specific Hypotheses
The preceding section offered some general hypotheses about the relationship between
the different dimensions of state capacity and physical integrity rights. However, one important
observation of a growing number of studies is that states will violate the four physical integrity
rights in different patterns (McCormick and Mitchell 1997; Cingranelli and Richards 1999;
1999a; 2010). It is my contention that a state’s level and type of state capacity will influence
which physical integrity rights governments violate because their array of available policy
options are determined by the level and type of state capacity on which they can draw. One
advantage of using a disaggregated measure of state capacity in this analysis is it makes possible
the exploration of these patterns in greater detail. Therefore, in this section I offer some
hypotheses about the specific relationships between different types of state capacity and
individual physical integrity rights. While one could find literature to justify hypotheses about
the relationship between each state capacity type and each physical integrity right, doing so is
beyond the scope if this chapter. Instead this section includes a description of the hypothesized
relationship between the two state capacity types the literature suggests are most likely to
influence each physical integrity right.34
3.3.1 Torture
Torture is defined by the Convention Against Torture (CAT) as,

34

It is important to note important studies linking other state capacity factors to the violation of individual physical
integrity rights violations. Walt (2005) and O’Shaugnessy (2000) note respectively the important relationship
between international power and the state’s coercive apparatus and torture. There is also a widespread literature
on how a lack of social cohesion or ethnic heterogeneity might make disappearances more likely as in the so-called
“dirty wars” in Latin America during the latter part of the 20th Century (Taylor 1997). This is only a sampling of
studies that connect the different dimensions of state capacity to government respect for individual physical
integrity rights. Although these are interesting relationships that deserve exploration, it is beyond the scope of this
project to go into each in detail. The goal here is to identify initial patterns and get the lay of the land, as so few
studies have disaggregated an analyzed the determinants of the four individual physical integrity rights.
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“any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions” (UN General Assembly, 1984).

The right not to be tortured may be violated by the state directly or by private actors enlisted by
the state. Torture can also include cruel and degrading treatment carried out by police or by
prison guards. Torture is the most persistently and widely violated physical integrity right
(Cingranelli and Richards 2010). If there is one takeaway from the extensive analysis of why
states torture, it is that the use of torture is also an extremely difficult habit for states to kick.
States that use torture in a given year, even sparingly, use it the following year 93% of the time
(Conrad and Moore 2010). As Lightcap and Pfiffner point out, “Of the three great evils that
states can perpetrate on those they control—genocide, slavery, and torture—only one has
positively thrived into the twenty-first century: torture” (2014, 3).

Torture TH1: States with higher levels of administrative-extractive will have more
governmental respect for the right prohibiting torture than those with lower levels.

Torture TH2: States with higher levels of reach-coastal capacity will have more governmental
respect for the right prohibiting torture than those with lower levels.
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Because of the large number and variety of countries that torture, it is difficult to identify
what state attributes should make states less likely to do it. Even in democracies torture is often
used, and indeed, as Rejali (2008) argues, democracies are often on the cutting edge of torture
techniques. That said, as Cingranelli and Richards (1999) note, one of the key explanations for
torture’s persistence is the difficulty governments have ensuring all of their agents, including
intelligence services, police, and members of the military, do not use it. Indeed, as highlighted by
the events at Abu Ghraib prison even low-ranking military personnel require only the subtlest of
hints to take it upon themselves to engage in widespread and systematic torture (Fisk, Harris,
Cuddy 2004; Dickenson 2007). Given this observation, it is likely that the administrativeextractive, and reach-coastal dimensions will lower the likelihood of states employing torture.
Both of these dimensions of state capacity capture different elements of a government’s ability to
exert non-violent over control what happens within institutions and within state borders
respectively. These dimensions of state capacity make it possible for the government to actually
ensure the legal protections against torture are actually enforced because of increased oversight
and training capabilities.
3.3.2 Political Imprisonment
Political prisoners are defined as those individuals who are imprisoned by the
government because of their religious or political beliefs or their membership in a group,
including ethnic or religious groups (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). Only those prisoners who
are incarcerated for non-violent speech or practices related to their group membership or beliefs
are covered by this definition.
The level of state respect for the right prohibiting political imprisonment is much more
fluid than torture. States are much more likely to change in their level of state respect for this
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right. Cingranelli and Richards (1999) hypothesize that this is due to the fact that it is much
easier for states to round up and also release political prisoners than it is for them to torture, kill,
or disappear them.

Police, soldiers, and prison guards, often without the permission or even
knowledge of high government officials, usually carry out these acts [killings,
disappearances, and torture]. Therefore making significant improvements in these
practices requires re-socializing or replacing large number of people in the
civilian and military bureaucracy. Ordering the release of some or all political
prisoners, however, is a relatively easy thing to do (1999, 531).

Political Imprisonment PIH1: States with higher levels of international-power capacity will
have lower governmental respect for the right prohibiting political imprisonment than those with
lower levels.

Since it might be relatively easy for a government to control political imprisonment
within its territory, it is less likely that dimensions of state capacity like administrativeextractive, and reach-coastal capacity will make a large difference in determining state respect
for the right prohibiting it. International-power capacity, on the other hand, should make states
more likely to use political imprisonment because they are likely to become targets of dissenters,
due to their military engagements, and they are insulated from the international consequences of
the outcry often accompanying political prisoners due to their power. China, for example, who
ranks fourth on the international-power dimension of state capacity, is a state that imprisons nonviolent dissenters and appears immune to international pressure to release them because of its
economic and military power.
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Political Imprisonment PIH2: States with higher levels of coercive-rentier capacity will have
less governmental respect for the right prohibiting political imprisonment than those states with
lower levels.

High levels of coercive-rentier capacity in a state will also act as a catalyst for the use of
political imprisonment by the government. Higher levels of coercive-rentier capacity might
indicate the state is likely to have problems like corruption, weak institutions, and inequality,
which can generate grievances and dissent among the population (Gurr 1970). Since rentier
states tend to be non-democratic, they also lack the tools to incorporate dissent into the legitimate
political process so they are left to use their coercive power to imprison dissenters (Tilly 2003).
States like Kuwait, Syria, Eritrea, and Jordan are all countries with high levels of coercive-rentier
capacity who also have either no or only partial respect for political imprisonment. Even
relatively democratic countries such as Israel who score highly on this dimension also have
lower levels of respect for the right prohibiting political imprisonment.
3.3.3 Disappearances
The right not to be disappeared enjoys the highest level of state respect of the physical
integrity rights. Since the famous Velasquez-Rodriguez case, heard in the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights in 1988 which held Honduras responsible for the disappearance of a political
activist within the country, disappearances have been on a well-documented decline (Grossman
2007).35 Disappearances were a common practice during the so-called “dirty-wars” of Latin

35

Grossman (2007) documents how the Velasquez-Rodriguez case tried in the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights led to a large increase in the visibility of disappearances as a problem, and helped further codify their
prohibition in international law.
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America in the late 1970s and 1980s.36 A disappearance occurs in those unresolved cases where
victims are unaccounted for. Cingranelli and Richards point out they are closely related to
killings, since once solved it is usually determined that the victims were killed (1999, 518).

Disappearances DH1: States with higher levels of administrative-extractive capacity will have
more governmental respect for no disappearances than those with lower levels.

Given the observation that disappearances are rarely used because they are costly for the
government state capacity types that raise these costs significantly should lower the probability
that they are used. Specifically, governments with a high degree of institutional oversight, which
I argue is indicated by high levels of administrative-extractive capacity, are less likely to use
disappearances than other forms of repression. Of course, an alternative story could also be the
case, that states with greater institutional capability and resources will also be able to undertake
the complex task of engaging in disappearances. That said, on balance the type of transparency
that often accompanies high quality institutions should make disappearances less likely in these
states.

Disappearances DH2: States with higher levels of international-power capacity will have less
governmental respect for no disappearances than those with lower levels.

Alternatively, since the primary hypothesized hurdle to the use of disappearances is the
costs state attributes that lower the relative costs of using this tactic should make disappearances

36

Timerman (1981) chronicles the use of disappearances as a tactic of repression during the civil conflicts that
plagued Latin America during the 70s and 80s. Disappearances were terrifying for family, friends, and supporters of
the victims due to their suddenness and lack of resolution.
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more common. Higher levels of international-power capacity, then, will make the use of
disappearances by the government more likely. International-power indicates a large and well
equipped military, which should provide the state with resources making disappearances easier
to carry out. As with previous hypotheses, international-power capacity also makes the
government feel insulated from the outcry that could accompany disappearances, or it could use
ongoing military conflicts as a pretext to justify or distract from its use of disappearances.
Countries with high levels of international-power like China, Russia, Iran, and India all have
records of using disappearances.
3.3.4 Extrajudicial Killings
Extrajudicial killings are killings carried out by the state, or private actors at the behest of
the state, without due process of law. Killings as a result of combat are excluded from the
analysis, but those that come as a result of excessive force by police or security forces are
counted (Cingranelli and Richards 1999, 518). The right prohibiting extrajudicial killings is the
second most respected after the right not to be disappeared according to Cingranelli and
Richards’ analysis (1999a, 2010). This means that in the calculation of how to repress the
citizenry, killings are considered a cheaper or less costly method than disappearances in most
states, but more costly than political imprisonment or torture.

Extrajudicial Killings EKH1: States with higher levels of the administrative-extractive capacity
will have less governmental respect for no killings than those with lower levels.

Following the logic of Cingranelli and Richards (1999) discussed above, reducing the
number of extrajudicial killings is probably dependent on a government’s ability to change
ingrained cultures and norms around mistreatment of prisoners and detainees by law
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enforcement. This ability will depend on the quality of the institutions of government to retrain
and oversee all government agents. Therefore, states with high levels of administrative-extractive
capacity are in the best position to ensure law enforcement and security forces avoid unnecessary
and illegal deaths of those in custody.

Extrajudicial Killings EKH2: States with higher levels of coercive-rentier capacity will have
less governmental respect for the right prohibiting extrajudicial killings than those with lower
levels.

A characteristic that should increase the likelihood of a state using extrajudicial killings
as a tactic of repression is coercive-rentier capacity. States with high levels of coercive power are
likely to use lethal force against citizens because they feel they can operate with impunity.
Additionally, a large coercive apparatus is harder to control. States with high levels of coerciverentier capacity have a large military relative to the population, and often use the military to
impose domestic order. Once conditions of martial law are imposed, killing often becomes more
likely as documented by numerous reports (Human Rights Watch 2009). Yemen, Libya, and
Syria, are examples of countries with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity and mixed to low
respect for most years to the right prohibiting extrajudicial killings.

3.4 Alternative Hypotheses
In addition to state capacity, there are numerous other factors that are thought to
influence state respect for physical integrity rights. Regime type is probably the most common
factor hypothesized to influence physical integrity rights. Numerous studies find that the more
democratic a state is the more likely it is to respect physical integrity rights (Henderson 1991,
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1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Hofferbert and Cingranelli 1996; McCormick and Mitchell 1997;
Richards 1999; Davenport 2007a). The mechanisms linking democracy to greater respect for
physical integrity rights include 1) that repressive behavior is more costly because leaders can be
voted out of office, 2) democratic societies are generally more accepting and tolerant which is in
conflict with the use of repression, and 3) democracies provide citizens with the ability to engage
in participation and contestation through legitimate pathways, thus reducing the justification for
coercive repression (Davenport 2007a, 10-11).
One modification to the regime type hypothesis is that the relationship between regime
type and state respect for physical integrity rights is not linear. Fein (1995) finds that, while high
levels of democracy are best for improving state respect for physical integrity rights, while states
are transitioning to democracy from dictatorship, they become more repressive. This so-called
“more murder in the middle” theory of governmental repression posits that states with incoherent
institutions, or a mix of both autocratic and democratic institutions are likely to be the worst
violators of physical integrity rights (King 1998; Regan and Henderson 2002; Davenport and
Armstrong 2004; Regan and Bell 2010; Conrad and Moore 2010)
Another condition strongly associated with a reduction in state respect for physical
integrity rights is ongoing violent civil conflict or civil war. As Hafner-Burton (2014) notes,
ongoing civil conflict is arguably one of the most well-established causes of human rights
violations. States experiencing civil conflict tend to be at their weakest and most threatened
creating a doubly strong incentive to violate human rights. Weak states are unable to protect their
citizens from the harms that can occur during civil conflict by both government forces and rebel
forces alike (Englehart 2009).

107

A state’s level of development and wealth is also closely linked to the level of state
respect for physical integrity rights. The connections between wealth and human rights
performance are fairly straight-forward since wealth gives the state many more resources to
“bargain” with the population (Young 2009, 289) thus removing potential grievances. Removing
grievances is important since a relatively content population is unlikely to require repression.
Obviously when it comes to economic rights wealth is even more important, since many of these
rights, like basic income guarantees, social welfare, and healthcare require a government with the
resources to provide them.
Finally, a state’s population is included in the analysis. Most studies of repression and
civil conflict include some control for population since higher populations often raise the costs of
a state taking action and can also make the government’s control over a territory more tenuous
and repression more likely (Henderson 1993; Herbst 2000). Larger populations also often
contain more political, ethnic, religious, and economic inequality, which are all potential causes
of grievances that might spur state repression.37

3.4 Data and Methods
To test my hypotheses about the relationship between state capacity and state respect for
physical integrity rights, I use the measures from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project
(henceforth referred to simply as “CIRI”) (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). CIRI uses the State
37

Numerous studies control for similar alternative hypotheses across all physical integrity rights (Poe, Tate, and
Keith 1999; Davenport 1995; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001). That said, one alternative hypotheses notable in
its absence is the lack of controls for human rights treaty ratification, which some have argued is not an important
factor in explaining state respect for human rights (Hathaway 2002; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007). More
recently studies have used convincing evidence to support the idea that under limited circumstances treaty
ratification might improve state respect for human rights (Neumayer 2005; Simmons 2009; Richards and Haglund
2015). However, these findings remain controversial and have raised important questions about how the influence
of treaties should be measured, that I have chosen to leave it out of this analysis.
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Department Human Rights Reports and Amnesty International country reports, to code state
respect for the four physical integrity rights for 202 countries from 1981-2011. The scores for
each right range from 0-2 with 0 representing “no respect”, 1 representing “some respect”, and 2
representing “full respect.”
There are multiple options when it comes to measuring physical integrity rights. The
Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Gibney et al. 2012) is the other well-known option for measuring
state respect for physical integrity rights. Both use the U.S. State Department human rights
reports and the Amnesty International (AI) human rights reports as the primary materials for
coding the level of state respect. The primary difference between the two is the fact that CIRI’s
score of state respect for physical integrity rights can be disaggregated into individual scores for
each type of violation, whereas PTS’ scores cannot as they only offer an overall score for
physical integrity rights taken together.38 Therefore, the data from CIRI are preferable for this
dissertation because one goal is to examine not only how state capacity influences physical
integrity rights generally, but also how state capacity influences each right individually.
In addition to including the scores for each dimension of state capacity generated in the
chapter two, some important control variables are included to account for the alternative
hypotheses of state respect for physical integrity rights.
The first important control is the level of respect a state has for the physical integrity right
under investigation in the previous year. It is widely accepted that states who use repression in
one year are very likely to use it again in the next (Gurr 1988) and presumably this translates to
the form of repression as well. For example, a state using torture in 1981 will be more likely to
use torture in 1982 than a state that did not use torture in 1981. Therefore one year lags of the
38

For a detailed discussion of the differences, advantages and disadvantages, PTS versus CIRI see Wood and
Gibney (2010) and Cingranelli and Richards (2010).
109

dependent variable are included as independent variables. These lagged variables are dummy
variables, for example, the lag of torture is actually three variables, each coded 0 or 1 if in the
previous year the level of respect is “no respect”, “partial respect”, or “full respect.” The
inclusion of the dummy variables of each score allows for the most detailed interpretation and
analysis of why states change their level of respect for physical integrity rights.
To control for civil conflict a measure of ongoing conflict from the PRIO/UCDP Armed
Conflict Database (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2014) is used. An ongoing
civil conflict is considered active within a country in UCDP/PRIO dataset when there are at least
twenty-five battle deaths within a given year. This is a much lower threshold than the Correlates
of War (COW) dataset on intrastate conflict which uses one-thousand battle deaths as the
threshold for an ongoing conflict (Singer and Small 1994; Sarkees 2000). The advantage of using
the UCDP/PRIO dataset is that the measure captures both intense large scale civil conflict, and
also smaller scale conflict which can lead to human rights abuses as well. Typically, states
engage in increasingly violent repression as the likelihood of greater conflict increases, not only
once it has already reached full blown civil war (Rost 2011).
To control for regime type the Polity IV scores for each country in each year are
included. Polity IV Polity IV scores all regimes from 1800-2013 on a scale from +10 to -10. +10
represent a fully consolidated democracy and -10 is a fully entrenched “autocracy”. Regimes
between +6 and -6 are considered “anocracies” since they have some democratic and some
autocratic characteristics. Democracies are considered those regimes where the population has
the ability to participate in the selection of political leadership through elections, has civil
liberties, and has institutionalized constraints on the executive. Autocracies are those where the

110

executive is chosen by the political elite and civil liberties are not respected (Marshall, Jaggers,
and Gurr 2013).
Furthermore, it is those regimes that are in the so-called “anocracy” or transitional phase
that are most likely to violate human rights Fein (1995) coined the “more murder in the middle”
theory of human rights violations, arguing that citizens are most likely to be repressed when a
regime contains a mix of authoritarian and democratic institutions. The explanation for this is
that these mixed regimes result in extremely weak institutions as elites struggle to hold on to
power authoritarian power and use the democratic process to gain power in relation to each other
and the citizenry. The precarious position of political elites makes them more likely to use
repression against dissenters and political opponents. This variable is called regime coherence
and is captured by using the squared version of the PolityIV measure of regime type described
above. Squaring the measure changes it from curvilinear scale to a linear scale with higher scores
indicating a coherent democracy or autocracy, while lower scores indicate anocracies with
“mixed” characteristics.
To control for the level of development and population of a country the natural log of
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and population are included in the analysis. The natural
log of both is taken to account for the exponential nature at which GDP per capita and population
can increase, this helps avoid distortion in the results by extreme values in large and small
countries and is a well-established method of controlling for potential bias and making
interpretation slightly more intuitive. 39 GDP per capita data comes from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators, and data for population is from the Correlates of War (COW)
project.

39

See Tufte (1974) for an explanation of why using the logged versions of GDP and population is appropriate.
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3.4.1 Estimation Technique
A random-effects ordinal logistic estimation technique, with standard errors clustered by
country, that includes lags of the dependent variables, is the most appropriate approach for this
analysis for five reasons. First, the data under investigation are cross-national time-series panel
data including 100 countries for the years 1981-2007, and the dependent variable is (state respect
for the four physical integrity rights). Since the dependent variable is categorical and ordered,
with a range of no respect = 0, some respect = 1, and full respect = 2 and ordered logistic model
is necessary. The advantage of using a random-effect ordinal logistic estimation technique is that
it controls for the influence of both variables that change over time and variables that do not
change over time. In this case, my state capacity measures include indicators that do change,
such as investor confidence, taxes collected, and military personnel and expenditures, as well as
indicators that do not change, such as geography, mountainous terrain, and ethnic and religious
fractionalization. Furthermore, this approach accounts for the “unobserved influence” within the
panel data of multiple observations being from the same country. For example, this technique
accounts for the fact that there might be some hidden commonality between all the observations
from Saudi Arabia during 1981-2007.
A second and third advantage of this approach is that by clustering robust standard errors
(unexplained variance) by country this approach accounts for serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity of standard errors within observations from countries. Serial correlation is
when the error terms from one year to the next are correlated. This is often the case in crossnational panel data, and can bias results (Drukker 2003). Similarly heteroskedasticity is a
problem because it means there is a systematic bias within the error terms. Put simply, this
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approach recognizes that there could be variance within the data not accounted for by the model
which could bias results. Clustering standard errors by country is the best way to account for this.
The fourth and fifth advantages of this approach are, respectively, the inclusion of oneyear lags of the dependent variables coded as dummy variables and controls for violations of the
parallel regression or proportional odds assumptions. The inclusion of dummy variable lags of
the dependent variable in each model is the best way to account for the role the past plays in the
present, in this case a state’s past level of repression (Hafner-Burton 2008; Peksen and Drury
2009). The parallel regression assumption assumes that the proportion of the odds for each
category of the dependent variable is explained equally by each independent variable. Brant tests
reveal that several variables in my analysis violate this assumption. One potential fix for this
problem is to use a generalized ordinal model because it estimates separate regressions for each
outcome category (Williams 2006). However, results of generalized ordinal models are difficult
to interpret, and after using both models results were highly similar, therefore I chose to use the
random effects model to make the interpretation of findings easier. Ultimately, using the
random-effects model with standard errors clustered by country and lags of each category of the
dependent variable accounts for the most potential bias in the model, and doing so increases the
chances of only observing significant results that are very robust.

3.5 Results and Discussion
This section includes a description of the results of the analysis of state capacity and
physical integrity rights. I begin by discussing the implications of the findings for the general
hypotheses on state respect for physical integrity rights (physical integrity rights hypotheses H1H5). I then move on to discuss the findings for the hypotheses of each individual physical
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integrity rights, and how the inclusion of state capacity types in the model influences other
common alternative hypotheses about state respect for physical integrity rights.
The results of the random-effects analysis of state capacity and the four physical
integrity rights under examination are presented in Table 3.1. Recall that these rights include
prohibitions on torture, political imprisonment, extra-judicial killings, and disappearances. The
results for each right in Table 3.1 are depicted in each column under the right’s name. The
number of countries listed at the bottom of each column indicates the number of country clusters
accounted for in the analysis. The values in each column are presented as odds ratios, where
numbers above 1 mean that a standard deviation increase in the values of the dependent variable
increase the odds of higher state respect for each right, numbers below 1 mean a standard
deviation increase in the dependent variable decrease the odds of higher state respect for each
right.40
Table 3.2 summarizes the hypotheses by listing state capacity factors and their expected
effects on physical integrity rights in general and individually. If higher levels of a state capacity
dimension are hypothesized to improve state respect for a right or rights the table reads
“positive” under “expected effect.” If it says “negative” then higher values on that state capacity
dimension is expected to decrease respect for the right or rights under examination. If the state
capacity dimension is statistically significant for the level of state respect for multiple rights, or
exerts a large influence over state respect for a single right, it receives a “strong confirm.” If the
state capacity dimension is statistically significant but works in the opposite direction of the
expected effect, for at least one right, it may receive either a “mixed” or “weak reject” depending

40

For a survey of the debate on using standard deviation changes for both continuous and categorical variables to
illustrate predictive comparisons see Gelman and Pardoe (2007)
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on the strength of the effect. Finally, if the right is only significant for state respect of one right
and/or exerts small influence over state respect for a right then it receives a “weak confirm.”
Table 3.3 depicts the percentage (as opposed to odds) change one standard deviation
increase in each independent variable has for the probability of an increase in state respect for
each physical integrity right. Figure 3.1 illustrates the relative increase in odds of a standard
deviation increase in the statistically significant dependent variables for the level of state respect
each physical integrity right. This figure provides an easy way to identify which independent
variables exert the largest influence over state respect for each physical integrity right.
The results depicted in Table 3.1 and Table 3.3 indicate strong support for physical
integrity rights H1, that higher levels of administrative-extractive capacity will improve state
respect for physical integrity rights. As Table 3.1 shows, administrative-extractive capacity is
statistically significant for each right, an increase by one standard deviation increases the odds of
greater state respect by 2.812 times to 7.359 times. As illustrated by Figure 3.1, this is by far the
most impactful factor when predicting state respect for all four of the physical integrity rights. To
illustrate what this means, in the early 2000s Japan or France would be an average of 4.613 times
more likely to respect physical integrity rights than Hungary, whose score on administrativeextractive capacity was one standard deviation lower. Still worse was South Africa during the
early 2000s at two standard deviations below Japan or France would be roughly an average of 9
times more likely to have lower state respect for physical integrity rights.
The results in Table 3.1 and 3.3 suggest, physical integrity rights H2, that internationalpower will have a negative influence on state respect for physical integrity rights, receives weak
confirmation. International-power capacity is only statistically significant in predicting state
respect for one physical integrity right, the prohibition on disappearances. That said, as Figure
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3.3 shows, while the effect is small when compared to the influence of administrative-extractive
capacity, a one standard deviation increase in international-power capacity still decreases the
odds of respect for this right by 53.6%. This means that a state like China or Russia in the mid2000s with high levels of international-power is 53.6% more likely to use disappearances as a
tool of repression than Saudi Arabia during the same period. Overall, international-power
capacity is not an important factor for physical integrity rights in general, but it does suggest
support for my contention that different types of state capacity will influence state respect for the
four rights in unique ways.
Physical integrity rights H3, that reach-coastal capacity will have a positive influence on
state respect for physical integrity rights, is weakly rejected by the results presented in Table 3.1
and Figure 3.1. Reach-coastal capacity is statistically significant for three different rights,
including the rights prohibiting torture, political imprisonment, and extrajudicial killings. Yet,
reach-coastal capacity is only positive for the right protecting against torture. This means reachcoastal capacity has a complex relationship with physical integrity rights. For torture, the causal
logic proposed in hypothesis H3 seems to hold because states that have greater institutional reach
and borders defined by coasts feel a lower urge to torture.
In the case of political imprisonment and disappearances the results suggest
governments use their reach-coastal capacity to engage in repression. Disappearances might be
more likely because reach-coastal capacity makes it easier to identify dissidents within a territory
and spirit them away to other territories or the ocean. Political imprisonment may be more likely
because the government uses its reach to stifle dissent or relies on the faith citizens have in
governmental institutions to trust that political prisoners “deserve it.” Countries with mixed to
poor respect for both the rights prohibiting political imprisonment and disappearances, like the
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Philippines, Dominican Republic, and Israel all score highly on the reach-coastal capacity
dimension. These countries have in-common domestic tensions, and governments that are
capable, and who often feel justified in dealing with dissent in repressive ways.
Coercive-rentier capacity is much less influential than either administrative-extractive or
reach-coastal capacity in explaining state respect for physical integrity rights. That said,
coercive-rentier capacity does lower state respect for the right prohibiting political imprisonment,
with a one standard deviation increase lowering the probability of respect by 33.8. Concretely,
this result means that a state like Greece is 33.8% more likely to have a higher level of state
respect for the right prohibiting political imprisonment than a state like Oman. This finding
offers weak support for Hypothesis H4, that coercive-rentier capacity will have a negative effect
on state respect for physical integrity rights. Coercive-rentier capacity may be related to this right
more than other rights for multiple reasons. Political imprisonment is a tool that tends to generate
a large amount of international and domestic attention. Coercive-rentier states may feel immune
from these pressures due to their greater power relative to society. Coercive states also may have
the capacity to arrest political dissidents.
That coercive-rentier capacity is not statistically significant for more physical integrity
rights is surprising given the number of studies that posit coercion and rentierism should lead to
more repression bad for human rights in general (Ross 2004; Fearon 2005; Tilly 2003). One
explanation for this non-finding is that coercive-rentier capacity cuts both ways so often that it is
only in conjunction with other factors that it becomes bad for physical integrity rights. One
reason it could cut both ways is that coercive-rentier capacity can dissuade political dissent and
remove the need to violate rights in an explicit way. This so-called “tyrannical peace” theory of
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Table 3.1: Results of the Random-Effects Model of
State Capacity and Physical Integrity Rights¹
(Presented as Odds Ratios of 1 Standard Deviation Change in X)
Torture
Political
Disappearances Extrajudicial
VARIABLES
Imprisonment
Killings
Past Respect = 0
0.247***
0.233***
0.458***
0.313***
(0.018)
(0.014)
(0.027)
(0.020)
Past Respect = 1
0.433***
0.466***
0.667***
0.598***
(0.049)
(0.051)
(0.075)
(0.088)
Past Respect = 2²
Civil Conflict = 1

0.877
0..814**
0.563***
0.696***
(0.189)
(0.160)
(0.041)
(0.099)
Regime Type³
0.822
1.851***
0.843
0.703**
(0.023)
(0.019)
(0.022)
(0.022)
Regime Coherenceª
1.575***
1.377***
1.339**
1.386**
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)
Wealth
0.584
1.242
1.402
0.482*
(0.165)
(0.180)
(0.221)
(0.167)
Population
0.213**
0.513
0.675
0.160***
(0.143)
(0.150)
(0.169)
(0.110)
Administrative-Extractive 3.334***
2.812***
4.947***
7.359***
(1.263)
(0.758)
(1.934)
(3.100)
International-Power
1.027
0.621
0.526**
1.061
(0.409)
(0.212)
(0.154)
(0.352)
Coercive-Rentier
0.999
0.661*
0.779
0.862
(0.264)
(0.162)
(0.174)
(0.201)
Reach-Coastal
1.364*
0.804*
0.744*
1.013
(0.230)
(0.104)
(0.121)
(0.151)
Social-Cohesion
0.807
0.763**
0.877
0.928
(0.132)
(0.094)
(0.104)
(0.106)
cut1
0.000***
0.006*
0.007*
0.000***
(0.000)
(0.018)
(0.019)
(0.000)
cut2
0.001*
0.128
0.069
0.000***
(0.002)
(0.357)
(0.204)
(0.000)
sigma2_u
3.911***
1.622**
1.692**
2.072**
(1.814)
(0.356)
(0.402)
(0.725)
Observations
1,356
1,352
1,355
1,356
Number of Countries
100
100
100
100
Robust Standard Errors In Parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
¹Random-Effects Model with Standard Errors Clustered by Country
²Dropped due to Collinearity

³Higher values = More Democratic
ªHigher values = More Democratic or more Autocratic
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Table 3.2: Implications of Results for Hypotheses of
State Capacity and Physical Integrity Rights
HYPOTHESES
Physical Integrity Rights H1: Admin-Extractive Capacity
Physical Integrity Rights H2: International-Power Capacity
Physical Integrity Rights H3: Reach-Coastal Capacity
Physical Integrity Rights H4: Coercive-Rentier Capacity
Physical Integrity Rights H5: Social-Cohesion Capacity
Torture TH1: Administrative-Extractive
Torture TH2: Reach-Coastal
Political Imprisonment PIH1: International-Power
Political Imprisonment PIH2: Coercive-Rentier
Disappearances DH1: Administrative-Extractive
Disappearances DH2: International-Power
Extrajudicial Killings EKH1: Administrative-Extractive
Extrajudicial Killings EKH2: Coercive-Rentier

Expected
Effect
Positive
Mixed
Positive
Negative
Positive
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Positive
Negative
Positive
Negative

Results¹
Strong Confirm
Weak Confirm
Weak Reject
Weak Confirm
Weak Reject
Strong Confirm
Confirm
No Effect
Strong Confirm
Strong Confirm
Strong Confirm
Strong Confirm
No Effect

¹Strong confirm = statistically significant for multiple rights with large effect
Weak confirm = statistically significant for two or fewer rights with small effect
Mixed = statistically significant for multiple rights but expected causal direction varies equally.
Weak Reject = statistically significant for multiple rights but with the opposite expected
influence for a majority of them.
No effect = not statistically significant for any rights or for a specific right.
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Table 3.3: Percentage Change in Odds of Greater
Government Respect For Physical Integrity Rights¹
Variable
Past Respect = 0
Past Respect = 1
Past Respect = 2²
Civil Conflict = 1
Regime Type³
Regime Coherenceª
Wealth (ln GDP pc)
Population (ln)
AdministrativeExtractive
International-Power
Coercive-Rentier
Reach-Coastal
Social-Cohesion

Torture
-75.32%
-56.73%
--

57.54%

Political Imprisonment
-76.67%
-53.42%
--18.61%
85.11%
37.73%

Disappearances
-93.81%
-68.37%
--80.14%

181.16%

394.73%

0.90%

-78.72%
233.44%

36.36%

-33.88%
-19.56%
-23.73%

Extrajudicial Killing
-68.73%
-40.24%
--30.41%
-29.70%
38.58%
51.80%
83.96%
635.86%

-47.37%
-22.09%
-25.56%

¹Percentages based on a 1 standard deviation change in the value of the dependent variable. Values only included for
significant variables.
²Dropped due to Collinearity
³Higher values = More Democratic
ªHigher values = More Democratic or more Autocratic
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the relationship between coercive capacity and repression is supported by the results presented
here. States with higher levels of coercion and rentierism may offer an extreme case of
deterrence to dissent, since the state uses its rentier capacity to build such a large coercive
apparatus that citizens calculate engaging in political dissent makes no sense since the odds of
success are so low. Furthermore since government revenue comes from the exploitation few
resources the ability of the citizenry to hold the government accountable in other ways through
economic disruption, protests, and/or boycotts, is small as well.
Finally, as the results in Table 3.1 show, social-cohesion is also only significant in
explaining state respect for the right prohibiting political imprisonment. This finding contradicts
hypothesis H5, that social cohesion will have a positive influence on state capacity. The effect is
small when compared with the other state capacity types, with a one standard deviation increase
in social-cohesion capacity lowering the probability of a higher level of state respect by 23.7%.
This counter-intuitive finding is surprising given the common notion that states with divided
societies will have more conflict than those with homogeneous societies. One optimistic
explanation for this finding is that states with high levels of social cohesion imprison those who
oppose state laws like requirements to serve in the military, rather than other, harsher
punishments like killings, torture, or disappearances. If true, this finding might reflect well on
these states rather than poorly. An alternative is that states with high levels of social cohesion are
often intolerant of those who speak out. This finding is discussed in more detail below.
3.5.1 Results and Discussion: Torture
Recall that torture is the most commonly practiced violation of physical integrity rights
and explanations rest on the idea that it is considered less costly than other forms of repression
and ensuring it is not used by rogue law enforcement or military officials is difficult (Cingranelli
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and Richards 1999). Both hypotheses (torture H1 and torture H2) related to torture described in
Table 3.2 are confirmed by the results presented above because the administrative-extractive and
reach-coastal dimensions of state capacity increase the probability that states will have a higher
level of state respect for the right prohibiting torture. This finding captures the idea that high
quality institutions, and institutions with high levels of reach, make it possible for the
government to actually ensure that law enforcement and military personnel do not engage in
torture or cruel and inhumane punishment.
Additionally, regime coherence, an indicator of having either fully autocratic or fully
democratic institutions is also statistically significant in predicting state respect for torture when
state capacity is included in the model. Population is also statistically significant, and states with
larger populations have less respect for the right prohibiting torture. This combination of findings
provides further evidence of the importance of institutional quality, reach, and stability in
preventing torture. Democracy, on the other hand, is not statistically significant in explaining
state respect for torture. This suggests it is less about institutional design than institutional
capacity and coherence when trying to explain a government’s respect for the right prohibiting
torture.
3.5.2 Results and Discussion: Political Imprisonment
As shown in Table 3.2 the results presented above indicate mixed results for political
imprisonment hypotheses PIH1 and PIH2. Turning to the first hypothesis, international-power
capacity was not statistically significant in explaining state respect for political imprisonment.
International-power was expected to matter to state respect for this right because political
prisoners, particularly in an era of proliferating human rights NGOs, are highly visible and
persistent signs of repression. Therefore, states with higher levels of international-power capacity
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would be able to resist pressure to change their tactics. However, the results presented in Table
3.1 suggest that international-power is not important in explaining state respect for political
imprisonment.
Political imprisonment hypothesis PIH2 is confirmed as coercive-rentier capacity
increases the odds of a lower level of state respect by 33.8%. This seems to be the chosen mode
of repression for states with coercive-rentier capacity because it is the only right where coerciverentier capacity is statistically significant in explaining the level of state respect. As mentioned
above, the explanation for this is most likely that governments in states with high levels of
coercive-rentier capacity are the least tolerant of political dissent and feel in the best position to
imprison opponents with impunity.
Other dimensions of state capacity that are related to state respect for political
imprisonment include the reach-coastal and social-cohesion capacities. As illustrated by Figure
3.1 the effects of these types of capacity are moderate compared with those of regime type,
regime coherence and administrative-extractive capacity, but a one standard deviation increase in
either form of capacity increases the odds of a state being in a lower category of respect by
19.56% and 23.73% respectively. As explained above, that reach-coastal capacity is negatively
associated with state respect for this right suggests governments in states with high levels of
institutional reach use that capability to imprison political opponents. This is evidence of state
attributes often associated with “good” outcomes, like the provision of important public goods
(Rotberg 2003), can also be used for repression. This finding confirms the expectation discussed
in chapters one and two that state capacity types may often cut both ways.
Similarly, that social-cohesion is also negatively associated with respect for the right
prohibiting political imprisonment is suggests again that more cohesive societies may feel more
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comfortable imprisoning dissenters because they are unlikely to become martyrs to a large,
disenfranchised minority group. These states also may value conformity of political opinion or
require military service, two factors that may result in many conscientious objectors. Examples
of states with mixed to poor records of respect for the right to political imprisonment and high
levels of social-cohesion capacity include North African countries like Tunisia and Egypt,
Southeast Asian countries like Bangladesh and Thailand, as well as many island nations like the
Philippines, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. Ultimately, this finding is an example of how it
social-cohesion is a subordinate cause of state repression and is probably triggered by the
presence of numerous overlapping factors. This confirms much of the literature on the role ethnic
and religiously divided states play as a necessary but not sufficient condition for human rights
violations to occur (Walker and Poe 2002).
Control variables that are statistically significant in explaining state respect for the right
prohibiting political imprisonment include ongoing civil conflict, regime type, and regime
coherence. As shown in Figure 3.1, with the exception of administrative-extractive capacity
regime type is the second most influential statistically significant variable, with a one standard
deviation increase in a state’s level of democracy improving the probability of being in a higher
category of state respect by 85.11%. This highlights the importance of democracy for the right
prohibiting political imprisonment, and is evidence of the idea that democracies are more likely
to value and protect political dissidents. Regime coherence is also important, though less so, with
a one standard deviation only improving the odds of a state being in a higher category of respect
by 37.73%. Indeed this is the only physical integrity right where a state’s level of democracy
matters more than its level of coherence when controlling for state capacity, and it indicates that

125

democracies, most likely owing to public pressure and robust legal protections, are unlikely to
engage in political imprisonment as a tactic of repression.
3.5.3 Results and Discussion: Disappearances
The results presented in Table 3.1 suggest strong support for both hypotheses related to
disappearances (DH1 and DH2). Both administrative-extractive capacity and international-power
capacity are statistically significant in explaining state respect for the right prohibiting
disappearances and the influence of both dimensions of capacity operate in the expected
direction. As with all the physical integrity rights, administrative-extractive capacity is
associated with an increase in a government not using disappearances as a form of repression.
The effect is large, with a one standard deviation change increase in administrative-extractive
capacity raising the probability of a state being in a higher category of respect by 394.73%. This
finding again offers support that institutional quality is the most important element in
determining state respect for physical integrity rights.
The influence of international-power is smaller than administrative-extractive capacity,
but as Figure 3.1 shows, it is still an important factor. A one standard deviation increase in
international-power raises the probability of a state being in a lower category of respect by
47.37%. As mentioned above, this is the only right international-power capacity is statistically
significant in explaining and it highlights the importance of different state capabilities in how
they choose to violate physical integrity rights. States with large militaries are often involved in
international conflicts, such as the so-called “war on terror” and may be more prone to disappear
their own citizens because they view home-grown terrorists as a threat, and have the capability to
carry out the difficult task of making someone vanish.
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Reach-coastal capacity is also statistically significant and negatively associated with state
respect for the right prohibiting disappearances. Again this finding is surprising given the
physical integrity rights hypothesis H3, which posits that this type of capacity would be
positively associated with state respect for physical integrity rights. Overall, this is another
example of how disaggregating different institutional components can shed light on how
governments repress their citizens. For example, administrative-extractive capacity focuses on
institutional attributes that generate high quality resources for the government, while reachcoastal capacity captures the level of penetration a state has in society. Both are important
elements to a state being able to take a given action, but one leads to greater respect for rights
while the other actually lowers respect for some rights.
Additionally, when controlling for a state’s type and level of capacity, civil conflict and
regime coherence are also statistically significant in explaining state respect for the right
prohibiting disappearances. The effect of civil conflict in this case is large, with ongoing civil
conflict lowering the probability of a state being in a higher category of respect by 80%. Civil
conflict, and the chaos it brings with it, encourages governments to engage in disappearances.
Regime coherence is positively associated with state respect for the right prohibiting
disappearances but the effect is small, with a one standard deviation increase in coherence only
increasing the probability of being in a higher category of respect by .9%.
3.5.4 Results and Discussion: Extrajudicial Killings
The final right investigated in this chapter is the one prohibiting extrajudicial killings.
The results presented in Table 3.1 suggest that more than for any other right, administrativeextractive capacity is the most important dimension of state capacity in explaining when states
use extrajudicial killings as a form of repression a finding confirms EIH1. A one standard
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deviation increase in administrative-extractive capacity raises the probability that a state will
have higher respect for the right against extrajudicial killings by 635.86%. Figure 3.1 illustrates
that this is by far the largest effect of any variable for any right. In states like Japan, Denmark,
Sweden, and Germany, all at the top of this dimension of state capacity state sanctioned killings
outside of the legal system are non-existent, while in states like Senegal, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Malawi they are much more likely.
Hypothesis EIH2 on the other hand, that states with high levels of coercive-rentier
capacity will have lower respect for the right prohibiting extrajudicial killings, is rejected due to
the fact that coercive-rentier capacity is not statistically significant. Once again this finding may
offer support for the idea that a government in a state with high levels of coercive-rentier
capacity so deter violent uprisings, that killings as a form of repression are unnecessary. These
governments may also be brutally straightforward in their strategies of repression, focusing
solely on political imprisonment as the primary tactic which creates living breathing reminders
of the consequences of political dissent.
Outside of administrative-extractive capacity, state capacity in general seems to play a
smaller role than other factors hypothesized to influence respect for physical integrity rights.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the importance of factors such as wealth, population, regime coherence,
regime type, past repression, and civil conflict play in explaining state respect for extrajudicial
killings. Perhaps the most interesting result is that when controlling for the different types of
state capacity more democratic countries are more likely to engage in extrajudicial killings. A
one standard deviation increase in regime type (more democratic) increases the odds of a state
being in a lower category of respect by 29.70%. Perhaps democracies this result is explained by
the fact that democracies’ preferred form of repression is to kill citizens rather than imprison,
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disappear, or torture them all practices that leave victims and witnesses with the ability to call
serious attention the rights violations. This could result in negative consequences for the
government officials who in democracies can be held accountable for their actions to a greater
extent than officials in other regime types.

3.6 Conclusion
The goal in this chapter was to examine the relationship between the different dimensions
of state capacity identified in chapter two, and all four physical integrity rights by testing
hypotheses using a multivariate random-effects modeling technique. Disaggregating analysis of
the physical integrity rights helps grow the understanding of ways that different state attributes,
namely the level of type of state capacity, influence states decision of which physical integrity
rights to violate and which to respect. Another advantage of this approach is that other factors
often thought to influence state respect for physical integrity rights can be examined in a
multivariate setting while controlling for the different dimensions of state capacity.
Overall, several important findings emerge. First, all dimensions of state capacity are
statistically significant in explaining state respect for at least one physical integrity right. This
result suggests that state capacity is indeed an important element in explaining state respect for
physical integrity rights. However, some dimensions of state capacity are more important than
others in explaining state respect for physical integrity rights, particularly administrativeextractive capacity which, as illustrated in Figure 3.1, is the most influential independent variable
for all four physical integrity rights.
A second important finding is that another dimension of state capacity associated with
institutional capability and quality, reach-coastal capacity, has mixed results for each physical
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integrity right. This suggests that the type and function of institutions matter and some may
actually make a state more able to repress the citizens in certain ways. Specifically, institutions
that enhance a state’s reach may actually also enable that state to repress the citizenry in ways
weaker states cannot. Reach-coastal capacity raises the odds of states using disappearances, a
tool of repression noted for its rarity and difficulty. This finding highlights the importance of
understanding the kaleidoscope of conditions that make higher capacity good for physical
integrity rights in some states and bad in others.
A third finding is that the social-cohesion, international-power, and coercive-rentier
capacities are less important in explaining physical integrity rights. This finding offers support to
the large literature suggesting that the quality and capability of institutions are the most crucial
element in explaining the human rights practices of governments. The fact that geographic
factors such as temperate climate, proximity to developed economies, and coastal land are all
included in the institutional dimensions of state capacity also highlights the important symbiotic
relationship between geography and institutions, and how that relationship can influence human
rights outcomes. Identifying this pattern, may help policy-makers work with states that are dealt
bad geographic or resource cards overcome these problems to build stronger institutions,
particularly those that favor higher levels of administrative-extractive capacity.
A fourth finding is that when state capacity is included in the model, regime coherence is
much more important in explaining state respect for all four physical integrity rights than is
democracy or wealth. Regime coherence is statistically significant and exerts a relatively strong
pull in a positive direction for all four rights. Democracy, on the other hand, is only statistically
significant for two rights, and in the case of extrajudicial killings, is negatively associated with
state respect. This finding offers support for the so-called “more murder in the middle”
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hypothesis (Fein 1995) and suggests that security and stability, rather than democracy might be
the best tactic for improving state respect for physical integrity rights.
Due to the variety of findings in this chapter, there is a great deal of potential for future
research. Examining the precise causal mechanisms and potential interactive effects between
different variables could be useful in painting a more complete picture of the relationship
between state capacity and physical integrity rights. Moreover, that each country in each year is
given a score on each dimension of state capacity, experts in particular regions or countries can
examine if the causal logic revealed in this macro analysis hold true at the more micro level. This
will hopefully aid policy-makers and human rights advocates in their efforts to improve the
human rights practices of states around the world.
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Chapter Four
State Capacity and Empowerment Rights
“While it is true that countries where the institutions of democracy (polyarchy) have been
achieved set a relatively high world standard for rights and liberties…the evidence does not
permit the complacent conclusion that advocates of human rights living in democratic
countries can safely turn their attention exclusively to the plight of people in nondemocratic countries.”
--Robert Dahl (1999).
4.1 Introduction
Of the large number of studies on state human rights practices, the vast majority of the
empirical examinations focus on the violation of physical integrity rights. While physical
integrity rights are often used to measure “state repression” there are undoubtedly many more
ways for governments to repress their citizens beyond torture, political imprisonment,
disappearances, and killings. Although these are certainly the most dramatic of human rights
violations, government restrictions on so-called “empowerment rights” (Cingranelli and Richards
2010) represent another, often more widespread and insidious, form of repression.
There is large variation in the degree to which states respect empowerment rights, or
those rights that protect citizens’ ability to participate equally in political and social life. These
rights include the freedoms of religion, association, speech, foreign movement, domestic
movement, electoral self-determination, and worker’s rights. Of course, most of these rights are
associated with democracy, so it would be easy to dismiss states who do not respect these rights
as simply “undemocratic”, “illiberal,” or “authoritarian.” However, for decades studies of
democratization have emphasized the “gradual nature” of democracy. That democracy is better
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thought of as existing on a continuum than as a dichotomous, either/or regime type (Bollen and
Jackman 1989; Collier and Levitsky 1997; Elkins 2000; Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Dahl’s
statement at the head of this chapter remains as true today as it was in 1999; the fulfillment of
human rights, including empowerment rights, remains highly imperfect, even in well-established
democracies.
Obviously, the degree to which a regime is democratic is important in explaining state
respect for empowerment rights. However, one assumption undergirding the analyses presented
in this chapter is that democracy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the realization of
these rights. Because democracy is necessary but not sufficient, factors such as the state capacity
types presented in chapter two of this project should influence the degree to which even
democracies respect empowerment rights. Moreover, as with physical integrity rights, patterns of
how states rationally calculate the level of empowerment citizens are granted and denied could
be associated with state characteristics. The goal in this chapter, as in the previous one, is to
explore the degree to which the measures of the state capacity types explain state respect for a set
of human rights—in this case empowerment rights.
This chapter begins with a discussion of democracy and empowerment rights. Crucially,
the discussion on democracy emphasizes that having democracy, even consolidated democracy,
will not automatically mean that a state will have full state respect for all of the empowerment
rights. The chapter then offers general hypotheses of how the different types and level of state
capacity might influence state respect for empowerment rights in general. The chapter then
moves on to outline some specific hypotheses of how the state capacity types will influence state
respect for each empowerment. Finally, results of the analysis are presented and discussed before
the chapter closes with some concluding thoughts and suggestions for future research.
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4.2 Democracy and Empowerment Rights
When the Cold War ended in the early 1990s it gave rise to a number of theories in
international relations that the spread of liberal democracy and capitalism would continue
unabated. Famously, Fukuyama (1992) proclaimed liberal democracy was the only remaining
political system that enjoyed legitimacy, regardless of the presence of many illiberal regimes.
Since that period of great optimism about democracy, some critics have pointed out Fukuyama’s
failure to anticipate the many states who would settle into new political equilibriums. In some
ways these states resemble liberal democracies, but in other ways they are highly illiberal
(Zakaria 1997). According to some, the continued existence of illiberal regimes in both China
and Russia exemplify these new equilibriums (Gat 2007).
The presence and persistence of many illiberal democracies led scholars to create a whole
new realm of investigation into so-called “hybrid-regimes,” or those regimes that are not
“transitioning” but are instead firmly ensconced somewhere between democracy and dictatorship
(Diamond 2002). Consequently, numerous studies investigate the degree to which the
democratization of these hybrid regimes affects human rights. It also caused those who study
democracy to differentiate between so-called “consolidated democracies” and all other regime
types. Linz and Stepan describe democratic consolidation thusly,

Essentially, by a "consolidated democracy" we mean a political regime in which
democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives
and disincentives has become, in a phrase, "the only game in town” (1996, 15).
Put simply, consolidated democracies are those regimes with no chance of backsliding into
authoritarianism, and have a deep, high quality democracy which above all respects civil rights
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and liberties, public participation in government through free and fair elections, and the rule of
law (O’Donnell 2004).
Almost by definition then, consolidated democracies have high levels of respect for
human rights. As discussed in the last chapter, a number of studies find that fully consolidated
democracies have higher levels of respect for physical integrity rights and conversely,
democratizing states that fall short of consolidation often have more repressive regimes
(Davenport 1995; Fein 1995; Arat 1999; Poe, Tate, and Keith1999; Davenport and Armstrong
2004). The causal mechanism is consolidated democracies are inherently more likely to bargain
and compromise with their citizens, thus reducing the need for violent dissent (Henderson 1991).
Moreover, checks on executive powers in consolidated democracies lessen the state’s ability to
repress the citizenry and the presence of free and fair elections create sanctions for political elites
who engage violate the rights of citizens (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). Of course, even highquality democracies still do violate physical integrity rights from time to time and regimes that
are only partially democratic are often the worst violators of them all.
Similarly, consolidated democracies have high levels of respect for many empowerment
rights almost by definition since these rights are considered necessary for citizens to enjoy full
and equal participation in public life, and are indicative of a high quality democracy. That said,
full respect for all of the empowerment rights is still beyond many robust, long-standing
democracies, and is certainly out of reach for many hybrid regimes. Even in high functioning
democracies some groups are disenfranchised, others are repressed in subtle ways and not so
subtle ways, simply due to the wishes of the majority (Donnelly 1999; Davenport 2007).
Linz and Steppan (1996), who originally defined consolidated democracy, also
acknowledge that democracy is important but not determinative of perfect practices when it
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comes to practices that might influence empowerment rights. Specifically, they outline five
characteristics that separate consolidated from non-consolidated democracies. These criteria
include freedom of association and communication, inclusive electoral contestation, rule of law,
Weberian rational-legal bureaucracy, and economic freedom. Significantly, they note that it is
nearly impossible to satisfy all of these criteria, and instead argue that mostly fulfilling these
criteria still places a state in the consolidated category. Imperfect governmental practices in
consolidated regimes often come during times when these states experience moments of
widespread dissent. For example, protests in the United States during the Occupy Wall Street
movement, or more recently in Ferguson Missouri, resulted in allegations of numerous violations
of empowerment rights. Yet, despite these incidents, few make the case that the United States is
not a consolidated democracy.
In a related argument, Lijphart (1999) finds that there are many “patterns of democracy”
depending on how institutions and elections in the country operate. In a study of thirty-six
democracies, Lijphart makes distinctions between federal and unitary systems, majoritarian and
proportional systems, and bicameral and unicameral systems. Crucially all of these countries are
still considered high functioning democracies, but they deliver dramatically different experiences
for their citizens. Specifically, Lijphart argues that some forms of democracy are “kinder” and
“gentler” to their population than others.
Therefore, it is folly to expect that even in consolidated democracies empowerment
rights will be respected by governments fully, at all times in all ways. What is more likely, is that
consolidated democracies have higher levels of respect for empowerment rights than hybrid and
authoritarian regimes, but will still violate rights in certain patterns based on the level and type of
state capacity a regime can tap into to take actions. Put simply, there is still much state capacity
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can explain about the level of respect states, including democracies, have for all of the
empowerment rights.

4.3 General Hypotheses of State Capacity and Empowerment Rights
By now it should be clear that political democracy, while very important to state respect
for empowerment rights, is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for governments to fully
respect these rights. Different levels and types of state capacity should influence government
respect for the various empowerment rights in a number of ways. Below are some general
hypotheses about the relationship each type of state capacity should have on a government’s
respect for empowerment rights.

Empowerment Rights H1: States with higher levels of administrative-extractive capacity will
have higher levels of governmental respect for empowerment rights than those with lower levels.

Administrative-extractive capacity is important to the provision of public goods. This
type of capacity includes a state’s ability to collect taxes from domestic sources and maintain
high levels of investor confidence. Both of these are important factors in the level of resources
states can spend on public goods, and thus crucial to the government undermining sources of
grievances and dissent (Gurr 1970; Rotberg 2003; Levi 1989; Besley and Persson 2009; 2011).
The inability of the state to provide social goods creates a perfect storm for the reduction in state
respect for empowerment rights. A weak state, which may allow some freedoms like speech,
association, movement, unionize, and the ability to vote, also may experience the growing voice
of grievances from the population. Historical patterns under these circumstances are for nations
to turn to strong men, who promise wildly during elections to win votes and then squeeze out any
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dissent once in power—often using a combination of subtle and extreme repression in the
process (Diamond 2010).
Examples of this so-called “capture and corruption” (Remington 2006) process is visited
upon weak states with disturbing frequency. The pattern takes shape in the form of leaders like
Napoleon in France, Idi Amin in Uganda, Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Fujimori in Peru, Chavez in
Venezuela, and Putin in Russia. All these leaders took over countries with limited capacity to
provide social goods, and consequently with populations who were skeptical of the ability of
democracy to solve social problems. As a consequence all of these states’ citizens experienced a
decline in the ability to participate meaningfully in their governments, as well as the ability to
enjoy civil liberties associated with democracy, such as empowerment rights. Therefore, the
strong institutions and sustainable resources associated with administrative-extractive capacity
should lead to higher levels of respect for empowerment rights.

Empowerment Rights H2: States with higher levels of international-power capacity will have
lower levels of governmental respect for empowerment rights than those with higher levels.
International-power capacity also affects the government’s options when it faces dissent,
but it often empowers the government to repress the citizenry. As argued in previous chapters
international-power capacity may simultaneously create grievances and insulate a government
from international pressure to avoid repression. International-power capacity can create
grievances because governments in powerful states tend to become involved in international
power politics which makes war more likely (Senese and Vasquez 2008). War creates grievances
because the costs are often borne disproportionately by certain elements of the population, this is
particularly true if the war goes poorly (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992).
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Furthermore, times of war tend to lead to domestic crackdowns or so-called “exclusionary
ideologies” based on national security that negatively impact government respect for
empowerment rights like association, speech, and assembly (Cardenas 2007). The anti-sedition
acts in the United States are examples of how a democracy can use national security as a pretext
for violations of empowerment rights (Costa 1998).
Another reason international-power capacity could have a negative impact on state
respect for empowerment rights is that powerful states feel insulated from international pressure
to change their practices. Cardenas (2007) argues that states like South Africa, that the
international community is willing to impose immense pressure on during times of human rights
violations, makes it them more likely they will change their behavior. China, on the other hand is
relatively immune to pressure, and while a host of variables contribute to this, international
power is an important factor. While this similar logic as that posited for the role internationalpower capacity plays in physical integrity rights in chapter three, it could be even more important
for violations of empowerment rights, as they are less easily hidden, making a state’s ability to
resist pressure from the international community crucial to its decision to continue violations.

Empowerment Rights H3: States with higher levels of reach-coastal capacity will have higher
levels of governmental respect for empowerment rights than those with lower levels.

Reach-coastal state capacity is closely related to the idea of “infrastructural power”
posited by Mann (1984; 1993). 41 Both include measures of contract intensive money (CIM) and
both attempt to capture the government’s ability to penetrate all areas of its territory in deep and

41

Fortin (2012) in operationalizing Mann’s (1984; 1993) conceptualization of infrastructural power also includes
CIM.
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meaningful ways. This type of capacity is often linked to higher levels of democracy and
therefore should improve state respect for empowerment rights in general. For example, in a
study of Eastern European countries, Fortin (2012) demonstrates that “infrastructural” state
capacity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy to consolidate. Fortin argues,

If there is no organization and competent state authority, even highly mobilized
citizens cannot possibly influence policies. In such settings, the state will not be in
a position to carry out basic policies, much less social policies that require even
higher state capacity for effective implementation (2012, 906).

The lynchpin of any conception of democracy is that leaders are accountable to the people and
therefore deliver social goods in response to demands (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999). When
leaders do not deliver social goods they are voted out and presumably new leaders will respond
to the demands of the people appropriately, however, if the state is unable to deliver social goods
to all areas of its territory certain areas may rise up and indiscriminate repression of
empowerment rights will emerge.
Another way reach-coastal capacity might influence the government’s respect for
empowerment rights is that it will affect the number of options available to the government to
cope with dissent. Numerous studies show that in the event of insurgency, or organized dissent,
the best tactic a state can use to successfully repress the citizenry is targeted, rather than
indiscriminate violence or intimidation (De Nardo, 1985; Mason and Krane 1989; Goodwin
2001). Targeted tactics, however, are difficult for states with low capacity to carry out because
they require a robust intelligence gathering state apparatus (Kalyvas 2006). Therefore greater
amounts of reach-coastal state capacity will be beneficial to government respect for
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empowerment rights since it allows governments to target only those citizens who are threats and
to avoid widespread violations of empowerment rights.

Empowerment Rights H4: States with higher levels of coercive-rentier capacity will have lower
levels of governmental respect for empowerment rights than those with lower levels.

Governments in states with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity should be more
inclined to repress empowerment rights. These states have the combination numerous grievances
often associated with the highly unequal economies and corruption often associated with rentier
states (Karl 1997; Ross 2004; Fearon 2005), and a large coercive apparatus to simply crush
dissent by violating empowerment rights rather than incorporating dissent through a peaceful
political process. Moreover, rentier states can use the revenue extracted from the export of
primary commodities to fund ever larger coercive capability, this allows the government and
political elites to remain immune from the consequences of failing to allow citizens a greater
influence in the political process.
Overall, the one consistent observation in the literature on government repression is that
if leaders feel repression will be costly then they avoid it until there is no alternative. If leaders
feel it will be a relatively low-cost option with a high potential for success then it is much more
likely (Gurr 1986; Simon 1994; Lichbach 1995; Gartner and Regan 1996; Davenport 2007;
2007a). Coercive-rentier capacity lowers the costs of repression by divorcing the political elite
from political consequences because they do not need to encourage robust diverse economies
that often require respect for empowerment rights.

Empowerment Rights H5: States with higher levels of social-cohesion capacity will have
higher levels of governmental respect for empowerment rights than those with lower levels.
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Social-cohesion capacity should improve government respect for empowerment rights.
Governments in states with higher levels of social cohesion should experience greater levels of
economic growth because of the deleterious effect diversity is noted to have levels of trust
between citizens (Easterly and Levine 1997). Furthermore, diversity tends to lower the
government’s ability to provide social goods while simultaneously increasing rent-seeking
behavior (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999). This is likely due to individuals using their ethnic
or religious group membership to organize with the hope of extracting a greater share of political
influence and resources (Horowitz 1985). While democracy, particularly respect for “political
rights,” is seen as a panacea for these problems (Collier 1998) it is not a smooth or easy road to
get there, empowerment rights may be severely restricted for groups not in power. Horowitz
writes,
Ethnically divided societies…have a special version of the usual democratic
problem of assuring decent treatment of the opposition. Opposition to government
is always susceptible to portrayal as resistance to popular will. An ethnically
differentiated opposition can easily be depicted as consisting of particularly
dangerous enemies (1993, 19).

In addition to the problems of ensuring that empowerment rights of minority or
opposition groups are protected in diverse societies, the factor analysis in chapter two revealed
that social-cohesion capacity also contains low levels of rentierism, which helps governments in
these states avoid many of the pitfalls that rentier states encounter. I argued above that these
rentier-state pitfalls make repression of empowerment rights more likely, and the fact that
cohesive societies often have lower levels of rentierism means empowerment rights should stand
a better chance of being respected.
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4.4 Rights Specific Hypotheses
The preceding section offered some general hypotheses about the relationship between
the different dimensions of state capacity and physical integrity rights. However, one important
observation of a growing number of studies is that governments violate human rights in different
patterns, which is why disaggregating the rights and evaluating them individually is an important
step in building understandings of government respect for human rights (Cingranelli and
Richards 2010). It is my contention that a state’s level and type of state capacity will influence
which empowerment rights governments violate because their array of available policy options
are determined by the level and type of state capacity on which they can draw. While one could
find literature to justify hypotheses about the relationship between each state capacity type and
each empowerment right, doing so is beyond the scope if this chapter. Instead this section
includes a description of the hypothesized relationship between the two state capacity types the
literature suggests are most likely to influence each empowerment right.42
4.4.1 Freedoms of Assembly and Association, Speech, and Religion
The rights to freedom of association, speech, and religion are perhaps the most basic
protections prescribed by modern liberalism. A central idea of the modern liberal project is that
rights act as a bulwark against governments, particularly those rights termed “civil rights and
liberties,” that allow the population to participate freely in the political process (Donnelly 1999).
These rights are also essential to a healthy civil society, which acts a check on abusive
governmental power (Edwards 2014). A government that respects these rights is closer to the
42

It is important to emphasize that this list of right-specific hypotheses is in no way meant to imply that these are
the only important potential hypotheses linking the dimensions of state capacity to each empowerment right. Only
that these are the most examined hypotheses in the theoretical literature on each empowerment right. Another
important observation is the fact that rights are interactive, and that is something left unexamined in this
dissertation. Governmental respect for worker’s rights, for example, are often thought to be determined by state
respect for the right to association, since association is the primary form of claim making (Leary 1996).
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democratic ideal discussed by consolidation theorists who emphasize the “quality of democracy”
over procedures like elections, in determining the level of freedom in a society (O’ Donnell
1996). However, these rights, particularly during times of political turmoil or national security
threats are often the first rights restricted by governments in the name of ensuring safety or
keeping the peace.
Despite the fact that governments often restrict these rights, particularly when they desire
to engage in an unpopular policy or practice, state capacity should help explain which
governments are more or less likely to violate each of the rights to association, speech, and
religion. Furthermore, despite the fact that these rights are related they are different enough that
different forms of capacity should influence the level of government respect for them in unique
ways.

Association AH1: States with high levels of reach-coastal capacity will have higher levels of
governmental respect for the right protecting freedom of association and assembly.

The right to freedom of assembly and association is fundamental to a democratic society
because, as Soviet dissident Ludmilla Alexeeva argues, it is the right that protects the ability to
demand all other rights (The Washington Post 2011). Because of the power of this right, weak
governments are the first to violate it, and governments that lack control over large swaths of
territory are the first to attempt to do so. Governments that lack control over areas live in fear
that dissidents will gain territorial footholds in areas where the government’s penetration is
weakest (Buhaug and Gates 2002). Therefore, reach-coastal capacity should increase state
respect for this right because it is the dimension of state capacity that most closely captures the
reach of governmental control.
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Association AH2: States with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity will have lower levels of
governmental respect for the right protecting freedom of association and assembly.

As I have argued throughout this dissertation coercive-rentier capacity is the dimension
of state capacity that most enables governments to engage in repression. It does this by lowering
the costs of the government violating rights because it insulates the government from reprisals
from the population. Particularly, the combination of coercive-rentier capacity creates grievances
from the population due to the corruption and inequality that accompanies rentierism and the
subsequent coercive crackdowns. Governments in states with high levels of the coercive-rentier
dimension of capacity, then, will feel empowered to restrict the freedom of association and
assembly to a greater extent than governments in states with low levels of this form of capacity.

Speech SH1: States with high levels of administrative-extractive capacity will have higher levels
of governmental respect for the right protecting freedom of association and assembly.

The right protecting freedom of speech is different from the freedom assembly and
association because one person can engage in speech the government does not like whereas with
assembly and association requires that multiple people engage in action for the right to be
enjoyed.43 Freedom of expression is often restricted in the form of crackdowns on members of
the press. Russia under President Putin, for example, is notorious for restricting the rights of the
press to criticize the government. Governmental respect for the freedom of speech should be less
a function of a government’s reach, as with association and assembly, and more closely linked to

43

The difference between having and enjoying a right is outlined by Shue (1980). To “enjoy” a right in this context
means that, beyond being granted by law, a right is actually used in practice, as intended, in the name of social
justice.
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a government’s administrative-extractive capacity. Higher levels of administrative-extractive
capacity should increase state respect for the right protecting freedom of speech because
governmental institutions should be relatively adept at providing public goods that lower the
odds of grievances. Furthermore, the government should have the resources to address and
incorporate criticism raised by oppositional speech, which should undercut the need for the state
to violate this right.

Speech SH2: States with high levels of international-power capacity will have lower levels of
governmental respect for the right protecting freedom of speech.

As I argue at other points in this dissertation, international-power capacity can have an
insulating effect on regimes that choose to violate rights. States with power tend to attract
investment, influence the international economy in their favor, and generally avoid the costs of
“naming and shaming” that can come with violating rights (Walldorf 2008).44 Furthermore, these
states are often the target of international terrorism and internal secessionist groups. The security
concerns surround these threats can often act as a compelling pretext for governments to restrict
empowerment rights, particularly the right protecting the freedom of speech. Russia and China
are examples of this as they both engage in wide-ranging censorship and violations of the press
in order to maintain control over the population and continue policies that could spark outrage
amongst a properly informed citizenry.

44

Walldorf (2008) argues that there are some conditions under which the international community, particularly
the great powers, will cancel strategic alliances due to human rights concerns. However, these conditions are
limited and so exceptional that they offer support for the idea that human rights concerns are largely secondary to
strategic ones.
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Religion RH1: States with high levels of reach-coastal capacity will have higher levels of
governmental respect for the right protecting freedom of religion.

The right protecting freedom of religion is one of the most widely adopted human rights
in constitutions world-wide, appearing in over 90% of all constitutions (Ginsburg, Elkins, and
Simmons 2013). Despite this enjoying broad de jure support, however, this right is violated by
numerous governments in practice. Causes of violations of the right protecting religious freedom
are legion, and according to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion
and Belief, include factors such as historical tensions between groups, competing claims to
geographical within a state, and that a religious minority promotes violence and therefore must
be repressed for the safety of a state’s population as a whole (United Nations, 2012). Religious
minorities often become scapegoats of governments who feel threatened by political dissent or
feel that control over state territory is weakening. Therefore, governments in states with high
levels of reach-coastal capacity will be less likely to engage in violations of the freedom of
religion than states with low levels. Reach-coastal capacity captures not only the penetration of
the government into all areas of the territory but also citizens’ faith in governmental regulation
and institutions all of which are likely to prevent government crackdowns on freedom of
religion.

Religion RH2: States with high levels of social-cohesion capacity will have higher levels of
governmental respect for the right protecting freedom of religion.

The social-cohesion capacity dimension of state capacity includes measures of religious
fractionalization, ethnic fractionalization, and low levels of rentierism by the government. All of
these factors should reduce the potential for religious tensions to emerge as the source of
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grievances and as a source of governmental repression. Therefore, states with high levels of
social-cohesion should experience lower levels of government repression of the freedom of
religion.
4.4.2 State respect for Freedom of Movement
The freedom of movement, both foreign and domestic, is another important component of
empowerment rights. Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the
right to freedom of movement (UN General Assembly, 1948). While this right is often taken for
granted in free societies, its importance becomes conspicuous in its restriction. The freedom of
movement has two dimensions. Some states primarily restrict the movement of citizens to travel
to and from other countries while other states restrict the movement of citizens within a country.
Movement is often considered a fundamental freedom and States like Myanmar (Burma) and
North Korea are notorious for restricting the movement of their citizens both domestically and
internationally.45 The purpose is to control them and avoid the organization of political
opposition, the spread of ideas counter to the regime in power, and the embarrassment of mass
defections (Dowty 1989). Movement is often restricted by states who seek to exert harsh control
over their citizens. A method of movement restriction often involves requiring citizens to carry
papers that designate where they can travel or work.

Domestic Movement DMH1: States with greater levels of administrative-extractive capacity
will have higher levels of governmental respect for the right to domestic movement than states
with higher levels.

45

Myanmar (Burma) has received a score of “0” signaling “no respect” for both Domestic and Foreign Movement
since 1989 by the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (CIRI). North Korea has never received anything but a 0 for all
years included in the CIRI database.
148

One of the principle reasons freedom of domestic movement is restricted within a state is
because the government feels that the movement of populations will carry with it the movement
of threats, either from peaceful political opponents or from violent home-grown terrorists.
Another reason to restrict domestic movement is that governments seek to segregate minority
groups they fear will undermine majority control, or create tensions. Often these reasons are used
as political pretext to hinder the movement of political opposition or to preserve control over a
particular industry or labor force by the political elite (Weiner 2009). Governments in states
with higher levels of administrative-extractive capacity should be able to ameliorate these fears
by using their institutional capacity to monitor only those individuals they are concerned about,
and by providing the public goods that lessen grievances of political opposition.

Domestic Movement DMH2: States with greater levels of coercive-rentier capacity will have
lower levels of governmental respect for the right to domestic movement than states with higher
levels.

A state capacity type that could increase restrictions on the freedom of domestic
movement is coercive-rentier capacity. As discussed throughout this dissertation, coerciverentier capacity couples the potential for serious grievances owing to high levels of corruption
and economic inequality with a state that has the ability to repress citizens. This makes it more
likely the government will seek to control the population rigidly, in an attempt to undermine the
ability of coherent political opposition to form. Furthermore, in states that engage in rentierism,
governments are likely to prioritize controlling certain industries that have to do with primary
commodities, therefore restrictions on domestic movement will be more likely to maintain
control over the labor force in these industries.
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Foreign Movement FMH1: States with higher levels of international-power capacity will have
lower levels of governmental respect for the right to foreign movement than states with lower
levels.

As argued throughout this dissertation, one of the principle consequences for states with
large amounts of international power is that they are more likely to be engaged in international
power politics, which includes military conflicts. States involved in military conflicts often
become the targets of espionage and foreign terrorist groups. Therefore, governments in these
states will attempt to restrict the foreign movement of their citizens because they fear foreign
movement will allow their citizens to participate in activities that might damage the state.
Furthermore, given that protecting territorial sovereignty is still one of the primary components
of the modern international system, governments in states engaged in military conflicts will
focus more intensely on this goal, and will use the conflict as a pre-text to violate rights to
foreign movement (Harvey and Barnridge 2007).

Foreign Movement FMH2: States with higher levels of social-cohesion capacity will have
lower levels of governmental respect for the right to foreign movement than states with lower
levels.

One variable that is often linked to instability and violent uprisings within a state is the
presence of a large minority group diaspora just over the border (Collier and Hoeffler 2000;
Fearon and Laitin 2003). Governments in these states may have reason to fear that members of
ethnic groups with large diasporas living outside the country are more likely to leave in an effort
to get military training, or to agitate in the neighboring country in an effort to destabilize the
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region to open up space to gain political influence and control for their ethnic group. States with
high levels of social-cohesion capacity will have less to fear from this potential threat to political
stability, therefore the incentives for the government to restrict the right to foreign movement are
lower in these states.
4.4.3 State respect for Electoral Self-Determination and Workers’ Rights.
Both electoral self-determination and workers’ rights are crucial to empowerment, but
they stand at different points on the spectrum when it comes to how deeply they reflect state
commitment to empowerment. Electoral self-determination is perhaps the minimal standard for
democracy, and thus, empowerment. The debate over the importance of elections in defining
democracy is well developed, and many argue it represents but a first step on the continuum
toward high quality democracy. That said its relationship to respect for other human rights is
mixed which is further evidence of the danger of using elections as a proxy for deeper
conceptualizations of democracy (Richards and Gelleny 2007).
Workers’ rights on the other hand, sit at the opposite end of the spectrum in terms of
representing a deep commitment to empowerment. Workers’ rights allow workers to participate
“in the determination of their wages, hours, and working conditions” (Gross 2002, 480). This
infusion of democratic principles into an often hierarchical and contested realm of activity, work,
is indicative of a society with deeply entrenched egalitarian values and protections. In many
ways they embody what O’Donnell (1996) refers to as “horizontal accountability” in society as
well as in government, a fundamental component of consolidated democracies. Workers’ rights
then reflect a deep commitment, to not just procedural democracy, but also to democratic values.
Although they the right to electoral self-determination and the worker’s rights reflect different
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dimensions of empowerment and the depth of democracy, state capacity types should influence
state respect for them.

Electoral Self-Determination SDH1: States with high levels of administrative-extractive will
have higher governmental respect for the right to electoral self-determination than those with
low levels.

Elections are often one of the first elements to appear in a state as it transitions from an
authoritarian regime to a more democratic regime (Brownlee 2009). States with higher levels of
administrative-extractive capacity are more likely to reach the levels of wealth required for these
transitions to take place because they are able to attract foreign investment and also levee and
collect taxes from domestic sources. In states with this type of capacity the government is more
likely to want to bring the people into the political process than to shut them out to ensure that
social capital is used to continue to grow and diversify the economy, which will provide the
government with more resources (Evans 1995). Elections are a first step in doing achieving this
goal.

Electoral Self-Determination SDH2: States with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity will
have lower governmental respect for the right to electoral self-determination than those with
lower levels.

Governments in states with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity will have lower
incentives to respect the right for electoral self-determination. Governments that engage in
rentierism are often fearful of allowing the population to engage in the political process because
the political elite’s power rests almost complexly on their ability to exert absolute control over
the natural resources in the state (Karl 1997; Ross 2004). The costs of losing power through
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popular elections are too high and therefore states with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity
will work to repress this right as long as possible.

Worker’s Rights WH1: States with high levels of both administrative-extractive and reachcoastal capacities will have higher governmental respect for the right to workers’ rights than
those with low levels.
Unlike conducting elections, respecting worker’s rights is a much more complex and
difficult task even for consolidated democracies. Internationally recognized worker’s rights
include the rights at work to association, to organize and collectively bargain, no compulsory
labor, a minimum age of employment for children, and acceptable conditions of work including
minimum wages, hours, and occupational safety and health.46 Enforcement of these rights often
face significant hurdles as the state must have extensive monitoring, the ability to impose
sanctions against powerful economic interests—a particularly difficult task in developing
countries—the ability to resist pressure from international markets to lower work standards, and
finally, the appropriate education so workers know their rights and can claim them.
Indeed enforcing worker rights domestically is often so difficult that advocates
emphasize the role developed countries like the United States must play in forcing developing
countries to adhere to international labor standards (Compa 2002; Alston 2004). Given this
difficulty it is likely that states with higher levels of administrative-extractive capacity will
improve worker rights as it is the type of state capacity most closely related to governmental
oversight and institutional capability.

46

These are the rights included under the category of “worker rights” in the CIRI human rights data which are
based on the 1984 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
(Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2013, 65). For more on the GSP see Compa and Vogt (2001).
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Worker Rights WRH2: States with higher levels of coercive-rentier capacity will have lower
levels of respect for worker rights than states with lower levels.

Governments in states with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity are less likely to
respect worker rights. Governments with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity rule by
monopolizing a natural resource and in repressing any organized political opposition. Worker
rights to assemble, organize, and collectively bargain are often seen as the beginnings of
potential political opposition or even revolution, therefore states that fear opposition use their
coercive capacity to brutally end attempts of workers to unionize. An example of this is the well
documented killings by paramilitary groups of Coca-Cola bottling plant employees attempting to
organize in countries such as Guatemala (Blanding 2010).

4.5 Alternative Hypotheses
In addition to state capacity, there are numerous other factors that are thought to
influence state respect for empowerment rights. As discussed earlier in this chapter, regime type
is probably factor most likely to influence state respect for empowerment rights. Empowerment
rights like freedom of association, speech, religion, and electoral self-determination are
considered fundamental elements of democracy. Therefore it is unsurprising that work on this
subject finds a strong relationship between indicators of democracy and respect for
empowerment rights (Cole 2015).
One modification to the regime type hypothesis is that the relationship between regime
type and empowerment rights is not linear. Some find that states stuck in transition between
authoritarianism and democracy are more likely to restrict certain empowerment rights than
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states that are fully authoritarian or consolidated democracies. This is particularly true for
transitional states experimenting with elections (Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Aleman and Woods
2014). Therefore, that higher regime coherence may lead to greater respect for empowerment
rights is an important potential alternative hypothesis.
Another condition strongly associated with a reduction in state respect for physical
integrity rights is ongoing violent civil conflict or civil war. As Hafner-Burton (2013) notes,
ongoing civil conflict is arguably one of the most well-established causes of human rights
violations. States experiencing civil conflict tend to be at their weakest and most threatened
creating a doubly strong incentive to violate human rights. Weak states are unable to protect their
citizens from the harms that can occur during civil conflict by both government forces and rebel
forces alike (Englehart 2009). Though few studies have looked at this specifically in the context
of state respect for empowerment rights, it is likely that it will have a negative effect on state
respect for all human rights.
A state’s level development or wealth along with its population is also potentially linked
to the level of governmental respect for empowerment rights. Wealth is a well documented
associate of more robust democracy (Lipset 1959; Inglehart 1997) which, by definition should
improve respect for many empowerment rights. Large populations are also often thought to lead
to greater levels of human rights violations because diversity larger populations often raise the
costs of a state taking action and can also make the government’s control over a territory more
tenuous and repression more likely (Henderson 1993; Herbst 2000).47

47

Although, numerous studies use the same set of controls across a number of different rights (Poe, Tate, and
Keith 1999; Hafner-Burton 2008; 2014; Cole 2015). I recognize that a number of these rights could be influenced
idiosyncratically by various factors. Worker rights, for example, are often thought to be improved by increased FDI
(Neumayer and de Soysa 2006) and by the presence or absence of restrictive developmental loans that impose
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4.6 Data and Methods
As with the investigation of the role state capacity plays in state respect for physical
integrity rights, measures of the rights in question come from the CIRI Human Rights Data
Project (henceforth referred to simply as “CIRI”) (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). However, in
this case justifying this choice is much easier since CIRI provides the only comprehensive set of
measures of empowerment rights. Empowerment rights include the rights to the freedoms of
speech, association, religion, foreign movement, domestic movement, electoral selfdetermination, and work protections. Certainly other measures of all of these individual
empowerment rights exist, however, they do not exist in one comparable dataset where the
conditions under which scores are created is similar across rights. As with each physical integrity
right, scores for the seven empowerment rights are all coded 0 for “no respect”, 1 for “partial
respect”, and 2 for “full respect”.
The indicators used to control for alternative hypotheses are discussed at greater length in
chapter three. These include an indicator of ongoing civil conflict from the PRIO/UCDP Armed
Conflict Database (Gleiditsch et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2014), an indicator of
regime type from the Polity IV project (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2013), an indicator of
regime coherence which is simply a squared version of the Polity IV regime type score, and the
natural logs of GDP per capita from the World Development Indicators (WDI) and population
from the Correlates of War (COW) project (Singer and Small 1994).
4.6.1 Estimation Technique
To test the hypotheses of the relationship between state capacity and empowerment rights
a random-effects ordered logistic model with lagged dummy variables of the dependent variable
neoliberal structural adjustment policies on states (Arat 2002). I return to this idea in the conclusion and argue that
more tailored models of state capacity and empowerment rights are necessary in the future.
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and standard errors clustered by country is used. The advantages of this approach are described
in greater detail in chapter three (see section 3.4.1). Ultimately, this estimation technique
provides the best controls for heterogeneity, autocorrelation, serial correlation, and
heteroskedasticity, all common problems that can bias results when analyzing cross-national
time-series panel data.

4.6 Results and Discussion
This section includes a description of the analysis of state capacity and empowerment
rights. I start by explaining the implications of the results of this analysis for the general
hypotheses on state respect for empowerment rights (empowerment rights hypotheses H1-H5). I
then move on to discuss what the findings indicate with respect to the two hypotheses for each
individual empowerment right. I also discuss how the inclusion of state capacity in the model
influences the effect of other factors hypothesized to affect governmental respect for
empowerment rights.
The results of the random-effects ordered logistic model are presented as odds ratios in
Table 4.1. The values in each column reflect the effect that each independent variable has for
each empowerment right listed at the top of that column. Odds ratios above 1 indicate an
increase in the independent variable of 1 standard deviation increases the probability a
government has higher levels of respect for the given empowerment right. Odds ratios below 1
indicate an increase in the independent variable lowers the probability a government has higher
levels of respect for the given empowerment right.48

48

An odds ratio of exactly 1 indicates the variable has no effect on the probability of higher or lower respect for a
given right.
157

Table 4.2 summarizes the hypotheses by listing state capacity factors and their expected
effects on physical integrity rights in general and individually. If higher levels of a state capacity
dimension are hypothesized to improve state respect for a right or rights the table reads
“positive” under “expected effect.” If it says “negative” then higher values on that state capacity
dimension is expected to decrease respect for the right or rights under examination. If the state
capacity dimension is statistically significant for the level of state respect for multiple rights, or
exerts a large influence over state respect for a single right, it receives a “strong confirm.” If the
state capacity dimension is statistically significant but works in the opposite direction of the
expected effect, for at least one right, it may receive either a “mixed” or “weak reject” depending
on the strength of the effect. Finally, if the right is only significant for state respect of one right
and/or exerts small influence over state respect for a right then it receives a “weak confirm.”
Table 4.3 depicts the percentage (as opposed to odds) change one standard deviation
increase in each independent variable has for the probability of an increase in state respect for
each physical integrity right. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the relative increase in odds of a
standard deviation increase in the statistically significant dependent variables for the level of
state respect each physical integrity right. This figure provides an easy way to identify which
independent variables exert the largest influence over state respect for each physical integrity
right.
The results shown in Table 4.1 indicate that the state capacity types play an important
role in explaining government respect for most empowerment rights and also that the level of the
different state capacity types helps to predict which rights a government will choose to respect
and violate. Indeed, every type of state capacity is significant for at least one empowerment right.
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That said, some state capacity types are, in general more influential across the range of
empowerment rights than others.
Turning now to the general hypotheses summarized in Table 4.2. In contrast to the
findings on physical integrity rights in chapter 3, there is no one type of state capacity type that is
strongly associated with respect for empowerment rights in general. The findings results in Table
4.1 suggest at best mixed support for the first general empowerment rights H1, that
administrative-extractive capacity would have a positive influence on empowerment rights.
Administrative-extractive capacity, which is so influential and positively associated with higher
levels of governmental respect for all four physical integrity rights, is much less so for
empowerment rights. Administrative-extractive capacity is only statistically significant for two
rights, freedom of foreign movement and worker rights and it is negative for one and positive for
the other, meaning at best this type of capacity has a complex relationship with empowerment
rights.
The results in Table 4.1 show that empowerment rights hypothesis H2, that internationalpower capacity has a negative relationship with respect for empowerment rights, enjoys weak
support. International-power capacity is only statistically significant and negatively associated
with government respect for one right, religious freedom. That said, as Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1
show, the influence of international-capacity is large relative to other statistically significant
variables as one standard deviation increase in international-power lowers the probability of the
level of governmental respect being in a higher category by 65.72%. Concretely, this means that
all things being equal, China and Russia are 65.72% less likely to have full respect for religious
freedom than India who is one standard deviation lower on the international-power dimension of
state capacity.
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Table 4.1: Results of the Random Effects Model of State Capacity and Empowerment Rights¹
(Presented as Odds Ratios of a 1 Standard Deviation Increase in X)
Association Speech
Religious
Domestic
Foreign
Electoral Self- Worker's Rights
VARIABLES
Freedom
Movement Movement Determination
Past Respect = 0
0.094*** 0.226***
0.264***
0.057***
0.083***
0.253***
0.165***
(0.003)
(0.022)
(0.013)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.020)
(0.008)
Past Respect = 1
0.338*** 0.428***
0.417***
0.179***
0.233***
0.465***
0.397***
(0.027)
(0.051)
(0.032)
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.049)
(0.038)
Past Respect = 2²
Civil Conflict = 1

1.070
(0.382)
Regime Type³
2.263***
(0.025)
Regime Coherenceª
1.358**
(0.004)
Wealth (ln GDP pc)
1.111
(0.261)
Population (ln)
0.432*
(0.159)
Administrative-Extractive
0.834
(0.318)
International-Power
1.489
(0.519)
Coercive-Rentier
0.508***
(0.131)
Reach-Coastal
1.306
(0.217)
Social-Cohesion
1.093
(0.156)
Table 4.4 Continued on Next Page

1.011
(0.255)
2.672***
(0.032)
1.176
(0.005)
0.914
(0.200)
0.182***
(0.127)
1.493
(0.476)
1.927
(0.903)
0.337***
(0.108)
1.346*
(0.208)
0.978
(0.169)

1.053
(0.293)
1.451**
(0.023)
1.199
(0.004)
1.011
(0.182)
1.210
(0.240)
1.315
(0.372)
0.343***
(0.132)
0.886
(0.141)
1.395**
(0.196)
0.951
(0.131)

1.170
(0.350)
1.761***
(0.018)
1.416***
(0.004)
1.057
(0.176)
0.657
(0.125)
1.244
(0.362)
0.769
(0.172)
0.477***
(0.087)
1.108
(0.124)
1.128
(0.123)

0.913
(0.237)
1.902***
(0.020)
1.499***
(0.003)
1.366
(0.218)
0.866
(0.173)
0.571*
(0.168)
1.261
(0.370)
0.881
(0.169)
1.099
(0.125)
1.633***
(0.177)

1.037
(0.281)
4.861***
(0.032)
1.247
(0.005)
1.501
(0.235)
1.043
(0.261)
1.315
(0.415)
0.668
(0.304)
0.651
(0.206)
1.119
(0.165)
1.153
(0.164)

1.078
(0.289)
1.704***
(0.019)
1.034
(0.004)
0.915
(0.175)
0.664
(0.184)
1.989**
(0.621)
0.688
(0.185)
0.957
(0.220)
1.269
(0.207)
0.951
(0.148)
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Table 4.1 Continued
cut1
cut2
sigma2_u
Observations
Number of Countries

0.001*
0.000***
0.085
0.000***
0.007*
(0.003)
(0.000)
(0.264)
(0.001)
(0.021)
0.041
0.001*
1.492
0.053
0.475
(0.151)
(0.004)
(4.613)
(0.124)
(1.338)
1.589
2.366***
1.888**
1.000
1.000
(0.632)
(0.784)
(0.488)
(0.000)
(0.000)
1,355
1,356
1,329
1,356
1,306
100
100
99
100
100
Robust Standard Errors In Parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.226
(0.763)
13.063
(44.147)
1.738**
(0.414)
1,356
100

0.003*
(0.008)
0.124
(0.382)
2.313**
(0.902)
1,354
100

¹Random Effects Model with Standard Errors Clustered by Country.
²Dropped due to Collinearity
³Higher values = More Democratic
ªHigher values = More Democratic or more Autocratic
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Table 4.2: Implications of Results for Hypotheses of
State Capacity and Empowerment Rights
HYPOTHESES
Empowerment Rights H1: Administrative-Extractive Capacity
Empowerment Rights H2: International-Power Capacity
Empowerment Rights H3: Reach-Coastal Capacity
Empowerment Rights H4: Coercive-Rentier Capacity
Empowerment Rights H5: Social-Cohesion Capacity
Association AH1: Reach-Coastal
Association AH2: Coercive-Rentier
Speech SH1: Administrative-Extractive
Speech SH2: International-Power
Religion RH1: Reach-Coastal
Religion RH1: Social-Cohesion
Domestic Movement DMH1: Administrative-Extractive
Domestic Movement DMH2: Coercive-Rentier
Foreign Movement FMH1: International-Power
Foreign Movement FMH2: Social-Cohesion
Electoral Self-Determination SDH1: Administrative-Extractive
Electoral Self-Determination SDH1: Coercive-Rentier
Worker’s Rights WH1: Administrative-Extractive
Worker’s Rights WH1: Coercive-Rentier

Expected
Effect
Positive
Negative
Positive
Negative
Positive
Positive
Negative
Positive
Negative
Positive
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Positive
Positive
Negative
Positive
Negative

Results¹
Mixed
Weak Reject
Strong Confirm
Strong Confirm
Weak Confirm
No Effect
Strong Confirm
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
Strong Confirm
No Effect
Strong Confirm
No Effect
No Effect
Strong Confirm
No Effect

¹Strong confirm = statistically significant for multiple rights with large effect
Weak confirm = statistically significant for two or fewer rights with small effect
Mixed = statistically significant for multiple rights but expected causal direction varies equally.
Weak Reject = statistically significant for multiple rights but with the opposite expected
influence for a majority of them.
No effect = Hypothesized variable is not statistically significant for any rights or for a specific right.
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Variable
Past Respect = 0
Past Respect = 1
Past Respect = 2²
Civil Conflict = 1
Regime Type³
Regime Coherenceª
Wealth (ln GDP pc)
Population (ln)
Administrative-Extractive
International-Power
Coercive-Rentier
Reach-Coastal
Social-Cohesion

Table 4.3: Percentage Change in Probability of an Increase in
State Respect For Empowerment Rights¹
Freedom of
Freedom of
Freedom of
Freedom of Freedom of
Domestic
Foreign
Association
Speech
Religion
Movement
Movement
-90.64
-73.39
-73.60
-94.27
-91.68
-66.21
-57.27
-58.21
-82.05
-76.74

126.28
35.80

167.42

-56.78

-81.85

45.14

76.12
41.64

90.23
49.90

Electoral
Self
Determination
-74.70
-53.53

Worker’s
Rights
-83.47
-60.28

386.09

70.45

-42.92

98.92

-65.72
-49.19

-66.27
34.63

-52.32
39.48
63.30

¹Percentages based on a 1 standard deviation change in the value of the dependent variable. Values only included for significant variables.
²Dropped due to Collinearity.
³Higher values = More Democratic.
ªHigher values = More Democratic or more Autocratic.
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Reach-coastal capacity is also less influential for empowerment rights than it is for
physical integrity rights, though as the results in Tables 4.1 and 4.3 illustrate, its relationship is
less complex since it is positively associated and statistically significant for two rights, those
protecting freedom of speech and freedom of religion. This offers weak confirmation for
empowerment rights hypothesis H3, that reach-coastal capacity would have a positive influence
on empowerment rights in general. A one standard deviation change in reach-coastal capacity
increases the probability of a government having a higher level of state respect for the rights
protecting the freedoms of speech and religion by 34.63% and 39.48% respectively. This
suggests that countries like Japan and New Zealand are 34.63% and 39.48% more likely to have
full respect for these rights than are the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, or Israel who are
all a full standard deviation lower on this dimension of state capacity.
The dimension of capacity that is most impactful to state respect for empowerment rights
is coercive-rentier capacity. As Table 4.3 illustrates, coercive-rentier capacity is statistically
significant for three different rights including the rights protecting freedoms of association,
speech, and domestic movement. Furthermore, coercive-rentier capacity is negatively associated
with government respect for all three of these rights. These results indicate strong support for
empowerment rights hypothesis H4, that higher levels of coercive-rentier capacity would have a
negative impact on governmental respect for empowerment rights. As Table 4.3 and both Figures
4.1 and 4.2 show, coercive-rentier capacity has the largest negative influence on state respect for
freedom of speech, followed by freedom of domestic movement and freedom of association
respectively. More specifically, a one standard deviation increase in coercive-rentier capacity
lowers the probability of government respect being at a higher level by an average of 55.9%.
This means that the government of Syria during the 80s and early 90s was an average of 55.9%
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less likely to respect these three rights than the government of the United Arab Emirates during
the same period. Moreover, Syria is an average of 111.85% less likely to respect these rights than
the government of Qatar, a state that is 2 standard deviations lower on this dimension of state
capacity than Syria.
The results in Table 4.1 show weak support for empowerment rights hypothesis H5, that
social-cohesion capacity will have a positive effect on state respect for empowerment rights. The
only right that social-cohesion is statistically significant in predicting is the freedom of foreign
movement, though its influence is relative strong with a standard deviation increase raising the
probability of a higher level of governmental respect by 63.3%. That social-cohesion capacity is
not particularly important to empowerment rights supports a growing consensus in both the civil
conflict and human rights literature that ethnic and religious diversity will only matter under very
specific circumstances (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Walker and Poe 2002). This relationship
between governmental respect for foreign movement and social-cohesion capacity is discussed
below in greater detail.
Finally, as with physical integrity rights, the inclusion of the state capacity types in the
models of governmental respect for all seven empowerment rights help illuminate the influence
of other variables theorized to influence state respect for empowerment rights. These include
ongoing civil conflict, regime type, regime coherence, wealth, and population. The results in
Table 4.1 show that regime type is statistically significant for all of the empowerment rights,
with more democratic countries being more likely to have higher levels of governmental respect
for all seven rights. As Figures 4.1 and 4.2 depict, with the exceptions of the rights to domestic
movement and freedom of religion, regime type is the most influential variable in predicting the
level of state respect for empowerment rights. Given the emphasis on the importance of
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democracy to human rights fulfillment in the literature (Goodhart 2005) and, as noted above, the
fact that many empowerment rights are by definition democratic, this finding makes sense. Still
the fact that state capacity still helps better explain how states respect these rights confirms the
baseline assumption underlying this analysis, that even in democracies there is an empowerment
rights gap and state capacity can help explain this gap. The exception that seems to prove this
rule is the only right that appears immune to the influence of state capacity—electoral selfdetermination. For this right regime type has by far the most influence in predicting the
probability of state respect for this right.
Another notable result with implications for the alternative hypotheses is that wealth no
statistically significant relationship with governmental respect for empowerment rights. Wealth
is often linked to deepening democratization (Inglehart 1997; Catterberg and Inglehart 2002) but
when state capacity is accounted for its influence is non-existent.
4.6.1 Freedom of Association
Table 4.2 summarizes the hypotheses that are specific to each empowerment right. The
first hypothesis related to freedom of association, AH1, is that reach-coastal capacity will be
positively associated with higher levels of respect for this right. The results indicate that reachcoastal capacity has no effect on respect for this right. The logic for this hypothesis, described
above, is that states with greater reach would be less inclined to violate the right to association
because they would not be worried about groups gathering in locations they lacked control to
form some sort of political opposition or outright rebellion. Despite this non-finding, the fact that
regime coherence was significant shows that states with institutional stability have less to fear
from respecting the right citizens to association so the logic of this hypothesis might still hold.
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Hypothesis AH2, that coercive-rentier capacity would have a negative influence on
governmental respect for the right to association, is supported by the findings presented in Table
4.2. A one standard deviation increase in coercive-rentier capacity lowers the probability of a
government having higher respect for this right by 49.19%. Examples of countries that have
experienced this effect include the former Soviet Republics like Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary
who all saw a 1 standard deviation decline in their coercive-rentier capacity throughout the 90s
and 2000s and a corresponding rise in state respect for freedom of association. These countries
support the idea that states with lots of coercive power, and potential for rentierism, experience
higher incentives to repress the population and attempt to undercut any momentum political
opposition might gain through rallies, meetings, or other forms of group protest.
4.6.2 Freedom of Speech
Two forms of state capacity are statistically significant in explaining the level of
governmental respect for the right protecting the freedom of speech, coercive-rentier capacity
and reach-coastal capacity. This finding offers no support for the hypotheses SH1 and SH2 that
both the administrative-extractive and international-power dimensions of state capacity would be
statistically significant in explaining governmental respect for the right protecting freedom of
speech. Recall, it was expected that international-power would make states disinclined to allow
freedom of speech because of potential war protesters. One possible explanation for this nonfinding is that governments in states with high levels of international-power feel less threatened
by the population due to their high levels of power relative to society making them feel
repression is unnecessary. That administrative-extractive capacity is not associated with
governmental respect for the right to free speech might be explained by the fact that governments
in states with this type of capacity use the monitoring capacity to both repress this right and
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respect this right in equal measure. Certainly some states with high levels of institutional
capability will use that to target leaders of opposition movements, but theses states may also be
so effective at providing public goods that they undercut serious opposition that needs to be
restricted.
That coercive-rentier capacity is statistically significant and negatively associated with
governmental respect for the right to freedom of speech fits with the finding that it is also
negative for the right to association. Political elites in states with high levels of coercive-rentier
capacity will feel empowered to use that to crush political opposition rather than risk losing their
control over government and the resources from which they are extracting rents. As Table 4.3
shows, a 1 standard deviation increase in this dimension of state capacity lowers the probability
of higher levels of governmental respect for the right to free speech by 66.27%. This means that
governments in states like Greece or Bulgaria in the 1990s are 66.27% more likely than
governments in states like Libya or the United Arab Emirates.
Reach-coastal capacity, on the other hand, has a positive influence on governmental
respect for the right to free speech. A potential explanation for this is that governments in states
with high levels of reach have little to fear from their populations as they are good at providing
public goods that reduce the levels of grievances. These states also have high levels of contract
intensive money (CIM), which suggests higher levels of faith in government regulation and
financial institution (Clague 1999). This also might undermine the sources of elite-challenging
speech the government might find threatening. As Figure 4.1 shows, the influence of reach-costal
capacity is not that large in comparison with regime type or even coercive rentier, but a 1
standard deviation increase still increases the probability of higher levels of respect by 39.48%.
A country like Bulgaria, for example, highlights this relationship. During the early 90s Bulgaria
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had high levels of reach-coastal capacity (mostly reach, given that Bulgaria is landlocked) and
full respect for the right to free speech, however, as its reach declined through the 90s and into
the 2000s state respect for the right to free speech declined as well. This is likely related to the
economic troubles the former Soviet countries experienced, and as the government’s control over
the country dwindled, political elites felt more threatened by oppositional speech and engaged in
repression more often. This pattern holds for other former Soviet countries like Romania,
Ukraine, and Hungary. In the end, this finding demonstrates the importance of governmental
control in explaining state respect for the right to free speech, but the type of control matters
greatly. Coercive control impacts the right to speech negatively, while reach control is good for
the right to free speech.
4.6.3 Freedom of Religion
The only state capacity type that is significant in explaining governmental respect for
freedom of religion is international-power capacity. As Table 4.3 shows, a 1 standard deviation
increase in international-power capacity lowers the probability of a higher level of governmental
respect by 65.72%. This result means that both hypotheses (RH1 and RH2) related to
governmental respect for the right to freedom of religion enjoy no support as both the reachcoastal and social cohesion dimensions of capacity are not statistically significant in the model.
That social-cohesion is not statistically significant is particularly surprising given that a lack of
diversity would presumably remove any reason for the state to undermine religious freedom.
However, this non-finding might suggest support for the notion that social cohesion can cut both
ways. In other words, when a high level of social cohesion is present in some states this will lead
to a respect for freedom of religion, while in other states this will lead to brutal repression of
very small minorities. Some posit what I call a “Goldilocks” theory of diversity, that too little
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and too much is bad, but somewhere in the middle is just the right for ensuring that compromises
are made to protect religious and ethnic minorities (Collier and Binswanger 1999; Elbadawi and
Sambanis 2000).
One possible explanation for the finding that higher levels international-power lead to
lower levels of respect for freedom of religion is that these states tend to be larger and have a
high degree of religious diversity that might challenge the ability of the state to mobilize
resources for war. States like China, Russia, India, Iran, and Iraq all score highly on this
dimension of state capacity and have low levels of respect for the right to freedom of religion.
This finding supports the often over-looked theory that powerful nations seek to forge a
nationalistic identity to make the use of state power abroad easier (Newman 2000). India, for
example, has increased its international-power capacity by nearly a full standard deviation since
1981 and has experienced a corresponding general decline in respect for freedom of religion. 49
4.6.4 Freedoms of Domestic and Foreign Movement
The relationship between the different dimensions of state capacity and the freedoms of
domestic and foreign movement highlights how different capacities influence how governments
choose to respect and violate empowerment rights. These findings related to these two rights also
demonstrate an underlying assumption of this project—that state capacity types are unlikely to
be positive for all human rights or negative for all human rights, rather each state capacity type
can enable a government to respect or violate rights depending on numerous other factors.
Coercive-rentier capacity is statistically significant and negatively associated with
governmental respect for the right to domestic movement which confirms hypothesis DMH1. As
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India’s CIRI score for freedom of religion has moved in fits and starts, but from 1981-2000 its average score was
1.25 or just above “some respect”. During that period India had “full respect” for the right to freedom of religion 9
times. However since 2000, which has seen India increase its international-power score the most, its average score
for freedom of religion is only .5 or between “no respect” and “some respect”.
172

Table 4.3 illustrates, a standard deviation increase in coercive-rentier capacity lowers the
probability of higher levels of governmental respect for the right to domestic movement by
52.32%. That states with high levels of coercive-rentier capacity would seek to restrict
movement fits with existent theories on how governments deal with potential threats. As
described in detail in other parts of this dissertation, high levels of coercive-rentier capacity in
states both produce grievances and lowers the costs for engaging in repression. Restricting
domestic movement is likely a fundamental strategy of repression for these states. As Figure 4.2
shows, outside of past levels of respect for this right, coercive-rentier capacity only lags behind
regime type in its impact on the probability of the level of governmental respect for the right to
domestic movement.
The results in Table 4.1 show that two different dimensions of state capacity are related
to governmental respect for the right to foreign movement. These are the social-cohesion and the
administrative-extractive dimensions of state capacity. Social-cohesion capacity is strongly
associated with improved state respect for the right to foreign movement. Indeed a one standard
deviation increase in this type of state capacity raises the probability of higher governmental
respect by 63.3%. This means that states like Greece, Italy, and Tunisia, who all score at the top
of this dimension, are significantly more likely to respect this right than Turkey, Uruguay, or
Thailand, who, while still high, are one standard deviation lower. This finding supports
hypothesis FMH2, which is based on the idea that social-cohesion will be positively related to
respect for this right because these states do not fear a minority group coming and going and
perhaps coordinating with a nearby diasporas to form political opposition. Jordan, Uzbekistan,
and even Slovakia are all examples of states with mixed to poor records on respect for the right
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to foreign movement and all have low levels of social-cohesion and problematic diasporas near
their borders.
Administrative-extractive capacity is also statistically significant in explaining the level
of governmental respect for the right to foreign movement. This finding is somewhat surprising
given the powerful positive influence administrative-extractive capacity has on respect for all of
the physical integrity rights analyzed in chapter three of this dissertation. That said, to restrict
foreign movement states require the ability to track citizens, issue papers, and generally account
for who is in the country. Certainly administrative-extractive capacity is a necessary capability to
performing these functions, given it includes a measure on the collection of domestic taxes. This
result again highlights that different governments can use the same type of capacity to both
respect and violate different rights. Countries with relatively high levels of administrativeextractive capacity that do restrict foreign movement include former Soviet Republics like
Hungary, Ukraine, Croatia, and Slovakia. Authoritarian regimes with high levels of this
dimension of state capacity, like China, also violate this right consistently.
4.6.5 Electoral Self-Determination
Electoral self-determination is the one right, of both physical integrity rights, and
empowerment rights, that resists the influence of all the dimensions of state capacity. This means
that both hypotheses SDH1 and SDH2, described in Table 4.2, have no support. As the results in
Tables 4.1, 4.3, and Figure 4.2 show, electoral self-determination is explained entirely by past
levels of respect for this right and regime type. Given that this represents the minimal standard of
democracy, and is part of the Polity IV measure of regime type, it is not surprising this is the
case. That said, as many have noted, holding elections is the least a state can do on its way to
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deeper, fully consolidated democracy that respects other human rights (Richards and Gelleny
2007).
4.6.6 Worker Rights
The results in Table 4.1 show that administrative-extractive capacity is statistically
significant and positively associated with governmental respect for worker rights. This result
confirms hypothesis WH1, and suggests that the difficulty of enforcing worker rights makes
states with high levels of administrative-extractive capacity uniquely able to respect these
rights.50 As Table 4.3 shows, the influence of administrative-extractive capacity on the
probability of governmental respect for these rights is large, with a standard deviation increase
raising the probability of higher levels of state respect by 98.92%. This means that states like
Germany, Japan, and France, who are at the top of the administrative-extractive dimension of
state capacity, are almost twice as likely to have full respect for this right than states like Greece
or the Czech Republic, which are one standard deviation lower on this dimension of state
capacity.
Notable exceptions include the governments of the United States and the United
Kingdom, who despite being high on the administrative-extractive dimension of state capacity,
often have either only some respect or no respect for these rights. The United Kingdom in
particular, experienced an interesting shift over time from “full respect” in the 80s, to “no
respect” in the 90s, and back to “full respect” in the 2000s. Correspondingly, the UKs
administrative-extractive capacity trend mirrored this pattern. The only other statistically
significant variable is regime type, though as Figure 4.2 illustrates its influence is less than
50

In the CIRI database, from 1981-2010 worker rights had the second lowest percentage of years with “full
respect” after freedom of speech (27% vs 30% respectively). Worker rights also experienced the highest
percentage of “no respect” (33.7%) during the same period. This highlights the difficulty many states, even
democratic ones, have respecting these rights.
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administrative-extractive capacity. This is further evidence that democracy, while extremely
important, is no panacea for empowerment rights, and must be coupled with different state
capacity types to maximize governmental respect for these important rights.

4.7 Conclusions
This chapter set out to test hypotheses about the relationship between state capacity types
and empowerment rights. First and foremost, even when state capacity is included in the model
political democracy remains very important to in explaining governmental respect for all of the
empowerment rights. Second, it is important to emphasize that the type and level of state
capacity does matter in explaining governmental respect for governmental respect of
empowerment rights. Coercive-rentier capacity is the most problematic dimension of state
capacity for empowerment rights. This fits with theories about how incentives lead governments
to select repression as a viable option. For governments in states with a large amount of
coercive-rentier capacity, repression is less costly owing to their large coercive abilities, and
threats and grievances are high as a consequence of rentierism. It is important to note, however,
that this finding contrasts with the non-effect of coercive-rentier capacity in predicting state
respect for most physical integrity rights in chapter three. Clearly repressing behaviors protected
by empowerment rights is the preferable option for these governments, an important finding.
Third, administrative-extractive capacity actually cuts both ways for empowerment
rights, allowing governments to restrict the right to foreign movement, while allowing them to
respect the worker rights. On balance administrative-extractive capacity still appears better for
human rights in general, but in the wrong hands it has potentially negative consequences. This
finding highlights one of the core assumptions underlying this dissertation, that all the
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dimensions of state capacity simply allow states to take actions, and do not inevitably lead to
normatively good outcomes.
Fourth, while the hypotheses describing expectations about the general relationships
between capacity and empowerment rights were mostly confirmed, the right specific hypotheses
enjoyed at best mixed support. However, these findings should not be taken as evidence that
state capacity is unimportant to governmental respect for empowerment rights. Instead, the
results presented in this chapter underline how much is yet to be done in the study of why
governments or violate empowerment rights. Particularly, researchers should look at the rights
individually and develop better models with potentially different controls for each right. Often
these rights are conceptually aggregated together into some measure of quality of democracy, but
it is in better understanding when states respect the really difficult rights, like worker rights, that
we will expand our understanding of the associates of deep, high quality democracy.
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Conclusions
Perhaps more than any other concept in political science, state capacity has achieved an
ethereal status insomuch that so many recognize its importance while, at the same time, claim
they are unsure exactly what it is. Thus, the main goal of this dissertation was the development
of a multidimensional conceptualization and measure of state capacity that would contribute
towards the research program attempting to close this knowledge gap. Beyond the original
conceptualization and measure of state capacity was a pilot test of sorts examining the
relationship between state capacity and human rights; allowing us a better understanding of
patterns of government respect for a range of human rights, particularly physical integrity rights
and empowerment rights. My findings suggest that the level of governmental respect for each
right studied is indeed influenced by the level and type of state capacity upon which governments
can draw.
The empirical analyses in the dissertation suggest several important lessons, for policy
makers and activists alike, concerning how to best confront human rights challenges facing
states. Below, I enumerate some of the central lessons from this study and offer some directions
for future research.
Lesson 1: State Capacity Is Multidimensional
I was able to empirically confirm that state capacity is multidimensional, offering support
for what others have long-suspected, but few have rigorously tested (Skocpol 1985; DeRouen
and Sobek 2004; Young 2009). Critically, this lesson contradicts much of the work described in
chapter one of this dissertation: that state capacity rests on one dimension, the quality of state
institutions (Hendrix 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Or, that capacity can be captured
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using one or two proxies, such as wealth (Fearon and Laitin 2003) or taxes collected (FauvelleAymar 1999). In chapter two, I factor analyze seventeen indicators often linked to state capacity
by previous research. What I find is that state capacity has five core dimensions, which I name
administrative-extractive, international-power, reach-coastal, coercive-rentier, and socialcohesion. I argue that each of these dimensions of state capacity is important to a state’s ability
to take a particular action, and the level of each of these types of state capacity will influence
both how governments make decisions and take action in their respective states.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that moves beyond simply looking at
domestic government capacity (government vs. society) by incorporating the important idea of
international autonomy, or power, into a conception of state capacity. Finally, my
conceptualization also accounts for the fact that there are some things states can control and
some things states cannot control, like its geography, natural resources, climate, and ethnic and
religious diversity. In these regards, states must play the hand they are dealt and, certainly, some
states use what they have more effectively than others, even given that their options are
constrained by these realities.
Another important contribution this dissertation makes to the state capacity literature is
that by using factor analysis to discover the different dimensions of state capacity, I
simultaneously test numerous theories about how different attributes of states interact to form
the basis of a state’s ability to take action. For example, the administrative-extractive dimension
of state capacity includes indicators of high quality institutions and indicators of favorable
geography including temperate climate conditions, as well as proximity to major trading hubs.
Geography is often linked by economists and political scientists to both economic growth and
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political development (Krugman 1991; Gallup and Sachs 1999; Diamond 1997; Acemoglu and
Robinson 1999). My findings are supportive of this body of work.
It is often argued that large and powerful states behave differently both domestically and
internationally, (Mearsheimer 1996, 2001; Bueno De Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992;
Senese and Vasquez 2008) so including an international dimension of state capacity allows for
better understanding of the behavior of powerful states. Specifically, including an international
dimension of state capacity in future research might help develop understandings of the so-called
“two-level game” governments must play with respect to their international and domestic
behavior (Gourevitch 1978; Putnam 1988).
The factor analyses also confirmed the idea that the concept of institutional reach is
important and also has geographical associates, specifically large amounts of coastal territory.
The discovery of reach-coastal state capacity fits with the concept in international relations of
“infrastructural power” developed by Mann (1993) and tested by others like Fortin (2012).
Including an indicator of this type of state capacity in future analyses will help to better
understand how different elements of institutional “control” over territory influence
governmental behavior, particularly when contrasted with the administrative-extractive
dimension of state capacity.
Coercive and rentier capabilities are associated in the factor analyses, and this fits with
current theories of how rentier states emerge and operate (Karl 1997; Ross 2004). This finding
supports the idea that governments who extract rents are likely to view internal struggles for
political power as a zero-sum game, and to build up a large coercive apparatus to maintain
absolute control over the sources of revenue.
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Finally, despite not being highly correlated, high levels of both religious and ethnic
homogeneity, and low levels of rentier capacity, form the final dimension of state capacity. This
social-cohesion dimension of state capacity fits with existing theories of how greater levels of
homogeneity lower the state’s level of political upheaval, civil conflict, and poor economic
growth (Horowitz 1985; Sambanis 2001; 2004). That rentier capacity is negatively associated
with the social-cohesion dimension also highlights one of the key causal mechanisms linked to
why fractionalized societies have challenges homogenous societies do not; that is that ethnic and
religious groups will attempt to use social divisions to achieve greater control over state
resources (Horowitz 1993).
Lesson 2: Respecting Complex Rights Requires Complex Institutions
Respect for rights requiring dramatic cultural shifts in how governmental and corporate
agents interact with citizens necessitates institutions with high levels of technical capabilities and
resources. For example, chapter three’s analyses show that the level of administrative-extractive
capacity on which a government can draw is the most influential variable in explaining respect
for the right prohibiting torture. As Cingranelli and Richards (1999) note, the right prohibiting
torture is widely violated by states often regardless of regime type, level of development, or a
number of other hypothesized factors. They claim the reason for this is because refraining from
torture often requires the oversight of numerous levels of military, law enforcement, and
intelligence agents, as well as the ability to incentivize dramatic culture shifts at all levels of
government-society relations. Indeed, the fact that all physical integrity rights are often
dependent on many levels of government changing their behavior, it is no surprise that
administrative-extractive capacity is the only dimension of state capacity that is statistically
significant and positively associated with governmental respect for all four rights.
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The importance of the sophisticated institutional capabilities captured by the
administrative-extractive dimension of state capacity is further highlighted by the finding in
chapter four, on empowerment rights. In this case, administrative-extractive capacity is only
statistically significant and positively associated with governmental respect for workers’ rights.
As with respecting the right prohibiting torture, respect for worker rights requires high levels of
government oversight and regulatory capability. Workers’ rights include the assurances of the
freedoms of workers to association, to organize and collectively bargain, to no compulsory labor,
to a minimum age of employment for children, and to acceptable conditions of work including
minimum wages, hours, and occupational safety and health. These rights have proved so difficult
for developing states to respect, many advocate that developed countries with strong institutions
must take it upon themselves to enforce these rights in developing countries (Compa 2002;
Alston 2004).
Lesson 3: No Dimension of State Capacity Is Universally Good
While it might be tempting to think that some dimensions of state capacity could exert a
positive influence on governmental respect for all human rights, my findings suggest that such an
expectation is incorrect. For example, the two dimensions of state capacity most associated with
strong, technically advanced, and efficient governmental institutions -- reach-coastal capacity
and administrative-extractive capacity -- have a negative influence on governmental respect for
some rights. Reach-coastal capacity, while positive (leading to greater respect) for the rights to
free speech and free religion, is negative (leading to less respect) for the rights to political
imprisonment and disappearances. Administrative-extractive capacity is negatively associated
with the right to freedom of foreign movement.
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The mixed effect of both of these dimensions of state capacity highlights that sometimes
a technically-proficient government with high quality institutions can use that capacity to repress
its citizens rather than respect their rights. All too often, governments might use their strong
institutions to monitor their citizens, leading to unfortunate ends when it comes to respect for
some human rights. This could be a sign of the phenomenon named “governmentality” by
Foucault (1980). A number of works in the study of international relations have focused on the
powerful effect of the sovereign state system and its ability to enforce compliance on citizens in
both violent and non-violent ways (Larner and Walters 2004). While not always a bad thing, the
restrictions on the freedom of movement allowed by greater institutional capacity warrants
further investigation.
Similarly, the social-cohesion dimension of state capacity, when statistically significant
(a rare occasion) has mixed results for rights respect. Social-cohesion improves state respect for
the right to foreign movement but lowers state respect for the right protecting against political
imprisonment. The negative effect of social-cohesion capacity has on rights respect may be
explained by the effect of the so-called “tyrannical majority” (Davenport 2007) on political
opposition. As well, this finding also fits with studies that find there might be a perfect level of
diversity that creates incentives for groups to compromise rather than simply oppress small
minorities (Collier and Binswanger 1999; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000).
In the end, the fact that no dimension of state capacity is always positive in its influence
on human rights indicates the need for further research on finding thresholds above or below
which different dimensions of state capacity might be good or bad news for governmental
respect for different rights. Furthermore, while beyond the scope of this dissertation, there may
be potential interaction effects between different elements of state capacity and other control
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variables that influence when a dimension is more or less likely to lead to increased
governmental respect for different rights.
Lesson 4: When Influential, International-Power and Coercive-Rentier Capacity Are Bad
For Human Rights.
All things being equal, higher levels of the international-power and coercive-rentier
dimensions of state capacity are bad for human rights. Specifically, international-power is
negatively associated with governmental respect for the right prohibiting disappearance and the
right to freedom of religion. Coercive-rentier capacity is negatively associated with respect for
the rights to freedoms of association, speech, and domestic movement, and the right prohibiting
political imprisonment. There are several potential explanations for these findings. First, power
is often viewed in a negative light by scholars and advocates of human rights (Ignatieff 2005;
Mertus 2004; Walldorf 2009). One argument is that power causes governments to place national
and international security interests above respect for human rights. These states are more often
involved in conflicts, charged with maintaining international peace and stability, and their
governments might use this as a pre-text for engaging in human rights violations of their citizens
who protest against their actions. States with power also often become the target of both
domestic and international terrorists and use this threat as a pre-text for violating the rights in the
name of domestic security. Finally, international power also has an insulating quality that creates
an environment of impunity for government officials who order human rights violations.
Governments can use their involvement in international conflict to create a rally-around-the-flag
mentality to avoid criticism. These governments can also resist any pressure from the
international community to change their behaviors and prosecute wrong doing at the highest
levels of government.
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Second, the coercive-rentier dimension of state capacity changes the decision-making
calculus of leaders for the worse because it couples power over citizens with little accountability.
Higher levels of coercive-rentier capacity means that states can more easily crush political
opposition than states with low levels of this dimension of capacity. It also means that the costs
of incorporating political opposition are often high, given the desire of political elites to continue
extracting rents from the state’s natural resources. Ceding power to opponents will result in a
corresponding drop in rent-seeking behavior. Finally, these states often view political power as a
zero-sum game since political opposition will often demand greater distribution of resource
wealth. The governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Eritrea, Bahrain, Burundi, and Syria are all
examples of entities that exhibit these tendencies.
Lesson 5: Democracy and Wealth Are Not Panaceas for Human Rights
Higher levels of democracy and wealth are widely thought to be the most important
factors towards improving a government’s human rights practices. States with higher levels of
democracy are assumed to be capable of incorporating political opposition, making repressing
unnecessary (Tilly 2003; 2006). Further, leaders in a democracy can be held accountable so the
costs of repression act as a disincentive (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Bueno De Mesquita
2005). Wealth is thought to make respect for human rights more likely because wealthier states
are often more democratic, and/or wealth undermines one of main sources of political
grievances, poverty, that can necessitate repression (Poe and Tate 1994).
While democracy was found in this dissertation to be the most important factor in
explaining state respect for empowerment rights, its influence varied among particular
empowerment rights. For example, democracy is most influential in explaining state respect for
the right to electoral self-determination and least influential in explaining the right to freedom of
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religion and workers rights. This finding offers support for the idea that majorities in a
democracy can sometimes restrict the rights of labor or religious minorities, a potential problem
noted by Donnelly (1999). Particularly for freedom of religion it appears international power
might exacerbate the effects in some countries of the tyrannical majority. States like France, the
United Kingdom, and India, all score highly on this dimension and have mixed records on
respecting religious freedom.
For physical integrity rights, the effect of democracy is much murkier when state capacity
is included in an analysis. Democracy is only significant in explaining the respect for the rights
prohibiting political imprisonment and extrajudicial killings. Moreover, democracy has opposite
effects on respect for these two rights: negatively associated political imprisonment and
positively associated with respect for extrajudicial killings. This finding, coupled with its noneffect for torture and disappearances, suggests that some democracies are permissive when it
comes to violating physical integrity rights. This might be because of a tyrannical majority
feeling threatened by a minority political group and thus supporting violations.
On balance, democracy is certainly good for human rights, though the findings here
suggest it is no panacea for government repression. Ultimately, more work should be done to
examine how democracy interacts with other factors in explaining governmental respect for
human rights.
Lesson 6: Better Data, and More-Tailored Study of Each Individual Human Right, are
Necessary.
There are numerous ways to potentially improve our understanding of how state capacity
influences respect for human rights. First, the different dimensions of state capacity should be
continually refined by developing more-complete data sets. As always, missing data and the
temporal limitations of available data can bias results. While my data cover nearly 100 states that
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encompass 85% of the world’s population, for many of the years between 1981 and 2010, there
are still many gaps that should be filled in as sources of raw-data improve.
Second, knowing that different combinations of explanatory factors lead to different
predicted outcomes of respect for different human rights emphasizes the need for more-specific
analyses of respect for each, individual human right. Many quantitative studies, for example, use
the same set of control and explanatory factors for each right (Poe and Tate 1994; 1998;
Davenport 1995; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Richards and Gelleny 2001; Young 2009;
Englehart 2009; Cole 2015). This dissertation does the same, as this approach is useful for work
seeking to establish general patters in state respect within a new context, such as here with state
capacity. However, beyond establishing general patterns, it is probable that there is important
variation in what factors explain state respect across a variety of rights. That there are likely to be
unique factor sets associated with particular rights is often explored in qualitative work, and
more quantitative work should follow suit.
Similarly, there are still relatively few quantitative studies that disaggregate physical
integrity rights and empowerment rights, for individual analysis. My finding that associates
differ for almost every right reinforces that doing disaggregated analysis is important to
understanding the policy patterns of governments with regards to respect for human rights.
Moreover, while there is a large extant literature on government respect for physical integrity
rights, empowerment rights remain understudied. Growing our understanding of respect for
empowerment rights should be an important goal of the general human rights research program
in political science, as knowing something about the pattern and sequence of state respect for
these rights could help shed light on important issues such as democratic transitions, democratic
peace theory, and post-civil conflict institution building.
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Finally, more work should be done linking state capacity to specific policies designed to
improve government respect for human rights; particularly, how the international community and
domestic actors can work together to improve the relevant dimensions of state capacity when
there is a problem with a government respecting a particular right or set of rights. Continuing to
examine the important concept of state capacity is crucial to bridging the gap between theory and
practice for human rights, an important endeavor for scholars and policy-makers alike.
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Chapter 2 Appendix

Table 2.1A: Countries Included in the Full Factor Analysis
Albania
Dominican Republic Kenya
Portugal
Algeria
Ecuador
Korea, Republic of
Romania
Argentina
Egypt
Kuwait
Senegal
Armenia
El Salvador
Kyrgyz Republic
Singapore
Australia
Estonia
Latvia
Slovak Republic
Austria
Ethiopia
Lebanon
South Africa
Bangladesh
Finland
Lithuania
Spain
Belarus
France
Malaysia
Sri Lanka
Belgium
Gabon
Mexico
Sudan
Benin
Georgia
Moldova
Sweden
Bolivia
Ghana
Mongolia
Switzerland
Bulgaria
Greece
Morocco
Syria
Cambodia
Guatemala
Mozambique
Tajikistan
Cameroon
Haiti
Nepal
Thailand
Canada
Honduras
Netherlands
Togo
Chad
Hungary
New Zealand
Trinidad and Tobago
Chile
India
Nicaragua
Tunisia
China
Indonesia
Norway
Ukraine
Colombia
Iran
Oman
United Kingdom
Congo, Dem. Republic of Ireland
Pakistan
United States of America
Congo, Republic of
Israel
Panama
Uruguay
Costa Rica
Italy
Papua New Guinea
Venezuela
Cote d'Ivoire
Jamaica
Paraguay
Zambia
Croatia
Japan
Peru
Zimbabwe
Czech Republic
Jordan
Philippines
Denmark
Kazakhstan
Poland
Summing the population figures from the COW database in 2008 for these 102 countries amounts to 6
billion people or 85% of the total world population
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